

A
REPLY
TO
Mr. Baxter's

Pretended Confutation of a Book
Entituled,
*Separation of Churches from Episco-
pal Government, &c.* proved
SCHISMATICAL.

To be read,

Three Letters written in the Year 1673, con-
cerning the Possibility of Discipline under a Diocesan
Government, (which though relating to the Subject of
most of his late Books, have never yet been Answered.)

By HENRY DODWELL, M. A. and sometimes
Fellow of Trinity College near Dublin in Ireland.

I scold them not, nor commanded them; therefore they shall not prophesy
people at all, saith the Lord. Jer. 23. 32.

Reader, take heed of believing words of reproach against *Adversaries*,
when Interest and Siding hath made men partial. Mr. Baxter's An-
swer to Dr. Stillingfleet, p. 81.

London, Printed for Benj. Tooke at the Ship in S. Paul's
Churchyard. 1681.



TO THE

Right Reverend Father in God,

Dr. WILLIAM LLOYD,

L. Bishop of S. Asaph.

My dearest and most honoured Lord,

I Am not a Person who ever had any design on Patrons, and am therefore little used to this Ceremony of Dedications, being withall sensible how insignificant it is in many other regards. But I cannot satisfie my self if I should omit this occasion of a Publick Acknowledgment of those many Favours I have received from your Lordship, ever since I had the happiness to be personally known unto you. I will not trouble you with an Enumeration of the Particulars, I know you had rather do them

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than hear of them. But I have several peculiar Reasons for this Address: The Possibility of Discipline in a Diocesan Jurisdiction is a Subject nearly concerning your Lordship upon your new Promotion, and I hope your Lordship will let Mr. Baxter see from your own experience, that it is as practicable in a Diocese, as in his Worcestershire Association. He allows no preeminence of one Minister above others, in order to the forming such Associations for great and generous designs, but what results from the difference of Talents. But certainly where, besides this preeminence in Talents, there is also a preeminence in Office too; where besides these gifts and qualifications of a Person to persuade his Brethren, there is also an antecedent obligation incumbent on them to hearken to his persuasions, it cannot choose but add considerably to the efficacy of such

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such his *persuasions*, both to engage them at first, and to *hold them together* when they are once engaged. This *assistance* therefore I hope for from your *Lordship*, that you will help me to convince him from his *own Topick of Experience*, and that you will give him an *experimient* of his own Age and Country, that he may not still complain of being remitted to Ancient and Forein Precedents.

Besides, you have given me hopes of an assistance in the *Dispute* it self, by Publishing a Discourse concerning the *Ancient Church-Government in these Islands*. You will there let him see his great mistakes in our ancient *Irish*, and *Scotish*, and *British History*, concerning the *Palladian* and *Anti-Palladian Bishops*, as he is pleased to distinguish them; and not onely his mistakes, but *Seldens* and *Blondells*, and the most ac-

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curate Antiquaries of the contrary Party. I am glad that I have given the occasion of it, by which I hope I shall do the World service, though I cannot by any thing of my own. I have no more to say, but to return my heartiest thanks for it, and remain,

My dearest Lord,

*Your Lordships most obsequious
obliged Servant,*

HENRY DODWELL.

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§ I.
*The true
and onely
way of
Conc. part
3. chap. 9.

MR. Baxter in a late Book of his bestowed one whole Chapter on the Confutation of my Schismatical Book (so he is also pleased to call it) of SCHISM. I wish with all my heart he had confined himself to my Book, and forbore *unbecoming*, as well as *undeserved*, Insinuations concerning my Person. I mean particularly those Suggestions concerning *Communion*, which most oblige me on the account of *conscience* to take notice of them; and which notwithstanding can hardly be discussed, without what I am otherwise so averse to, some *consequential* Reflection on *him*. He has indeed put me in hopes of some amends for it. If he perform it, it will be well for his *own sake*. For *my part* I do not intend to

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depend* on it. I know how ordinary it is for the *Nonconformists* to asperse that same Religion, which has been settled here by those *Laws* and *Legislators*, who first excluded *Popery*, with that same odious Name, against which those *Laws* and *Legislators* were deservedly so zealous. We know how very lately they have again been endeavouring it, and even at a time when themselves pretended a cordial union among *Protestants* so very necessary. I know particularly how Mr. *Baxter* has been guilty of it in his Book of the *Grotian Religion*. I know how

*This I had written before I had seen the Admonition prefixed to his Church History, where he pretends to make me the amends. he had promised, but still leaves it as a dispute what I really am, to be

determined not from his Testimony, but from my Book. We had at his own nomination referred the form of his Purgation to the excellent Dean of Canterbury, to whom I had expressly given warning of such slippery forms, from some trial I had of him both in Discourse, and in a Letter; but he never consulted him. By this it appears how little reason I had to depend on him. However I am glad he has acquainted the Reader with the true reason of these disingenuous Suspicions concerning me, that he has referred him to my Books. He cannot mean my two Books designedly against the Romanists, but only the last of Schism. Upon which the Controversie will be reduced to this short issue; They who will have the defence of Ecclesiastical Authority to pass for Popery will judge me a Papist; but they who will take the estimate of Popery from what the Laws and Church of England has condemned under that name, will find no shadow for so base an Accusation. I am heartily content to abide this trial; but Mr. Baxter had dealt more sincerely, if he (who is, on other occasions where there is no need, so offended at others for not explaining terms not understood by the parties in different senses) had been here as careful to warn his Reader, that this was all he meant by the name of Popery. He cannot but know, that the Commonalty, to whom he would make me odious by this insinuation, mean far different and worse things by it, than the bare defence of Ecclesiastical Authority free from any of the Romish Encroachments and Usurpations.

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Moderation in the *Disputes* of *Christendom* is apt to be so miscalled by these, who so much pretend themselves to *Moderation*. What difference is there betwixt that which was decried as *Grotianism* in those excellent persons Bishop *Bramhall* and Doctor *Pierce*; and that which is so much applauded as equal and candid dealing in *Monsieur le Blanc*, Mr. *Baxter* himself, and as many of that Party as have affected the praise of being Men of *Healing Principles*? I know how the defence of *Order*, and *Discipline*, and *Ec- clestiaſtical Power*, is apt to be so miscalled by them. And far be it from me that I should endeavour to purchase their good word or opinion, by deserting such Causes as these, let them call them by what odious names they please. For others who are more *equal Judges*, I think I have as much to say to clear my self from the imputation of *Popery*, as Mr. *Baxter* himself has, or can have. I mention not my Education from the beginning in the *Communion* of the *Church of England*, and never varying from it. I mention not my *Renunciation of Popery* when I was made Fellow of the College of *Dublin*, which he seems willing to asperse, because I had once the honour to be a Member

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ber of it. I mention not my *Books* against *Popery*, in one of which I have endeavoured to prove, that the Doctrines of the Church, as well as the Court, of Rome are *treasonable*; which let any equal person think what service it could do them, by one who must be supposed onely to dissemble himself of another Communion. I mention not the *Witnesses* of my Life in those places where I have spent the greatest part of it.

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concern-
ment.

MY present communicating with the Church of England, and none other, will with equal Judges, who will allow any possibility for Protestants to clear themselves from the imputation of *Popery*, when charged on them in times of *ill design*, be a sufficient Purgation, notwithstanding his Cavils to the contrary. If my mind should change, (as at present I foresee no probability that it ever will) I hope in God that greater Fears than those I have from him, shall never force me to *dissemble*. At present I intend, that this shall not fright me from any reasonable Candour to *Papists*, as well as other Adversaries. And this methinks a *Peace-maker*, and a person of that *Catholick* temper to which Mr. Baxter does so pretend, should not be angry

¶ II.

Part 3. ch.
9. Sect. 32.

Terms of
Conc. part
2. chap. 5.
sect. 39.

at, who can himself (when he thinks fit) give a just Character of what he thinks commendable in them. But I am weary of such Personal Subjects, in which the Publick is so little concern'd; and I am not willing to make this *slander* look too like a matter of *real dispute* by too solicitous a defence. All I shall say further for my own vindication in this matter is, that I challenge the *justice* of them that know me, and that I claim the *charity* of those who do not, till they have better information, than the *Surmises*, rather than *Arguments*, of this otherwise *good man* in his passion. I dare stand by an Authority which he cannot well decline; it is his *own* against *himself* in this very Book wherein he has traduced me. Himself has observed how ordinary it is to charge even *just moderation* in Disputes wherein the *Papists* are concerned with *Grotianism*; no doubt out of a consciousness of his own guilt, for I believe he is himself the *principal* (if not the *only*) Author of the charge of *Grotianism* to the Sons of the *Church of England*. Himself has also observed how not *only the common gang*, but even *learned men*, yea and *zealous religious men* are to be *suspected in their evil Characters*, and *Reports*

Part 3. Ch.
2. Sect. 11.

Part 1. Ch.
13. Sect. 2.

in defence of my Book of Schism.

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ports of those that they are speaking against as Adversaries. And he says, It grieveth him to think how little most Adversaries in this case are to be believed. So that without disparagement to his acknowledged zeal and religiousness, the impartial Reader has from himself a sufficient warning to suspect him in this matter.

FAR be it from me to recriminate, or to return him evil for evil. I have in truth a just Reverence for his Devotional Labours, and the benefit that many Souls have received by them. I have a Reverence for his publick designs of charity, and particularly for that of endeavouring the Peace of Christendom, and am sorry that my agreeing with him in it, (which I hoped might have been an endearment) has in the event proved an occasion of offence. I have withall a Reverence for his years, and am unwilling that the defects of his Age and Controversial Writings, should impair any of that Credit his former and Devotional Writings have justly gained him. On these accounts I most willingly pass by his other personal Reflections on me, which my Conscience will permit me to take no notice of. I pass by even his disrespectful mention of our primitive Forefathers,
of

§ III.

of *Bishops* as *Bishops*, and *Clergie* as *Clergie*, and even of those to whom in his *Episcopal Ordination* he must have promised *Canonical Obedience* antecedently to the *Covenant*. I pass by the *Imperfections* of his way of reasoning used generally in his *later Writings*. I pass by whatsoever may concern his *person*, as far as my *cause* will give me leave. I cannot deny, but some of these may *justly* forfeit him that *reverence* which his other Performances have deserved. But besides my own *unwillingness* to take advantage even of just *Forfeitures*, I have other *prudential reasons* to forbear such a subject. They administer no occasion of promoting useful Knowledge; they are neither likely to be received by others, nor to benefit himself, as proceeding from an *Adversary*.

§ IV.

CONCERNING the *cause* it self I find so little said, as that I had thought to cast my self upon the *candour* of our *disinterested* Readers. But remembering that a *subject* which was wanting here, was given me formerly in these Letters which pass'd between us some years since, upon the Publication of my *Letters of Advice*; remembering that the *same things* which had been objected then, are still objected anew in this, and his other late

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late Books, without * the least notice of those Answers which had been so long since returned to them; considering withal, that that Subject was new, and not, that I knew of, considered professedly in any modern Discourse; I thought it not unreasonable to take this occasion of publishing them, the rather because they may serve as an Answer to the

greatest part of the Argument of his Book; and because what new matter is here urged, might conveniently enough be included in a Preface. But because I had desired him not to publish any thing without common consent; and because I wanted the Copies of his Letters, which I (being to keep the Originals) did therefore not transcribe, but yet could not now come at, because they were in Ireland, and are mislaid since my departure; and because I was willing to take leave to correct what I thought amiss in my own Letters, yet so as to do him no wrong by doing so; I therefore craved his concurrence and assistance in the Publication. But

he

* Since my writing of this I find Mr. Baxter once referring to the second of these Letters in his Church History; but he has added nothing that I find against what had here been argued, excepting his account of the small numbers of the Church of Alexandria from Mr. Clarkson, which I should here have considered, if that as well as the rest of the design of his Church History, had not been already undertaken by an excellent and learned Friend, from whom I hope the World will shortly have an account of it.

Let. 3. 507.

3.

he left me to dispose of my own as I thought fit. I have accordingly taken the liberty to expunge some things *personal*, and, but very rarely, to add what might better clear my *own sense*; but was in both as cautious as I could be, not to misrepresent him to his *disadvantage*, and the rather because I wanted his own *Originals*. I have always endeavoured rather to answer his *sense* than his *expressions*, whenever I thought his *expressions* were not so much for the *advantage* of his *cause*. But if any suspect otherwise of an Adversary, I am content, and shall be glad that what I say may pass for a *Reply* rather to his *cause* than his *person*; that he be charged with nothing but what he owns again in this Book, or will own again when there is occasion. I know not what himself can desire more in order to my dealing fairly.

¶ V. TO come therefore more closely to his pretended *Confutation* of my Book, I wonder what it is that any *indifferent* person can indeed *mistake* in it for a *Confutation*. I have given a *Summary* of my whole *design* in the beginning of it; (I wish he had transcribed it where he pretends to give an account of my *Design* and *Doctrine*.) It had certainly been
no

Part 3. ch.
9. sect. 20.

no disparagement to him, to have allowed me for a fitter Interpreter of my own mind than himself) I have digested it into the several *Propositions* whereof it consists, in the *natural order* wherein they follow each other, with reference to the several *Chapters* wherein they are proved, by which the *Reader* may readily inform himself, whether I onely beg, and do not prove, so many things as this reverend person pretends begged and not proved by me. And every *Chapter* has, in the Contents, a general *Analysis* of the *proofs* contained in it. I did prevent all the Answers I know of, not onely in his *Disputations* of *Church Government*, and in *Voe-tius*, but in all others that either I had read or could foresee, though I did not think it needful to make an endless *Application* to every particular *Author* that had written on the subject. Whoever will not believe me let him try, after he has once thoroughly acquainted himself with my *principles*. And what has he done against all this that may deserve the name of a *Confutation*? Has he answered the *proofs*, I do not say of my *whole Work*, but of any *single proposition*, I think I might say, of any one *single Argument* in it? For my part I cannot find one single Instance, and

See the
Summary
at the end
of this Re-
ply.

Ibid. sect.
29.

and let the Reader judge between us. But it may be by *Confuting* he does not mean *Answering*, but *Disproving*. Has he therefore *disproved* any *Answers* on my part, that might either be given *consequently* to my principles, or which were *expressly* given by me? Whoever had designed the Improvement of Knowledge, would have endeavoured the *prevention* of such *Answers*, as might have been made by my principles; but I have not had the favour to have those taken notice of, which were *particularly* and *expressly* given. The Opinion of those who make *Episcopacy* and *Presbytery* not different in order but degree, and the Case of a desolate Island, are still urged and urged as *Arguments*, as confidently as if nothing yet had been said concerning them. Yet I had considered the former in a whole Chapter. Concerning the latter I denied what he said, and gave my *Reasons of denial*: yet has he not been pleased to take any the least notice either of the *denial* or the *disproof*. He tells me that I *call men off to Catholick Unity*, and never tells them what it is, or how it may be known; yet even this I made the subject of a principal part of a Chapter. By which the Reader will judge, who it is that *provokes*

Part 3. ch.
9. sect. 12.

1b. sect. 11.

Ch. 23.

Ch. 28. sect.
29, &c.

Ch. 27.

Part 3. ch.
9. sect. 19.
20.

to write the same things over again. And now when neither Proofs are answered, nor Answers disproved, how can that properly be called a Confutation?

I KNOW not for my own part what he can mean further by this word but a disproof of my conclusion, though without any particular application to my Principles. And if this must pass for a Confutation, why may not my Book, though written the former of the two, be called a Confutation of his, as well as his a Confutation of mine? For if my conclusion must therefore be supposed false, because inconsistent with what he has proved true; why must not his be for the same reason supposed false, because inconsistent with what I have proved true also? But yet even in this way of Confutation, of disproving falsehoods by proving truths inconsistent with them, it ought to be considered, whether all the Answers that may be given in defence of my principal Conclusion be proved false, as well as the Conclusion defended by them, though their Phenomena were not particularly accounted for? Or at least whether his disproofs be of themselves more certain or more evident to us, than those Arguments by which I had positively proved

¶ VI.

ved it? If neither of these can be pretended in his case, with what Justice can he call his Performance a *Confutation*? And not now to enter into the particular merit of his *cause*, let us see whether his *disproof* will endure a tryal by even these *presumptions*. He says, that *Church Power* is given *immediately by God*, and therefore may be *had* rather where it is not *received* by the *Ministry of Men*, nor can be *diminished* by any intention of theirs from whom it is *received*. This he proves from two *Similitudes*, that of the *Power* of a *Corporation* given by the *Charter*, (which

Ch. 20. sect. 21.

been his custom to take notice of any *Answers*) and that of a *Husband* over the *Wife*. Suppose I shall at present be so kind, (and he must indeed acknowledge it for a *kindness*) as to let his *Similitudes* pass for *Arguments*; yet who can be so extremely *partial*, as to think them *comparable* with those used by me, deduced *a priori*, from the *nature* and first *original* of *Ecclesiastical Power*? Wise men value any *Arguments* whatsoever before *Similitudes*. How much more such as these, which are acknowledged to be, in their own *nature*, the *strongest* of all *Arguments*?

HAS he therefore proved what is said in defence of my principal Conclusion false, as well as the Conclusion it self? Has he proved that our title to the benefits of the Gospel does not depend on the actual promise of God? or that our title to his eternal promises is not to be derived from our Interest in his Covenant? or that our legal Interest in the Covenant is not obtained by the Seals? or that the validity of the Seals does not require Authority in him who presumes to use them? or that the same Reasons which made this Authority necessary for this validity of the Seals, will not hold now (as well as they did in the days of the Apostles) and for ever? Does he deny any of these things? can he in the least pretend to have disproved them? Do any of his Arguments reach them either directly, or by any clear and necessary consequence? Can he defend his Brethrens Ordinations or Sacraments administered by them who never received Episcopal Orders? If he have done none of all these, nor so much as attempted them, what will become of his pretended Confutation?

¶ VII.

TILL he do, or attempt these things, I cannot conceive how he can pretend to prove my Doctrine false. All that

¶ VIII.

that he endeavours is to make it *popularly odious*. That is the tendency of all those *odious consequences* which he deduces from it, concerning my *unchurching* and *unchristening* such *multitudes* of *Christians* and *Churches*. The *consequences* are of his *own* deducing. I undertake not to judge where I am not thoroughly informed in the *matter of fact*. But what if these *consequences* should really follow? will he thence conclude my *reasonings* false, because *multitudes* are concerned in the *consequences* of them? This also was an *Objection* prevented and accounted for in my *Preface*, if he had thought himself obliged to speak to *Answers* in his *Confutations*. But does he not know that this very *same Objection* was made use of by the *Heathens* against *Christianity*, and by the *Romanists* against the *Reformation*, that if either *Christianity* or *Protestancy* were the only true way to *Salvation* exclusively to others; then much the greater number of *Mankind* or *Christians* must have been out of the *true way* of *Salvation*? And can he deny that the *matter of fact* was true, that there was indeed a time when *Heathens* were more numerous than *Christians*, and *Romanists* than *Protestants*? Will he therefore grant that

Pref. Sect.
II, &c.

that *Christianity* and *Protestancy* were not the onely ordinary true *means of Salvation*? I know he will be far from saying so. But yet he is not sensible how much *himself* is more concerned in the Consequence of this Discourse than I am. He that in his *Diocesan Ordination* must have promised *Canonical Obedience* to his *Ordinary*, cannot renounce our *Diocesan Communion* as *Diocesan*, without some charge of sin, greater than the sin of *breaking his Promise of Canonical Obedience*. And if this sin agree to *Diocesan Communion* as *Diocesan*, then certainly it must be not onely a single act of sin, but a *state of sin*; and such a *state of sin* as all will acknowledge *destructive of Salvation*, so agreeing to *Diocesan Communion* as *Diocesan*, it must agree to all *Diocesan Communion* whatsoever. And if all *Diocesan Communion* as *Diocesan* be *destructive of Salvation*, how much more *uncharitable* will he prove than I, if to maintain principles from whence consequences will follow, which will prove hurtful to *faulty persons*, must be thought *uncharitable*? How few are those *Protestants* that want *Episcopal Ordination* (who can alone seem chargeable with the consequences of my Discourse) in comparison of the whole *Greek*

and *Latin Churches*, and those other *Foreign Protestants* also, as well as those of our own *Dominions*, which will be concerned in the *consequences* of his? I might here declame as tragically as he does, and retort a great part of his own Discourse upon himself, if I were desirous to take advantage of *this Topick* against him, not so much to prove his *Doctrin* false, as to expose it as *odious*. If he will say, that he has notwithstanding *charitable thoughts* concerning the *persons* of many, who differ from him in *principles* of their own *nature* destructive of Salvation: Abate his affection to his *party*, which makes him (as his matter requires) speak inconsistently; and I think I shall allow as much *candour* and *charity* to the *persons* of Dissenters, as he can *rationaly*, and with any *consistency* with any, even his own *principles*.

§ IX.

IF therefore it be granted, that these *consequences* are no *just argument* to prove the *principles* false from which they follow; it will then follow further, that in order to the *confutation* of my *principles*, he ought not to content himself with deducing these *consequences*, without more distinct *application* to the *principles* themselves; it will follow, that even the *odium* of

of such *consequences* is *irrational and sinful*, and therefore not at all regardable in *conscience*, whatever it may in *prudence*. No truly *conscientious* persons can be offended at *just consequences* from *principles* whose *truth* is not proved questionable, especially where *positive reasons* have been produced for them. And therefore whoever are so, must for that very reason, at least in this *particular*, be presumed not to act *conscienciously*, or consequently to be regardable on account of *conscience*; It will follow, that till he do answer more distinctly to my *principles*, the very *unkindness* of the *application* will be rather his than mine. For till he weaken the *proof* of my *principles*, I shall have reason in all equity to presume them *true*. And if he draw *Inferences* unfavourable to them from *unconvicted principles*, it will be he, not I, that must be responsible, at least for the *application*. If therefore he will not make them less concerned than it is their *Interest* to be in case of *real danger*, let him first secure them from the *danger* by a *conviction* of my *principles*; which when he does, he will have me as well as them indebted to him for the *Obligation*. Till he do so, certainly *plain dealing* and a *fair warning* is the most real

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office of *Friendship*, that can be shewn in case of *danger*. I wish I may, by this intimation, prevail with whosoever shall hereafter trouble themselves to answer me, not to satisfy themselves with invidious *clamours*, and *evasions* of a direct Answer to my *principles*. A direct Answer would better become them, as *Lovers* and *Enquirers of truth*, rather than *Votaries to a Party*; would more tend to the satisfaction of *conscientious Dissenters*; would afford a better subject for *useful information*.

¶ X.

As for *particulars*, there are onely two that I can know of, in which *indifferent Friends* do think me concerned. One is, that he says, and says it more than once, that the Generality of our *Saxon Bishops* derive their Succession from *Aidan* and *Finan*, who (says he) were no Bishops, as *Bede* and others fully testify. So that he says, *The denying the validity of the Ordination by Presbyters, shaketh the Succession of the Episcopal Church of England, and proveth it on that supposition interrupted*. I know not how it becomes him, who himself pretends *Episcopal Ordination*, to discover his Forefathers *nakedness*, if it had been true that is here suggested. But not to expostulate with him concerning the

Premonition. Terms of Conc. p. 11. chap. 5. sect. 23. Church History.

Part 3. ch. 9. sect. 4. 13

the *unkindness* herein shewed to his *Or-
lainers*, what benefit can he do his *own
cause* by this Objection? Would it fol-
low, that his Brethren have *Succession* be-
cause we had fail'd of it? Would it fol-
low, that *Succession* is not necessary, be-
cause none could justifie their Claims by
it? Would it follow, that the *Right of
Ordination* must in course be escheated to
the *Presbyteries*, or the *People*, or the
Magistracy, in case no Right could now be
made out by Derivation from the *Apo-
stles*? If *Succession* be still necessary for
the *validity of Orders*, as it may be not-
withstanding this Argument, till he an-
swer the Arguments produced to *prove* it
necessary; all that he can expect by using
such Arguments as these will be, not to
satisfie us, but to *prove* us as *faulty* as
themselves; not to *quiet the consciences* of
those who should be afraid of *Sacrilegious
Ordinances*, but onely to make them *de-
spair* of ever being quieted. And there-
fore this is an *Answer*, if at all fit to be
insisted on, yet not till he had attempted
a more particular *Answer*.

But, God be praised, we have no need
to be concerned for this *Objection*: Bede
is so far from denying *Aidan* and *Finan* to
have been *Bishops*, as that he expressly
affirms

Bede Hist.
Angl. III.
3.5.

ib. c. 5.

ib. 6.

affirms the contrary. *Oswald* King of *Nor-thumberland* sent to the Elders of the *Scots* for a Bishop; *Antistes* is the word in *Bede's Latine*, and *Biscop* in the *Saxon* of *Alfred*. Accordingly he receives *Pontificem Aidanum* as the *Latine*, or *Biscop* as it is again in the *Saxon*. When this Bishop was come, he has an *Episcopal See* provided for him; so *Bede* most expressly, *Veniente igitur ad se EPISCOPO, Rex hunc Sedis EPISCOPALIS in Insula Lindisfarnensi, ubi ipse petebat, tribuit. Again, Monachus ipse EPISCOPUS Aidanus.* He elsewhere tells us the very time when he was made Bishop, *accepto gradu EPISCOPATUS quo tempore eidem Monasterio Segenius Abbas & Presbyter praecepit.* Where the *Saxon* also gives him the Title of Bishop, though it omits the particularizing of the time when he received it. He therefore also gives an account of the reason why his *Monastery* pitch'd on him particularly as a person fit for that Employment. He tells us, that thereupon they judg'd him *dignum Episcopatu*, that accordingly *illum Ordinantes ad prae-dicandum miserunt.* Again, he is called *Reverendissimus Antistes*, (*Biscop* in the *Saxon*) and *prae-fatus Episcopus.* The same Title is very frequently given him, *cap. 14, 15, 16, 17.*

16,17. & l.4.23,27. l.5.23. so frequently, as that I do not know whether it be worth while to transcribe each particular Instance, and the Time of his *Bisboprick* distinctly noted. So also in his *Epitome* at the Year DCLI, *Aidanus Episcopus defunctus est*. So extremely little occasion he had of even *mistaking* in this matter from *Bede* himself. Nor could he have much greater from those others to whom he refers us, who must have taken what they had from *Bede*, if they had any Authority. The *Saxon Chronicon* transcribes the very words of *Bede's Epitome*, and at the same Year, The like Agreement there is in those who took from him at a greater distance, (a) *Turgotus*, (b) *Simeon Dunelmensis*, (c) *Malmesburienfis*, (d) *Huntington*, &c. if any be yet further curious.

(a,b) *Simeon. Dunelm. in Collect. Seldeni.*

(c) *Malmesb. de gest. Angl. l. 3. de gest. Pontif. Angl. l. 3.*

(d) *Huntingd. Hist. l. 3.*

Nor is *Bede* and his *Transcribers* less clear in the case of *Finan*. *Bede* is most express. Immediately after the death of *Aidan*, he subjoyns, *Successit vero ei in Episcopatum Finan, & ipse illo ab Hii Scotorum insula ac Monasterio destinatus, ac tempore non pauco in EPISCOPATU permansit.* Concerning the Baptism of *Peada* Son of *Pendan*,

Bede Eccl. Hist. III. 17

L. 3. c. 21.

Ibid.

L. 3. c. 22.

Pendan, King of the *Middle Angles* and the *Mercians*, *Baptizatus est ergo à Finano Episcopo*. *Duma* also (mentioned by Mr. Baxter) was sent as Bishop of that new Colony of Christians, *ordinatus à Finano EPISCOPO*. *Sigbercht* King of the *East Saxons* was baptized by the same *Finan*, *Baptizatus est à Finano EPISCOPO*. And when *Cedd* a holy person was invited by *Sigbercht* for the Conversion of his People, he took occasion to make a visit at *Lindisfarn*, the Seat of the *Northumbrian* Bishops, *propter colloquium Finani EPISCOPI*, where he was made Bishop by *Finan*, *vocatis ad se in Ministerium Ordinationis aliis duobus EPISCOPIS*. *Qui, accepto gradu Episcopatus, rediit ad provinciam, & majore autoritate ceptum opus explens, fecit per loca Ecclesias, Presbyteros & Diaconos ordinavit, &c.* We see here how punctual Observers of the Canons these *Scotish Bishops* were, notwithstanding our Adversaries would fain persuade us, that themselves were ordained by *Presbyters*, because the *Monks* of the *Isle of Hii* (though *Bishops*) were subject to their *Abbot*, though onely a *Presbyter* as to the Rules of their *Monastick Discipline*, for the sake of their first Founder *Columba*, who never exceeded the Order of *Presbyter*.

But

But Mr. Baxter would do well to let us know what use they could have had of Bishops at all, if it were not to perform some office, for which no Superiority of their Presbyter Abbot in the Monastery could qualifie them without Bishops. And what either then, or ever was taken for so unseparable a Right of Episcopacy as Ordination? If therefore they were willing their Presbyter Abbot should, for the sake of Columba, have all the Honour of which a Presbyter was capable, and yet thought it necessary to have Bishops also for their Ordinations; is not this a plain Conviction, that they thought this Office of Ordination not performable by single Presbyters? And how had it been an unusual Order, as Bede expressly says it was, that Presbyters (if such onely had been meant by the name of Bishops) should have been subject to the Abbot, who was also a Presbyter? But to fancy that the Offices of Bishops and Presbyters were confounded in those later Ages of which we are discoursing, (whatever they were in the Apostles) is indeed a fancy so extravagant, as Mr. Baxter could hardly have been guilty of, if he had been either so ingenuous or skilful in Church History as he would fain persuade us.

See Bishop
Bramhalls
Vind. of the
Church of
Engl. c. 9.
Bishop
Pearson
Vind. Ign.
l. l. c. 10.

us. But so far were those ancient Scots from invading this *Right of Episcopacy*, that as to *Ordination* they strictly observed even our present *Canons*. Three *Bishops* were at the Consecration of a *Bishop*, who when he was thus consecrated, and not before, had that greater *Authority* of ordaining *Presbyters* and *Deacons*, which it hence appears was not allowed to any under *Bishops*. But to return from whence I have digressed, *Finan* and *Aidan* are both of them expressly said again to have been *Bishops*, and not onely so, but the *Cathedral Church* of *Finan* is mentioned again by *Bede*: *Interim Aidano EPISCOPO de hac vita sublato, Finan pro illo gradum EPISCOPATUS, à Scotis ordinatus ac missus acceperat, qui in insula Landisfarnensi fecit Ecclesiam EPISCOPALI Sedi congruam.* Again, concerning the Dispute between *Wilfred* and *Coleman*, *Facta est autem hac questio Anno Dominicæ Incarnationis DCLXIV, qui fuit annus Oswi Regis XII, EPISCOPATUS autem Scotorum, quem gesserunt in provincia Anglorum, annus XXX, siquidem Aidanus XVII annis, Finan X, Coleman III, EPISCOPATUM tenuere.* Yet after all it is very well known, that our *English Succession*, even in the Kingdom of *Nor-thumberland*,

L.3.c.25.

c.26.

thumberland, was not derived down to us from Coleman, the last of those Scottish Bishops, but from Wilfrede a Saxon who succeeded him. I wish he would not write such things of such consequence, and so often, with such confidence, without once consulting his Authors. As for his other Authors, he would oblige us to tell us who they are, that could know any thing concerning those times, but what they must have from Bede as well as we.

The other particular is that which does indeed look most like reasoning and principles, of any thing that is said by him in his whole Book. And I shall endeavour to shew him all the fair dealing I can, in representing what he says to the best advantage. The Summ therefore of what he says seems most conveniently reducible to these Propositions.

1. That the power of the Ministry is grounded on the gifts and qualifications of the person immediately; so that whoever has those gifts and qualifications, has thereby an essential right to the power; and he that bestows those gifts, does thereby bestow the power; and they who cannot bestow them, cannot consequently dispose of the power.

2. That

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2. That God alone has the disposal of these gifts, and disposes of these gifts immediately, has never impowered men to confer these gifts, but onely to examine and declare them; which Declaration does not make but find them qualified, and consequently impowered, before any humane interposition.

3. That even in the Apostles times these gifts and qualifications were not ordinarily given in Ordination, but supposed to be antecedent to it; as appears from that gift of Prophecy and discerning of Spirits, by which they were enabled to judge who were fit to be ordained; which must have related to gifts and qualifications not given by the Apostles, but by God immediately. And that if any gifts and qualifications were superadded in the very act of Ordination; yet they were extraordinary, and therefore not to be expected by Successors, especially not at this distance of the Age we live in.

4. That these gifts being given by God immediately, and this power being thus necessarily consequent to these gifts; even the designation of the particular person is from God, as well as the investing him with the power. So that all that the interposition of men can do in this matter, cannot be to give any power to the person to be ordained that he had not before; but onely to judge of it in order

to acceptance, as to its exercise. The judgment of the person himself will be necessary in order to his own acceptance. The judgment of the Senior Pastors (not in order to the investing them by Ordination by delivery with the power, as Mr. Baxter speaks in-^{Part 3. c. 9. sect. 7. p. 75} consistently with his own Principles, who acknowledges no power given by the act of Ordination, for I am willing to consider his Cause free from the inconveniences of his management; but) either as they are the ordinary Representatives of the people in accepting, and such as are first to propose whatsoever is to be proposed to the people, even in affairs wherein their suffrages are not ultimately concluded by their Representatives, or as at least the Solemnities of Acceptance are to be transacted by them. The judgment of the people also, as they are the Objects of his Ministry, and as they are supposed on that account to have the original right of Acceptance.

5. That the way to know what persons are by God invested with power, and with what power they are invested, is by the Scriptures. There he is supposed to have described the gifts and qualifications, which when Pastors and People find in any man, they must be supposed to be obliged to accept him. And there he is supposed to have described that power,

power, which himself gives by giving him such gifts and qualifications.

6. That this power being thus given by God immediately, without any humane interposition in the giving it, but onely in the accepting it; consequently the extent of this power must be known by enquiring, not into the mind of the Accepters, but of the giver of it; and the mind of God the giver is to be known onely in the Scriptures.

7. That the extent of this power being thus to be gathered from the Scriptures, as private persons are not obliged to think their Governours Expositions truest, but may with reason and conscience differ from them, (there being nothing requisite for the understanding of the Scriptures, that is capable of being known by the Clergie, which learned Laicks are not as capable of knowing also;) so private persons may believe themselves invested with a power from the Scriptures, which their Superiours neither gave them, nor believe to be the sense of such Scriptures, either that themselves ought to give it as authorized by God to do so, or that God will himself give it immediately.

8. That persons authorized have not onely power to believe what they take to be the sense of the Scriptures, though different from the sense of ordinary Ecclesiastical Governours;

in defence of my Book of Schism.

33

ours; but also to practise their different sense, at least so far as their Authority extends. And therefore if a Bishop or his whole Presbytery, whether in irregular or regular Assemblies, do deny a Presbyter any part of his Office, which indeed they never gave him, neither by any invalid, nor on these principles by any valid, act of theirs; he may notwithstanding use and exercise it as given him by God immediately.

9. That every person for himself, as he is capable of understanding those Scriptures, which describe the extent of the power as any others, though Superiours; but yet is more conscious to himself of his own integrity, in using means to the best of his abilities, and following his own convictions, than any others; so for the gifts and qualifications, which by this Hypothesis confer an immediate title to the Office, he can much better judge than any others, because they are things more within his own cognizance than they can be of any others. So that in order to his own practice, he must on these principles be obliged in reason, and conscience, and prudence, more to rely on his own judgment, than on that of any others.

10. That this power being immediately from God, he is to presume that what God did once give, that he intends still to give till

D

be

he declares his pleasure to the contrary. This Observation will both make Scripture-precedent (which is the utmost they can pretend concerning the power of Church Officers, described in Scripture as in a Charter) an Argument now, and will excuse them from the extreme difficult task to which their ordinary management does oblige them, of proving it obligatory on other principles. For grant it never so mutable in its own nature, yet even mutable Determinations oblige till the Legislators pleasure be known for an actual change. But supposing this power to have been immediately from God, without any so much as interposition of men; supposing therefore (as has been shewed on these principles) that it must appear to us by an express word of God, such as may seem express to us without humane Authority even in the exposition of it; supposing that no such express word of God is ever to be expected for the future: it will follow, that what is left determined any way in the Scripture, must for ever be as secure from an actual change, as if it had been of its own nature immutable. But if the power it self be given by men; then if they will prove it immutable by the men who give it, they must endeavour to prove it either from the nature of the thing, or the continuance of the same reason

reason and circumstances of its first institution, or some express command of God in Scripture, that they should not actually change it; which yet would not prove an invalidity, but onely an irregularity in their doings, supposing the power not to come from God immediately, but by their mediation; which would be much more difficult for them to prove than than they are aware of. Whence it will further follow,

II. That all that others can do, whether Bishops, or Presbyters, or People, cannot be either to give any power, or to inform any person that he has power, which he had (though he knew it not) antecedently to their Declaration; or to hinder him of the exercise of that power which he has, and may know that he has independently on their Declaration: and therefore can be onely to judge for themselves in order to their own acceptance. So that if they refuse him, that cannot in conscience hinder him from either finding, or proselyting others that will accept him. And in the mean time he may exercise that power where he can, and exercise it to the full extent of it, as far as himself conceives it to extend, because he must on these principles be supposed to have it, and to know he has it, whether they accept of it or not.

¶ XII. I KNOW some things are suggested in this way of Management, which are not actually observed by Mr. *Baxter*, nor Mr. *Humfrey*, nor any other that I know of, that has undertaken this *Hypothesis*; and I believe some things, which when they see how consequentially they destroy all *Ecclesiastical Order and Government*, themselves will then perhaps be willing to disown. But I am confident nothing has been added, but what has been for the *advantage* of the *Argument*, and what is consequential and agreeable to the main *Hypothesis*; and for that they must, whether they will or no, be responsible till they are pleased to disown the *Hypothesis* to which it is *consequent*. Certainly it is much more defensible than the bare *Simile's* of the *Husbands power* over the *Wife*, or of the *power* conveyed by an *Original Charter* to all succeeding Posterity. 'Tis true indeed, that no *compact's* of the *Wife* with the *Husband* can diminish that Right which was never given him by any Compact of hers, for that very reason, because *God* never left her at her *liberty*, whether she should be subject or no, but onely to chuse the *person*, to whom she was in particular to pay

pay Subjection. But certainly my Reasoning will hold, if *Ecclesiastical Power* be properly given by the Mediation of those *Ecclesiastical Persons*, who minister in the Act of *Ordination*. And that it is not properly given by them is onely *begged* by that *Similitude*, but *proved* onely by the *Hypothesis* now mentioned. But as for *Charters*, the Instance is very unhappy to their purpose. They cannot, I believe, give an Instance in any *Humane Charters*, where bare *qualifications*, though *acknowledged*, and acknowledged by them who have *power to invest* them in *office*, are thought sufficient to invest them without some *further act* of them who have *power to invest* them. They cannot give an Instance where the Acts of such acknowledgedly *qualified*, but not *invested*, persons are thought *valid in Law*, or the Acts of persons *lawfully invested*, though confessedly less *qualified*, are not thought valid, a plain sign that their *Investiture* does properly *confer* such *power*. They cannot give an Instance of any *power* settled by *Charter*, where upon a failure of all who are by the *Charter* impowered to *dispose of Offices*, that *power* must devolve to those who are not by the *Charter* impowered (on foresight of

such a case) to *dispose* of them, and where such a *Charter* is not thought in *Law* to *fail* by becoming *unpracticable*, till the *supreme* unaccountable *Power* be pleased again to interpose concerning it, which is the very case impugned by me in the *Nonconformists*. They cannot give an Instance of any *Humane Charter*, that ever allows any person impowered, to extend his *own power* by a *private exposition* of the *Charter*, against the sense of all the *visible supreme Powers* of the *Society*; and not onely to *challenge* it (on such an account) but to *practice* it also; or that does *ratifie* such *practice* when attempted; or that does not look on it as *invalid* as well as *irregular*. Yet this is also their Case, who arrogate this *power of ordaining others*, against the *sense and permission* of all their *supreme visible Governours*.

§ XIII. BESIDES, many things are taken for *granted* very confidently in this *Hypothesis*, which they will find extremely difficult to prove when they are put to it. Where can they find such a *Charter* for the *power of Presbyters* in the *Scriptures* as they speak of? Where can they find their *power* described in any *professed Constitution* concerning it? They may indeed some *actual practises* of *Presbyters* there;

there ; but will they call that a *Charter*? Will they make all *actual practises* obligatory for ever, and unalterable by the *prudence of succeeding Ages*? Are not many *actual practises* grounded on *circumstances*? Are not many of those *circumstances* obnoxious to great *mutability*? Are not *ordinary Governours* the competent *Judges* of their *actual change*? If any *practises* be grounded on *unalterable reasons*, it will be by those *reasons* that they must become *unalterable*, not from their being barely *actual practices*, not from their being barely *historically* mentioned in the *Scriptures*. And what is that *reason* that makes such a just *proportion* of power immutably due to the *Office of Presbyters*? Yet when all is done, it is not *reason* but *writing* that makes a *Charter*. Where do they find men plead *Charters* in *humane affairs* upon so weak pretences to them? And where is it that *reason* is admitted to prove the *right* of an *actual practice of power*? *Reason* does indeed prove it fit that men should have that *power* given them which is *reasonable*. Does it therefore follow, that they actually have that *power* which it is *reasonable* they should have? If they actually have it not *given* them, by those who had *power* to *give* it

them, that is sufficient to prove their *practice* of it an *Usurpation*, and utterly *invalid* as to all intents and purposes of *Law*. But for *matter of fact* I do not see but that this *supposition* concerning the inseparable connexion of the *power of Ordination* with the office of a *Presbyter*, will rather *ruine* than *advance* their Cause, as I have accordingly retorted it in my former Book. Since it is certain, that this *power of ordaining* others was not given to the first dividing *Presbyters*, it will follow plainly that they were not made *Presbyters* at all, if the *power of Ordination* be *essential* to the office of a *Presbyter*. And then their *succession* will fail as well on account of their want of *true Presbyters*, as of their *Presbyters* wanting the *power of Ordination*.

§ XIV. BUT neither did I onely overthrow their *succession* on account of their first *Ministers* not receiving this *power of Ordaining* others, from the *Bishops* who ordained them, but from the *invalidity* of that *act* by which they derived their *Orders* to their *Successors*, supposing they had indeed received a *power of Ordination*. Supposing they had it, yet they could not *exercise* it but in *lawful Assemblies*, which none but the *Bishops* as *Presidents* of the *Pres-*

in defence of my Book of Schism.

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Presbyteries had power to indict; nor yet even there, supposing all *Presbyters* equal, could they carry it but by plurality of suffrages. And therefore the generality of their later *Ordinations* being performed by single over-voted persons, without the consent of the greater part of those *Presbyteries* of which they were originally Members, and out of *lawful Assemblies*, must on these accounts be not onely irregular but invalid too. Here therefore no *Presbyters* were at all made, and therefore it is in vain to talk of *Charters* to prove the power of legal *Presbyters*, when these are not the persons of whom those *Charters* speak, and whose power they are conceived to describe. And the same is applicable also to the *Commonalty*. Neither can they exert any power of which they might otherwise have been capable, but by majority of Votes, and in regular *Assemblies*. If they do, it is Null by the fundamental principles even of *Democratical Government*. This therefore will destroy the validity of their second *Ordinations*, though their first had been valid; will null all their *Ordinations* in the state of *Separation*, though the *Orders* received by them in the *Churches Communion* had been as valid, and

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valid to as great purposes, as they can pretend to *prove* by any *Charters*. These are *Arguments* not (that I know of) insisted on by *Jansenius*, not answered by *Voet* or Mr. *Baxter*, not (I believe) thought of or considered either by *them*, or by any *others* of our Adversaries, that have most accurarely managed their *cause*; and will hold if they were as succesful as themselves desire in answering the *others*. The *Hypothesis* therefore thus managed is that which alone it is their Interest to stand by. And if this prove nothing, or nothing to their purpose, we shall have no reason to be very solicitous for any thing else that is pretended by them.

§ XV. I HAVE said several things in answer to this same Argument as urged by Mr. *Humsfrey*, a person of much more *candour and judgment*, and *elaborate thoughtfulness* than Mr. *Baxter*. I am unwilling to repeat any thing there said more than I needs must, though he has served it as he uses to do *Answers*, passed them all by without any notice taken of them. Yet he is the person who has the confidence to complain of being *forced to repetitions*. What I shall now say, shall rather be with a prospect on the *Argument* it self, and with reference to some worthy

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Brethren of our own Communion, than on account of any new Obligation I can think my self under from any thing new observed by Mr. Baxter. First therefore, I shall onely desire at present, that what has been said Chap. XXII. of my former Book, be onely understood on *supposition*, that *Ecclesiastical Power* is not conferred immediately by God, but *mediately* by the interposition of the *Ordainers*. And on that *supposition* I cannot conceive what reason there can be to question it. Who can doubt but that, supposing *Ecclesiastical Power* to be properly their gift, it must be conveyed to others by virtue of some compact of theirs whose gift it is, as all other gifts are to which any one else can pretend a *legal right*? Who can doubt but the *legal validity* of all such Conveyances depends upon that which the Law presumes to be the *intention* of the Giver? Who can doubt but that the Law presumes every one to *mean* that which he *ought to mean*? Who can doubt but that in all like cases of *legal judicature*, that is still presumed to be the *sense* of the Law, which is the *sense* of all the visible *Makers and Executioners of Laws*, no *legal appeal* being ever admitted to Powers *future or invisible*? Who can doubt

doubt that if the *Laws* be competent *Judges* in any case, they are most so in such cases, wherein *publick* not *private* Right is concerned, such as is that of *Ecclesiastical Power*, which is the subject of our present Dispute? Who can doubt but the *visible Powers* of any *Communion* must judge, that all *Ordainers* ought to mean to give that Power, which by the *principles* of their *Communion* is thought proper for the *Office* to which the person is ordained; and to mean to *withhold* that which by the *principles* of their *Communion* is thought *unlawful* to be given to that *Office*? Who can doubt but where it was thought *Heretic* to believe, that *Bishops* and *Presbyters* had the same power, there it must also have been thought *unlawful* to give it them? Who can doubt but that where the *Power of Ordination* was taken for the peculiar *prerogative* of the *Bishop*, there it must have been thought *unlawful* to give this particular *branch of power* to simple *Presbyters*? If all these *suppositions* agree with the *matter of fact* in that Age wherein these *separations* were first made, I cannot possibly conceive how that *power of ordaining others* (on which the *validity* of the present *Sacraments* and *Ordinances* of our several

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ral Sects do at present depend) could have been conveyed to the first *Presbyters* of the several *Parties*, by any *gift* of those *Bishops and Presbyteries* who first *ordained* them. So that if they will pretend at all to have it, they must necessarily bethink themselves of some other *Hypothesis*, such as this, by which they might have it *an-
tecedently* to, and *independently* on, the *gift* of the *Ordainers*.

2. THEREFORE I desire it may be observed further, that this *Hypothesis* is not agreeable to the *notions or practices* of any Party whatsoever, that owns any such thing as *Ecclesiastical Power* for the suppression of *Heretic* or the prevention of *Schism*; but onely for *Enthusiasts*, who utterly *deprive* the Church of any such *power*, or of being a *political Society*. I do not say but that it may follow from some *principles* expressly owned by them, (as particularly from that *principle* so much received among the *Sects*, that it is *dishonourable* to think, that the *Holy Ghost* can be given by any means of *Humane Ministry*, though of his own *Appointment*; for the *giving of the Holy Ghost* was in the *Jewish Theocracy* the exact *Method* of *investing* any with *power*) but onely that it is not agreeable to their

¶ XVI.

their notions and practices concerning Government. For all that hold any such thing as Government must, unless they will make it perfectly useless, own a power of restraining particular persons from Innovation; I mean, which may in conscience oblige such persons, (how different soever from the sentiments of their Superiours, yet) even in conscience to forbear Divisions in the same Churches, or erecting new ones in opposition to those which are already established. But this cannot be maintained by this Hypothesis. For where all that others can do, can neither hinder a private person from Authority, nor from knowing that he has it, not even from such a knowledge as may suffice in conscience, to justify his acting pursuant to that Authority. There it is plain he is under no obligation to forbear drawing parties after him if he can. As for the Interest others have in admitting him for their Minister, that signifies nothing to this purpose: It onely secures that they shall not be drawn away without their own consent. And for that what use is there of Government? If he can persuade and seduce them, he will have the consent of as many as he can persuade and seduce. If he cannot persuade them,

them, it will not be in his power to make any *Divisions*, though there were no such thing as *Government*. And this is the rather so, because in order to *persuasion* there is, on these *principles*, no obligation incumbent on *private persons* from the *Determinations* of *Assemblies*. For as that *private knowledge*, which such a person may have of his own *Authority*, may suffice to justify his own *acting* as a person *authorized*, so the *private evidence* every particular person may have of his *Gifts*, and consequently of his *Authority* grounded on those *Gifts*, may also suffice for to make it lawful for such a person to receive him for his own *private use*, though *over-voted* by the *Suffrages* of *regular Assemblies*. So that for this there is no need of any, so much as *Democratical Authority*. And the same reason which will make this *power* possible to be had without, nay and contrary to, the intention and gift of the *Bishop*, will prove it also possible to be had without any gift of the *Presbytery*, or of the *People* as they are capable of giving any *Authority*, by any *Rules* even of *Democratical Government*.

BUT the *Hypothesis* I am now considering as it agrees with the *principles*, so it

¶ XVII

it fully answers the *designs* of our modern *Enthusiasts*. It agrees with their principles. For these are they who indeed make the *office* immediately consequent to the *gifts*, so that where *women* have the *gifts*, they are thought to have as good a title to the *office* as *men*. These conceive *extraordinary gifts and inspirations* to be common now as well as in the times of the *Apostles*; conceive these *gifts* to be given by God immediately, without dependence on *Sacraments* or *Humane Ministeries*; conceive every one who has the *Spirit*, to have withall the *gift of discerning the Spirit* in himself and others, so that in order to his *own* satisfaction he is conceived to have a surer testimony *within himself* than any *Humane Authority*, yet so as that he cannot deny but that *others* of his Brethren, who are supposed to have the *like gifts*, have also a right to judge of *his gifts* in order to their *own reception*. It answers their *designs*. For receiving their *Authority* immediately from God, it follows in course that they should not *in reason* be responsible to any but him. And as they are not supposed to receive any *Authority* from *men*, so neither is there any rational Obligation for *dependence or subjection to men*. This I warn that

that they, who upon other occasions oppose this *Hypothesis* when maintained by *Enthusiasts*, may see how little it is their *Interest* to be driven to such *principles* as these in their own defence; how much they as well as we are concerned to answer what can be said for them; and how bad that Cause must be, that cannot be maintained but by recourse to such *principles*, as upon other occasions are so disowned by themselves.

THESE things therefore being thus premised, I come now more closely to examine the *Hypothesis* it self. No doubt some *Dispositions* are necessary to qualify men for *Ecclesiastical Offices*. No doubt it is fit that *Ordainers* should judge who have those *Dispositions* before they intrust them with the *Offices* for which they are qualified by such *Dispositions*. No doubt but these *Dispositions* are Gods gifts, not onely on account of that common Providence by which even *natural endowments* are his gifts, but also an account of that *supernatural assistance* which is thought necessary for all *virtues and ordinary graces*, in opposition to the *Pelagians*, and for all eminent *Discriminations* between Men and Men. But these things are not more proper to *Ecclesiastical* than to *Secular Off-*

ces. There is also the like necessity of *Dispositions* for *Secular* as for *Ecclesiastical Employments*. There is a like necessity of *Graces* as well as of *Gifts* among those *Dispositions*. There is a like necessity of *Divine* and *Supernatural Assistance* for those *Graces* which tend to the accomplishing of men for such *Employments*, as there is for those that fit men for *Ecclesiasticals*. Yet who is there that therefore thinks that God gives *Secular Authority* also antecedently to any interposition of *Men*? What *confusions* and *disorders*, what *violations* of *Authority* and *Obedience*, would he introduce in *Seculars* who should think so?

¶ XIX. BUT not to take advantage against these *principles* from the *falsehood* of their *Consequences*, themselves are also very questionable. It is very unreasonable to think that *Authority* must necessarily result from even true *qualifications*; or that it must so depend on them, as that where the persons ordained may want any of them, there the whole *Ordination* must be *Null*, because of the *incapacity* of the matter. I shall speak to both these *Uses* of this *Argument*, because they are both of them, as occasion serves, insisted on by Mr. Baxter. 1. It is unreasonable to conclude that *Authority* must necessarily result even from the true
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qualifications. It is not agreeable to the sentiments of Mankind in *chusing persons qualified.* They certainly suppose persons qualified *antecedently* to their own *election* of them, because their judging them so is the *reason* why they do *elect* them. But do they therefore suppose them already *authorized*? If so, what need of any further act of *giving the power*? How shall they do when they confess *many Candidates* sufficiently qualified for an Office, of which notwithstanding *only one* is capable? Can their *not electing* them *deprive* the persons rejected of their qualifications? Can it upon these principles *deprive* them of their *authority*, if that do necessarily *result* from their qualifications? If it cannot, then in case of an *Elective Kingdom*, all the persons who were admitted as *Candidates* (which they would not have been, if their *Electors* at least had not *judged them qualified*) must, when they are *put by* as well as *before*, be supposed to be *Kings*. And where can such a supposition end but in a *Civil War*? But among all the unreasonable pretensions that have been made by persons *interested*, and of *power* sufficient to prosecute their *Interests* by force, what *History* can afford an instance of

any one who challenged the power onely because he was thought *qualified*, and permitted to stand *Candidate* for it?

¶ XX. **THUS** it is in case of *Supreme Power*, but much more in *Subordinate*. They who have derived the *Supreme Power* from God, that they might this way the better assert their *Unaccountableness* to Men, have for that very reason thought it necessary, that *inferiour Governours* should receive their power from Men, that they may thereby be made *dependent and accountable* to those Men (as well as God) from whom they had received it. And who is there that doubts, but that a *legal warrant* of the meanest *Justice of Peace* is of more force in Law, than the *advice* of the ablest and most prudent *Lawyer*, who is much better *qualified* to be a *Justice* than he who is one? This is the sense of *Mankind*, which (besides that it overthrows the *consequence*, that if the *gifts* of particular Ministers be from God immediately, therefore their *Authority* must be so too, till proved more particularly than as yet they have attempted to prove it) will also be of great moment for proving *Right* in a question of this nature. For that Crimes of *disobedience to Government* may indeed prove *criminal*,
and

and imputable to the person guilty of them, it is requisite that their *criminal-ness* may appear to him from his own *Notions*. And accordingly God has always fitted *Governments* established by himself to the *notions* received among the persons to be governed. If therefore men do take it for the best *preservative of Societies*, to have all *inferiour Governours* obliged to a strict dependence on the *supreme*; and the best *security* of this, that *inferiours*, whatever their *qualifications* be, should yet receive their *power* it self from their *Superiours*; then certainly we have reason to *presume*, even on this account, that this same Method was also observed by God himself in his provisions for *Ecclesiastical Government*.

THIS *presumption* there is, that God would never make this *Authority* immediately consequent to the *qualifications* requisite to dispose men, from the *notions* of Mankind concerning *Government in general*. And as little reason there is to believe it from the *particular principles of Ecclesiastical Government*, those very principles I mean which are owned by themselves when they are *settling*, though they are forgotten and contradicted when they are onely intent upon *overthrowing the Authority*.

rity of their own *Superiours*. When they as well as I make the *power* of the Church a *power of sealing Covenants in Gods Name*, and of *transacting* for him with Mankind, it is strange how they could fall into this mistake, if they had minded being constant to these *principles*. No doubt whoever would imploy a *proxy* to act in his name, and to make *legal covenants* that should oblige himself, would in prudence chuse one that should be skilful in the *Law*, and prudent as well as faithful to his *trust*. But which of themselves would therefore give an *indefinite Authority* to all that were so qualified to seal *legal obligations* for them without a more particular Deputation? Which of them would think themselves *justly* dealt with, or obliged even *in conscience* to performance, if any person whom even themselves could not deny to be so *qualified*, should presume to do so? And can they think God legally obliged in a case, wherein they would think themselves *injured* if it were their own? Is this to judge of God by the same measures by which they would be content to be judged by themselves, which God owns as *just*, and appeals to in the *Prophets*? If themselves think other *qualifications* requisite,

quisite, for *trust* as well as for *abilities* of management of a *trust* to be committed to them, before they think it prudent to entrust a person, even of *known and confessed Abilities*, with a power of *obliging themselves*; has not God the same *frail persons* to deal with, who may fail in *fidelity* to his *trust*, as well as in point of *ability* to discharge it? But to let alone the *inconvenience*, and to insist onely on the *justice* of this Cause; do not themselves look upon this *right* of disposing of what is their *own gift*, and of *impowering others* to do it, as a *right* inherent in themselves, which no other mans *qualifications*, how great or acknowledged soever, can in justice alienate from themselves, or entitle him to, without a more particular *act* of their own? And must the *power* of God in *sealing Covenants* for *Heaven* and the *Holy Ghost*, and *pardon of sins*, escheat to all that are *qualified*, without any more distinct *gift* than that of their *qualifications* themselves? Of the two, certainly the disadvantage does rather lie on the *creature's* side. Their *rights* may indeed be disposed of in some cases *without their own act*, because they are not absolutely at their *own disposal*, but depend on the *pleasure of God*, and of their *lawful Superi-*

ours impowered by him. But the *independency* of the *Divine Right* excludes all *possibility* of any case wherein any *right* of his can be disposed of without his own particular *consent and act* for disposing of it.

¶ XXII. AND yet of all *Rights, Forgiveness* of offences committed against any one, is that which is least capable of a *general alienation*. *Property in Goods*, especially as among Men, depends generally on *compact*s or *positive humane* (and therefore variable) *Constitutions*. But *offences* relate to their *persons*, as also the *grief and resentment* consequent to them, and therefore may be where there is no such thing as *property in goods*; and the remitting of Offences does essentially consist in the remission of that *personal resentment*, and other mischiefs as consequent to it, and therefore must be as *unalienable* from any as his *own person*. As long as his *person* is free and at his own disposal, so long none but *himself* can undertake for the management of his own *resentments*. Though in truth in God his *benefits*, conveyed by this *covenant*, are as *unalienable* without his own *express act*, as his *right* to forgive sins committed against himself. Men may by *general acts* put the *Effects* out of their

their own power to recall them. They may dispossess themselves both of their *goods* and of their *power* to right themselves, and even of their *legal right and equity* by some less prudent management. But neither can God act imprudently, nor are his gifts at the *actual disposal* of his Creatures, even where he has *obliged* himself to ratifie what is engaged for in his name. Even there it is *he*, not the *creature*, that must immediately confer the *Spirit*, and *pardon of sins*, and the *eternal rewards* promised by him. The very *actual giving* them is not in their power. How then can this *right* be granted by God to any without a most particular and express *conveyance*?

YET is not this all; we are to consider further, that in *forgiving or punishing sin* God acts under the notion of a *Governour*. Now a *Governour* has not the same liberty in *forgiving offences* against the publick, and against himself as a *publick person*, as a *private person* may have in remitting *private injuries*. A *private person* need onely consider his own *private interest*, and in doing so he may remit much of his *own right* where no others are concerned. But a *publick person* must consider the *publick interest*, and must not take

A Reply to Mr. Baxter

take any other course in forgiving *publick offences*, than what may be beneficial for the *publick*. *Humane Governours* are obliged hereunto by the *Law of Nature*, by the nature of the *trust* committed to them, by the *implicite interpositions* of *Providence* by which they are made *Governours*, and by the common *dictates* of *natural conscience*. And even God is also obliged to it, not by *imposition* of any *Superiour*, but by his own *natural inclinations*. Having undertaken the *person* of a *Governour*, it is as impossible that he should use any other methods in *pardon- ing* offences against his *Government*, than what is for the benefit of the *Society*, whose *government* he has undertaken, as it is impossible that he should not act *well and wisely*. But who does ever think it fit that *private persons* should have a right to *pardon* or *retain* Offences committed against the *Government*, without a particular *express gift*? Who thinks it fit that they should have a *right* to pass a *pardon* under the *Broad Seal*, and in due *solemnities* of *Law*, for no other reason but onely because they are *qualified* for it? Who thinks such *Pardons* *valid*, or thinks it *just and reasonable* that they should be so? How is it possible that

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Government should ever be maintained, if the right of it be resolved into *pleas* so capable of being made use of by false *pretenders*, and so little *notorious* to *Subjects* that are so highly concern'd in it? How can Government be maintained where *Inferiours* may pardon what their *Superiours* condemn, where *Rebels* may justify or pardon their own *Rebellions*, by as good a *title* as they who are actually possessed of the *Supreme Government*, (as they may certainly do, if *Inferiours* as well as *Superiours* derive their Authority from God *immediately*) where pretended *Expositions of Charters* against the sense of all the present *visible Governours* of a Society must be thought to give men an *authority* here in this Life, which how falsely so ever pretended, must yet by this means be rendered incapable of *conviction* till the day of judgment? For what can in the consequence more necessarily invest men with *authority*, than this power of *pardoning* or *punishing* offences committed against the *publick*?

THUS unreasonable it is to believe, ¶ XXIV that bare *qualifications* do invest any with *actual power*? What can they now pretend further, but an *authority* sufficient to countervail and silence all these contrary
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D. Stearn
de Obsin.

Eph. 4. 11.

Gal. 1. 1.

Reasonings? I repeat not now what I have elsewhere proved, that some *reasons* are such, as to be greater Evidence than any other *authority* whatsoever. I insist not on what might have been said to shew, that the *reasons* now produced are of that sort. But alas, how little do they produce to prove this from *authority*, which yet is the foundation of all their *consequential reasonings*? How much less to prove *their sense* to be the *sense of Scripture*, than what has been produced to prove the *contrary* to be the *sense of God*? They observe, that God is said to have *given some Apostles, some Pastors, &c.* as if their very *gifts* had *made* them so. But where do they find that God ever gave *Bishops, Presbyters, and Deacons*? Will they not allow some *difference* between the *extraordinary offices* there spoken of, and the *ordinary* ones of which we are at present disputing? Will they not allow a *difference* in this very matter of their *gifts*? Whither do they reason so confidently from those *extraordinaries* to these *ordinaries*? Those *extraordinary offices* seem indeed to have been made neither of *man* nor by *man*, but by God himself *immediately*, and possibly by the degrees of their *inspiration* received their several *denominations*

tions of that kind respectively. Thus S. Paul proves his *Apostleship*, which it seems was then called in question by his Rival *false Apostles*, among other Arguments, by that especially, that he was made so before he had ever seen any of the *Apostles*, and when he did see them, that they received him on *equal terms*, and added nothing to him above what he had received before. And what men could pretend to give that Supreme Dignity of the *Apostolical Office* who were not themselves *Apostles*? The like might have been observed concerning others of those extraordinary offices. And I have before conjectured that, according to these extraordinary gifts, so they performed the several Offices of their *Ecclesiastical Assemblies*. So I understand the *ἐκκλησία* and *ἐκκλησία ἐν τῷ πνεύματι*; 1 Cor. 14. 16. to which the *Amen* was in course replied by him who answered among the people, as it was answered in the Office of the *Eucharist* in the time of S. Justin Martyr. And can they desire any more? Yet even then there was this dependence on the ordinary Officers of the Church, that even these extraordinary gifts of the Holy Ghost were generally not given but by that *Imposition of hands*, which usually follow-
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ed after their Baptism, that even then their deviating from the *Spirit* of those from whom they had *received the Spirit* in that office, at least of *confirmation*, was a *presumption* against those who first deviated from their *predecessors*; (so S. Paul proves his own Orthodoxy from his *agreement* with those who were in *Christ* before him, though he had not received his Doctrine from them, and he generally presupposes this Principle in his Disputes against the *disorderly Prophets*.) That there were *manifestations* of the *Spirit*, *signs* of the *Apostleships*, the *gifts of discerning of the Spirits*, and *Judges of the Spirits* for the satisfaction of *others*, not only to judge in order to their *own reception*, (as our Brethren would have it) but to judge so as that they were not to be presumed to have the *Spirit* at all, who could not abide their Judgments, if after their rejection they presumed to exercise any such *gifts* in the state of *Separation*. If they will plead these *extraordinary gifts* themselves, let them grant the continuance of the *like gifts* in their *Superiours*, and we shall be at least secure from any *Schismatical Consequences* of such pretensions. But if they will *alone* challenge this continuance to *themselves*; let them

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consider how *unequal dealing* this is; let them consider how different from their pretended Veneration of *Apostolical Precedents*, when they separate those *gifts* now which then were made *mutually* useful by their *conjunction*; how different this is from the Judgment of the *Apostles* themselves, and consequently of God, by whom the *Apostles* were more particularly inspir'd in what they did relating to these *extraordinaries*, who did not it seems think these pretences to *extraordinaries* safe, without these remedies from the *gifts of others*, and particularly of *Superiours*. Several of these things were already suggested and proved, and will be more particularly in my *Second Part*, if it please God to encourage me to go on with it, by which this whole Reasoning is overthrown, which is drawn from these *Apostolical Precedents*, even in *extraordinaries*.

AS for those *other precedents*, of their *ordinary establishments for Succession*, when these *extraordinary gifts or evidences* of them should fail, (which are in truth the *only precedents* which are pleadable as *arguments* in our *present times*) there is so extremely little in favour of such pretences, as would make one wonder how con-

XXV.

considering persons could fall into such mistakes. The *Inconveniencies and Schisms* resulting from those very pretences to *extraordinaries*, were observed and particularly provided for even in those *Apostolical Ages*. Such were the *Prophets speaking* (a) many of them at once, their using the gift of *Tongues* in the *Ecclesiastical* Offices without an (b) *Interpreter*, the *Prophetesses* using their Gifts in promiscuous Assemblies of (c) *men*, their prophecying as it should seem like the *Sibyls*, with their hair (d) *dishevel'd*, and without their *veils*, unbecoming the modesty of their Sex. How does the *Apostle* provide to remedy these *Inconveniencies*, but by obliging all to a strict dependence on their *Superiours*? by obliging the *Prophets* not to speak but in (e) *order*, not to use their gifts but for (f) *edification*, not to use them (g) *indecorously*, to submit to the (h) *Judges* of their *Prophecies*; by restraining the *women* universally from all (i) *publick exercise of their gifts*; a plain sign that the *Spirit* who gave those gifts, did not thereby exempt any who had them, from their due *Subordinations*, much less did thereby give them the governing power of their *Ecclesiastical Assemblies*, as our Brethren would fain persuade

us. This also was the great occasion of that *Schism* which was the subject of *S. Clement's* Epistle to the *Corinthians*, and that not many years after this former had been written to them by *S. Paul*. The *gifted Brethren* did then also assume, and raised a *Sedition* against the *ordinary Presbyters* of that *Church*, and are again taught their duty of *Obedience, Humility, and Subjection*, through the whole current of that Epistle. How could that be, if their very *gifts* had made them *Presbyters*, when acknowledged, as they are not here denied? This very pretence therefore was particularly and expressly disowned by those very Precedents, to which our Brethren do so eagerly appeal.

ACCORDINGLY they never XXVI find any of those *Officers*, to whom *Succession* is at present pretended, made immediately by *God*, but by the intervention of *men*, notwithstanding that there were then *Gifts of the Spirit* requisite to *qualifie* men for those *offices*. There were the *ἐπισκοπία*, and *ἐκκλησιαστική*, and *γνώσις*, *Rom. 12.6*, and *προβλεπή* reckon'd among the *gifts of 7.8.* the *Spirit*, which fitted men for the *offices* of *Bishops and Presbyters*. There was also the *διakonia*, with other *gifts* fitting men *v.7.*

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for the *offices* of *Deacons*. Yet who sees not this exprefs difference between these and those *extraordinary Officers*, that these never so much as pretended to be immediately from *God* without the mediation of *Men*? What great Argument had it been for *S. Paul* to prove his *Apostleship* by, that he was not *of Men* or *by Men*, if this were the *ordinary case* in the *ordinary Governours* and *Officers* of the *Church*? if all that *men* did was onely a *recognition* of their *gifts*, and a solemn *reception* of their *Authority*, which was as requisite for *Apostles* as *ordinary Bishops* and *Deacons*? Where do we find any of these *ordinary Officers* made, but there is exprefs mention of *Men*, who laid on their *hands*, and performed the Ceremony, and that by a *distinct* Imposition of Hands from that whereby they then usually received the *Holy Ghost*, immediately after their *Baptism*? And the words used concerning it, *χειρουργία* and *ἐπιτάξις*, are the same by which the *giving* of *Authority*, even in *Secular Offices*, where *Authority* is confessedly given, is usually expressed according to the custom of that Age. *S. Timothy* is said to have his *χειρουργία* *ἀπὸ τοῦ κυρίου καὶ ἀπὸ τοῦ συνέδριου* of *S. Paul*, is said to have it given him, among other things, by the *laying*

Acts 14.23
Tit. 1.5.

2 Tim. 1.6.

laying on of the hands of the Presbytery,
 ἡ δὲ αὐτῶν ἀποστολὴ, καὶ ἐπιθεσιῶν τῶν χειρῶν Πρε- I Tim. 4.
 σβυτέρων. What can be more clear than 14.
 these words, if they be understood of Or-
 dination? And who are more forward
 to understand them so than our Breth-
 ren, when they are concerned to pro-
 duce Precedents of Ordinations by Presby-
 ters? But I confess I am not my self ve-
 ry confident of that Exposition. The
 thing is clear enough from this new Im-
 position of hands, which was used on this
 occasion of ordaining the ordinary Officers
 of the Church, but not of the extraordi-
 nary. When S. Matthias was chosen
 Apostle into the place of Judas, no more
 was done than onely to know God's plea-
 sure concerning it, according to that or-
 dinary way of Divination usual in such
 cases by Lots. When that was known,
 there was no further act of Men, no Im-
 position of hands, onely he was added to
 complete the number of the Twelve Apo-
 stles. That more was observed in ordina-
 ry Ordinations, why was it but to shew,
 that the Influence of humane acts was grea-
 ter in them. οὐ γὰρ ἐ-
 λείδον, Ads 1. 26.

BESIDES, the very Ceremony of
 Imposition of hands, was generally design-
 ed to communicate some of those superna-
 tural

tural gifts, wherewith they were themselves endued. So it was in their casting out of Devils. and their curing the sick, and particularly so it was in their giving the Holy Ghost. And indeed what other gift is imaginable, that was ordinarily necessary for ordained persons? Themselves cannot think it could be dispossessing or healing, &c. What could it therefore be but the Holy Ghost himself? And what gifts could be then thought necessary for making ordinary Officers, but such as are ordinary and perpetual as the Offices themselves? If therefore the Holy Ghost was given, this was (according to the Jews) an investing them with power, where he was given particularly with such a design. So it was in the case of (a) Saul and (b) David, and of the (c) Apostles themselves. And what other design is conceivable in giving the Holy Ghost to them, who were supposed already to have received him before in their Baptism, and that Imposition of hands which then usually accompanied their Baptism? And if the Holy Ghost were given in Ordination, then plainly they had not all their gifts antecedently to their Ordination, as our Brethren conceive, particularly not those which immediately intituled them

a1 Sam.

10.9.

b1 Sam.

16.14.

cS. 7^{ol'n}

20.20, 21.

to

to Ecclesiastical Power. If these Gifts of the Holy Ghost (which immediately intitled them to Power) were given them by the *ministry* of Men; then certainly the Power it self was not given them immediately by God, but by *humane ministry*. And therefore their *antecedent gifts* (which they judged of by the *gift of discerning of Spirits*) did not immediately give them the power.

THE great Prejudice that possesses our Brethren against this power being thus given by the *ministry of men*, is that, conceiving it to result from the *gift* of the Holy Ghost, they think it dishonourable to the Holy Ghost to say that he is given by men. But how can they deny those plain Evidences of Scripture wherein he was so frequently given by the *Apostles*? Will not their Conjectures reach them as well as our Ecclesiastical Officers now? Were not they men of the like *frail sinful nature* as ours are now? But if they would indeed consider how he does it, what is there more dishonourable in this than in the whole management of the *Incarnation*? Why may not God the Father and Son (whose Gift undoubtedly he is) give him by *covenant* as well as otherwise? Why may not himself do so too?

XXVIII.

Supposing them willing to take this way of disposing of him, what can hinder them from deputing *men* to represent them in the *solemnities* of such a *covenant* to be made with *men*? What is there in this, I do not say *dishonourable*, but *unusual*, where ever such *covenants* have been made? Having done so, how can it be thought *dishonourable* that they should be obliged by their own *act of deputation*, to ratifie what is by him acted in their *name*, when they have *impowered* him to do so? Nay, would it not rather be *dishonourable* to the Divine Persons, to think them not *faithful* to those *obligations*, which they have been pleased to *impose* upon themselves? Why may they not *impower men* for all *future ages* as well as that of the *Apostles*, seeing there are *new persons*, and new *explicit covenants* to be made with each of them for their *own persons* in all *succeeding ages*? Why may not they be as firmly *obliged* by the act of a *wicked man* as a good, if he come *lawfully* by his *power of deputation*, by a *regular succession* from those who first received it? Nay, who is there of themselves, that does the least question this in other cases, where their *Interest* does not make them justly suspicious of *partiality*? Does the

Law

Law ever make the least inquiry into the *Lives of Proxies*, where it is satisfied of their *Authority*? Who ever thinks that a *Bond* signed by a *Proxy*, who is a good man, does more oblige the person for whom he is concerned, than a like Obligation signed by another who were *vicious*, supposing them *equally authorized*? Do any of themselves think what *Judas* acted as an *Apostle*, to have been less obliging to his *Master*, or less *valid* in the effect, than what was acted by any of the *other Apostles*? Thus I have shewn, that those *gifts* to which *Ecclesiastical Power* is really *consequent*, are not given by God immediately and antecedently to *humane interposition*, and that those *gifts* that are indeed given antecedently to *Ordination*, are not, nor were, such as did entitle them, who were acknowledged to have them, to any *Ecclesiastical Office or Authority*.

SO also, on the contrary, neither does the want of such extraordinary gifts as men are capable of having antecedently to *Ordination*, irritate the whole act of the *Ordainers*, and make it null, in regard of the incapacity of the *maker*, supposing they should be mistaken in judging them to have them who have them not, as

Ch. Hist.
professedly,
and else-
where.

Mr. *Baxter* does frequently intimate. This he urges sometimes so far as to make *Immoralities* of *Life* sufficient to deprive them of their power, and to excuse a *Separation* from their *Ministry*, from the guilt of *SCHISM*. Should I tell him, that this very Doctrine of his was condemned as *SCHISMATICAL* in the *Donatists* by the *Ancients*, I easily foresee how little the Authority of those *Ancients* is like to signify with him, who scruples no occasion of aspersing their Sacred Memory with opprobrious and reproachful Epithetes. I have already shewn from the nature of the *things*, how little the *validity* of their *Ministry* is concerned in the holiness or unholiness of their *Lives*. The same is easie to be proved concerning those other *qualifications*, if he had considered them in relation to *my principles*. He should first have remembered, that there are two sorts of *Uncapacities* of such a person to be ordained, such as make him utterly *unable* of the Office it self, and such as onely make him *unable* of administering it wisely and advantageously. Now though these *later Uncapacities* ought to be considered by *Ordainers*, whilst the person as yet stands onely *Candidate* for Or,

Ordination, and even afterwards may reflect on the *fidelity or prudence* of his *Ordainers*; yet they are onely the *former* sort of *Incapacities* that can *irritate* their act when *past* and *irrevocable*. He should further have considered, that no *Incapacity* can *irritate* the whole *gift* of an *office*, but that which makes a man *incapable* of the *essential work* of an *office*; not that which onely *incapacitates* him for such works as are not *essential*, but onely *ornamental*. Now the *essential work* of the *Ministry* according to my *principles*, (which he ought to have confuted more particularly in this matter, if he was unwilling to stand by their *consequences*) is to transact between *God* and *Men*, to *seal Covenants* on behalf of *God*, and to *accept* of those which are made by *men*, and to *oblige* them to perform *their part* of the *covenant* by, otherwise *authoritatively* excluding them from *Gods part*. Hence results the whole *power of Ecclesiastical Government*. And for this no great *gifts* and *abilities* are *essential*. All the *skill* that is requisite *essentially* is onely in *general*, to know the *benefits* to be performed on *Gods part*, and the *duties* to be promised on *Mans*, and the nature and obligation of *covenants in general*, and the *particular*

cular Solemnities of Ecclesiastical Covenants, And of this how can any be *uncapable*, who is but capable of understanding the *common* dealings of the world? And how can *Governours* be supposed so grossly mistaken, as that when they design *peculiar and excellent* qualifications, they should fall short of such *mean* ones as these?

¶ XXX. THE *gifts* so much insisted on by Mr. Baxter and his *Brethren*, are such as accomplish an excellent and useful *Preacher*, which Office of *Preaching* they have been used on all occasions to magnifie, as if it were the *only*, or at least the *principal*, imployment of the *Ministry*. But how can they prove that, suppose their office were to *preach*, it is *essential* to every *particular Officer*, that he be *eminently gifted* for and *skilful* in it? How can they prove that *Preaching* is at all any *essential part* of the office? How can they prove that in the *primitive Apostolical times*, every *particular Presbyter* did either *practice* it, or did think himself *obliged* to do so? If they cannot, how will it follow that he who is *lawfully* impowered, must therefore be no *Minister* on account of *incapacity*, if he could not *preach* at all? And they are his *Brethren*, who upon other occasions do suggest the most likely

likely Arguments, to prove that *Preaching* was no essential part of the employment of an *ordinary Presbyter*. They are the persons who tell us, that in the *primitive times* *Preaching* was looked on as the *peculiar office* of the *Bishop*. If so, how could it be any essential part of the duty of *ordinary Presbyters*? They tell us, (I do not say *Mr. Baxter* is one of them) of the distinction between *ruling Presbyters* and those who *laboured in word and doctrine*. They can never prove that any of those *Presbyters* were *Laicks*, but however the distinction seems plainly to imply, that some of those *Clerical Presbyters* did onely rule, and did not concern themselves in *word and doctrine*. Nor was this unagreeable to the aproved advice of the *Apostle*, who would have every man lay out himself according to his *different gifts*, not that every one should endeavour all, as the Custom is now. So he that had the *gift of Prophecy* was to give himself to *Prophecy*, he who had the *gift of Preaching* (called elsewhere *didachia* or *διδασκαλία*) was to give himself to *Teaching*, he who had the *gift of Exhortation* (called *edgallous* or *ἐδγᾱλλους* or *παραινήσις*) was to give himself to *Exhortation*. And so they who had the *gift of Government* (called

Acts 15.
32.

led *πρωσια*, whether of the *whole Church* or *particularly* for managing the *Church Alms*, then given for the use of the *poor* where to *lay out* themselves upon that *πρωσια*, very probably the same with that mentioned in *S. Timothy*. And when *Judas* and *Silas* persuaded the differing Parties of *Jews and Gentiles*, to agree in the accommodation of the *Synod of Jerusalem*, exercising the Gift of *πρωσια*, they are observed to have done it, not as *ordinary Presbyters*, but as *Prophets*, to whom (it seems) that Gift of *πρωσια* was then thought proper. And by this means it should seem that they did designedly contrive the *mutual necessity* of each others *gifts*, for the maintaining that *Unity of the Spirit*, so much insisted on by the *Apostle*, in his Disputes against the *disorders* of the *gifted persons* of those times, that *each* might have *some* which might make him useful to his *Brethren*; but that none should have so *many* of them as to disoblige him from a dependence on the *gifts of others*. And if this was the *precedent* of the *Apostolical Ages*, how false measures then do our *Brethren* take, (who are yet the greatest Pretenders of Reverence to the *Scripture-times and Apostolical Precedents*) when they judge of

of the whole Ministry by this *only* Employment of *Preaching*. But it is easie to see what Exigency of their *cause* has brought them, to it. Their great *neglect* of *Sacraments* and their *contempt* of *Excommunication*, and their opposition to all that power that can give them *justifiable Sacraments*, and their Consciousness how little their *own Sacraments* can oblige others to adhere to themselves, who have given so ill *precedents* of deserting the *Sacraments* of those who were *originally* their own *actual and present Superiours*, have obliged them to such *slight thoughts* of the *Sacraments*, as if they were the least part of the Office of a *Minister*.

HAVING therefore thus proved, XXXI
that what power is received by any *ordained person*, is properly given him by the *Ministry* of his *Ordainers*, I cannot foresee what can be further urged against my Argument drawn from the *intention* of them who gave it, but that taking it with the *Distinctions and Limitations* which I have made use of in managing it, it is such as any *Law*, or *Equity* either, would consider in order to the *validity* of a *Conveyance*. And it is easie now to make *Application* also to the *particulars* of the *contrary Hypothesis*, as I have managed it.

To

To the I. It has been proved, that *power* does not *immediately* result from those *gifts* which onely *qualifie* men for the *Administration of Ecclesiastical Offices*. Whence also the *consequences* do fail, that the *giving* or *not giving* of those *Offices* is to be proved from the *giving* or *not giving* of those *gifts*.

To the II. That *gift* of the *Holy Ghost* which does indeed immediately invest with *Ecclesiastical Power* is disposed of by *God*, but not *immediately*, but by the *Ministry* of the *Ordainers*, who do not onely *declare*, but properly *convey* it.

To the III. The *gifts* which in the *Apostles* times were *antecedent* to *Ordination*, and which were judged of by the *gift* of *discerning of Spirits* in the *Ordainers*, did not intitle to the *power*, but onely that *gift* which was given in *Ordination*, which as to the *essentials* of it was not *extraordinary*, (though it might be so in regard of some *manifestations* of it) and therefore fit to be expected in all *future generations*.

To the IV. Though the *Interest* of the *person* to be *ordained*, and the *people*, be onely *acceptance*, yet it has appeared that the *Interest* of the *Ordainers* is not *acceptance* and *recognition* of a *power* already *received*,

ceived, but the conveyance of a new power, which the Candidate for Ordination had not before he received it by virtue of this conveyance from them, because God does not convey it but by their Ministry.

To the V. The gifts described in the Scriptures were many of them extraordinary, in which we are not concerned now; of those that were ordinary, all were not requisite in each particular person, and indeed fewer were requisite according to the Discipline of those times, when each of them laid out themselves on some particular employments than now, when each particular Minister must undertake all the several necessities of a Parish; and this very difference of their Employments will make the Scripture times incapable of being precedents now, when the Employment is so much changed from what it was then, and will make many more Ministers by the qualifications requisite then, than can be by those which are required now, all which must be owned to be valid Ministers antecedently to any humane Ordination, (if our Adversaries principles hold) though they be not qualified for much the greatest part of that which is counted the Ministerial Employment now. Nor does it appear that the Scripture does ob-

oblige us to accept them immediately for *true Ministers*, even upon *recognition* of those *gifts* which are indeed *true qualifications*. And withall the *Scriptures* are very far from describing all the *particulars* of power of our present *ordinary Ecclesiastical Offices* with that *likelihood of design* to do it, and that *distinctness*, as might in reason have been expected if the *Holy Ghost*, or the *sacred Writers*, had intended them as a *Charter* for the *extent* of those *Offices in future Ages*. They do not distinguish between their *Ordinaries*, which were to descend to their *Successors*, and their *Extraordinaries*, which were not. They do not distinguish between *Prudentials*, which might *validly* be changed by *acts of humane authority*, and *Immutables*, which might not. They do not descend to any *particulars*, but such as were occasioned by the *Disputes* of that Age. They do not so much as *explain any terms*, which were then *notorious*, though it could not be *expected* they should always be so, even to the distance of our *present times*; nor have they done any thing which, upon these *principles* might prevent *litigious Disputes* concerning *Government and Subjection*, which no doubt so good and wise a Governour as God would have

have done for a *Society*, so well beloved by him as his *Church*, if he had designed her a *written Charter* to appeal to for all *future Generations*.

To the VI. As it does prove that recourse were indeed to be had to the *Scriptures*, for knowing the mind of God immediately concerning the *extent of Ecclesiastical Power*, supposing the Power it self were immediately derived from him; so by the same proportion of *reasoning* it confirms my *argument*, that recourse ought now to be had to the *intention of the Ordainers*, seeing it has appeared that God is pleased not to confer it *actually*, but by their *mediation*.

To the VII. It thence appears how irreconcilable this *Hypothesis* of our *Adversaries* is with *Government in this life*, in that it permits persons to *assume Authority*, and to *extend* it as far as they think fit, by *appealing to writings* against the sense of all the *visible Authority of this life*, and this *rationally* by their *principles*, which let any of themselves consider and explain (if they can) how it is reconcilable with the *practice of any visible Government upon earth*. On the contrary, our *Hypothesis*, obliging *inferiour Governours* to prove their *title to their Office*, and the

extent of it, from the *intention* of their *superiour Governours*, does oblige all to a *strict dependence* on the *supreme visible power*, so as to leave no place for *Appeal* concerning the *practice* of such *Government*, (which as it lasts onely for *this life*, so it ought not to admit of *Disputes* more lasting than its *practice*) from them, and that upon *rational and conscientious principles*. For how fallible soever they may be conceived to be in *expounding Scriptures*, yet none can deny them to be the most *certain*, as well as the most *competent Judges* of their own intentions. As certainly therefore as God has made his *Church* a *visible Society*, and constituted a *visible Government* in it; so certainly it is to be *presumed*, that their *Hypothesis* must be *false*, which by *rational consequence* does make it *unpracticable*; and ours *true*, which does so fitly secure the *practice* of such *Government* by a like *rational consequence*.

To the VIII. It is in truth very *consequent* to the former *proposition*, but having indeed no more *evidence* of its *truth*, as applied to our *present subject*, than its being *consequential*, it is sufficiently overthrown by what has been said against the *principles* from which it follows. And this *use* may be also made further of its being

being *consequential*, that whatever may be said *against it* to prove it *false*, will more strongly *convict the principles* themselves of *falsehood*, than if it were not so naturally *consequent* from them. And let any equal person consider, how any *Ecclesiastical Government* can be *practicable* on these terms. *Subjects* may indeed preserve their due *Subordination* to their *Superiors*, notwithstanding their differing from them in *opinion*. But how can they preserve it if they also *practise* differently? They may possibly do it, notwithstanding *practices* of *humane infirmity*, and *disavowed* by themselves. But how can they do it, whilst they defend their *practises*, and pretend *Divine Authority* for them? It is yet harder to reconcile such *practises* as these with *Authority*. Yet they who *disown their Subjection* in some *singular instances*, may yet own it in *all others*. But how is it *possible* that they should own it, who do not onely defend *single practices* different from the *sense* of their *Superiours*, but pretend to *Authority* and *Offices* unaccountable to them, which must justify a whole *course of different practices*? Who defend their *Authority* and *Offices* by such *principles*, as if they were true must in reason make

them *unaccountable*. If their *Authority* be *immediately* received from God, and the *Rule* of their *practices* be taken from the *Scriptures* as understood by *themselves*; what reason can there be of *Subjection* to any *humane Superiours*? As certainly therefore as all that is *false*, which destroys the *practicableness* of *Government*; as certainly as this Proposition does so, so certainly is it *false*, and all those other *antecedent principles* from whence it does *naturally follow*.

To the IX. The same things may be said, that it is indeed rationally *consequent* to the former, to justify the *lawfulness* and *prudence* of differing from *Superiours* in a *judgment of private discretion*, and consequently of *differing in practice*, and that *practice* the *practice* of an *Authority* where yet it is *established* on such *principles*, as that a *different judgment* even of *private discretion*, may be allowed as sufficient to *defend* such different *practices*.

To the X. It is the only *rational way* of making *Scripture precedents* in such matters as these are, an *obliging Rule* to our *present times*, and *rational* only on the *principles* now mentioned. If, on the
con-

contrary, God give his authority by men, then for *prudential cases* the commands of those same men ought by the same reason to be taken for his commands, as the Authority given by them is taken for his Authority. And then these being Cases not to be expected in the Scripture, and there being notwithstanding a means to know God's mind concerning them as far as we are concerned to know it in order to the knowledge of our duty, and there being withall so little reason to presume, that the sacred Writers or the Holy Ghost intended to give us any account of such matters; they will not find it so easie as they think, to prove us obliged even by Scripture precedent it self in such cases.

To the XI. It is a consequence which it may be our Brethren will not stand by, who when they speak of the Interest of Presbyters and People, in judging concerning the gifts of such a Candidate, in order to their own acceptance of him, and speak of this with a design of solving the Phenomena of Government by it, and of restraining disorderly persons from erecting new Churches and Schisms at their pleasure, will no doubt be willing to believe, that persons so excluded, or at least not admitted by the Presbyters or the People,

ought in conscience or modesty at least to forbear the *exercise* of their *gifts* and *authority*, till they be somewhere *regularly* admitted. But how they can *avoid this consequence*, admitting this *Hypothesis* of an *immediate call from God*, for my part I confess I cannot understand. If they be sensible how inconsistent such *disorderly practices* as these are with *Government*, (as they seem to be when they endeavour, by this *Interest of Churches* in admitting *gifted persons*, to prevent the *consequence* of such *disorderly practices*) it will then concern them seriously to reflect on their *principles*, which will *justify practices*, which themselves confess to be so *disorderly*, and will *ruine Government*, for which themselves pretend to have at least some little *reverence*.

Part 3. c. 9.
sect. 21. f.
92.

I only observe one thing more, that Mr. Baxter tells me, that I have at first *given* the Nonconformists *their cause*, and *confirm'd them*. But I am not *conscious*, nor is he pleased to *tell me* where I have done it. If I could tell how to excuse them, I should still think my self obliged to *own my convictions*. But whatever I have done, methinks *he* of all men should not upbraid me, who gives so many *Reasons of Suspicion*, that he is *conscious* of de-

defending a bad Cause. It is hard to think of any *artifice*, which a person so *conscious* would make use of, but Mr. Baxter has practised something which looks very like it. Such a one would *evade all direct Disputes* of the *merit of the cause*, would neither *answer Arguments*, nor *confute Answers*. Such a one, where he could not *justifie the Succession of Orders* not derived from *Bishops*, would have recourse to those of the *Nonconformists* Part 3. c. 9. sect. 13. p. 83. who had *Episcopal Orders*, but had' not been impleaded in those *Disputes* concerning the *necessity of Succession*. Such a one would make a *Conclusion odious*, where he could not disprove it as *false*; would ib. sect. 33. p. 102, 103 endeavour to raise the *affections* of his *Readers*, where he despaired of prevailing on their *Judgments*; would traduce the ib. sect. 2. p. 74, 100. *person* of his *Adversary*, where he had no hopes of obtaining his *cause*. Such a one would be as *confident* as he is in *general charges of Absurdities, Contradictions, and Wordiness, &c.* ib. p. 92, 90 but would withall be as *cautious* as he is of mentioning any *particulars* of such *Charges*. Such a one would refer an *Adversary* to Books written before for *Answers to Arguments* not ib. sect. 19. p. 90. so much as *treated of* in those Books, would with great *boldness* impose on *Readers*

ders *ignorant* of those matters, that all had been already answered there, and that the onely reason why no more is answered *now* is onely to avoid *Repetitions*; so that unless a new *question* be produced as well as a new *argument*, there shall never want an excuse for want of a new *Answer*. I wonder how Mr. Baxter can pretend to have answered what I have said concerning the *sin against the Holy Ghost*, or the *sin unto death*, or the *Sacraments*, (which yet I see are so displeasing to him) or even the way of deriving their *Succession* from their *first Separation*, what I have said concerning the *opinion* of the *Schoolmen*, that *Bishops and Presbyters* differ onely in *degree*, to shew how unsufficient *that* is for justifying their *present Succession*; what I have said concerning this way of resolving the Dispute, not into *ancient Learning*, but more *modern Histories* of their *Succession*; what concerning their derivation of Power from any *valid act* even of the *Presbyteries* themselves, &c. Should I say things so notoriously *false* with such *confidence*, I confess I could not tell how to excuse my self from his uncivil Epithete of *Audaciousness*. Such a one would *slight* the question that pinched him, how *momen-*
tous

tous soever it might prove in its conse-^{lb.p.81.}
 quences, and divert to others, though of
 nouse, yet more capable of *odium*, and of
 a popular talent of raising *passion*. And has
 not Mr. *Baxter* (who cannot find *leisure* ^{lb. sect. 2.}
 to answer these Arguments, wherein the ^{p. 47. sect.}
Orders of his Brethren, and their *Sacra-*
ments, and the whole *comfort* of their ^{29. p. 97.}
Communion, are generally concerned)
 shewn, that he has a great deal of *leisure*
 to rake *Church History* to asperse the *dead*,
 and *blaspheme the living Rulers* of his *peo-*
ple, for condemning *Heresies*, when yet
 the generality of his Brethren themselves
 do not pretend to differ from us in any
 thing which even *we call Heresie*? To
 what end is all this, but to make a noise
 at a *distance*, to divert us from the *real de-*
bate? Such a one would cavil as he does
 about words. What can I think it else
 but *cavil*, when he pretends himself so
 extremely ignorant in the meaning of the
Terms of our *Dispute*? When he who
 has lived all his Life in *England*, and has ^{p. 72.}
 received his *Orders* from a *Bishop* of the ^{lb. sect. 13.}
Church of England, is yet to learn what ^{p. 85.}
we in England, in our *Disputes* with his
 Party, mean by the name of *Bishop*; nay,
 even by that of the *Church of England*?
 If he thought himself in earnest as *igno-*
rant

rant as he pretends, why would he meddle in Disputes where he does not understand the *Terms*? If he *knows* better things, what *charity* can excuse him from the charge of *Insincerity*? Though *persons* may, yet *causes* cannot *equivocate*. There is but *one sense* of all *Terms*, which *causes* oblige men to mean, and that every one *ought* to know who pretends to *skill in causes*. Other senses I did not think my self obliged to take notice of in *Terms* of *notorious signification*, till I found some occasion for it from the misunderstandings of my Adversaries. But there is one thing that looks most like an Argument of *Self-conviction*, which though it has been taken up by persons of worse design than *he*, yet does withall run through the Reasoning of several of the later Books of Mr. *Baxter*; that is, that *our Clergie* must alone be responsible for all the *scandals* that any *Clergie*, who never had any affinity with *ours*, but that of their *common office*, were ever guilty of. What is this but in effect to acknowledge that *ours* are the onely *real Clergie*? What is it but to acknowledge the *conclusiveness* of those *Arguments*, which have been used by me to disprove the Title of their Ministers to the Office of *real Clergie*.

in defence of my Book of Schism.

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gie-men? If they thought their *own* to be *Clergie-men*, why will they not be as obnoxious to all the *scandals* they can rake of *Clergie-men* out of the *Histories* of *Sixteen hundred* Years, as *ours*? I wish I could by this Suggestion make them sensible of the *dissingenuity* they shew in this way of Reasoning, and of the *mischief* they do *themselves* and the common cause of *Christianity*. It is strange if Mr. Baxter can ever expect to revive *Parochial Discipline* by such means as these, of ruining *Diocesan*. Can he ever expect to prevail with those *irreligious Laicks*, who are on this occasion so ready to make use of this misguided zeal of his Brethren, not as more *orthodox* than others, but as a *popular party*, to submit themselves to the Censures of his *Parochial Ministers*, when he teaches them to despise an *Authority* so much more *venerable* than theirs, on all the accounts which Mankind owns for just *reasons of veneration*? Can he in earnest hope, than an upstart *Authority of Innovators*, too late to have their *Scandals* traced through any distant *Histories*, can procure *reverence* with them, who are told such vile things of those, who upon the first division were found *possessed* of an *Authority* so much more received by

A Reply to Mr. Baxter

by a *peaceable* as well as a *just prescription*? Can he expect that he can *preserve* that *Authority in Inferiours*, which he endeavours to *ruine* in their *Superiours*? Can he think to *preserve* it in those, whom it seems *himself* dares not own for *Clergie-men*, whilst he teaches them to asperse the very *name* as well as the *authority* of *Clergie-men*? Can he think to *preserve* it in those, who have no other but *extraordinary ways* of pretending to a *Divine Authority*, or to pretend *Charters* expounded by themselves in their own favour, when he teaches them to *undervalue an Authority*, derived by all the ways by which it is reasonable to expect an *Authority*, should be derived at such a distance? Can he expect in the *age* we live in, that the *great ones* will ever be induced to pay respect to the *inferiour Clergie*, who are so unknown to our *Laws*, when they are taught to deny it to those, who have as good a Title even to *legal honours* as themselves? Mr. *Baxter* may possibly *ruine* us, if God should grant him the curse of a success on his present Endeavours; but I cannot for my life conceive how he can *settle* us, or really *reform our lives*, or restore *Discipline*, on such Principles as these. True *Latitudinarianism* does

does onely tend to introduce *Scepticism* into the *minds*, and *Libertinism* into the *lives* of Men. God deliver us from an *experiment* of his Projects, and him from the dissatisfaction of a *fruitless repentance*, when he cannot *remedy* us.

THIS is all which I think fit to say at *present*. If Mr. *Baxter*, or any of his Brethren, shall think fit to reply further to my Book, I shall again humbly put them in mind of the same *requests* I made formerly: if they will be pleased to observe them, they will not onely approve their own *sincerity* by doing so, but also minister a *subject of useful information*; if they do not, they will force me instead of *yielding or rejoyning*, to cast my self upon the indifferent and impartial *Readers* candour to *judge* between us, and I hope they will not flatter themselves with the hopes that all will be *partial*.

The Summary of my Book treating of the Sinfulness and Mischief of SCHISM, with reference to the Chapters, where each particular of this Summary is proved.

1. **T**hat all are obliged to submit to all un-
sinful conditions of the Episcopal
Communion where they live, if imposed by
the Ecclesiastical Governours thereof; and
2. that the nature of this Obligation is such, as
will make them who, rather than they will
submit to such Conditions, either separate
themselves, or suffer themselves to be exclu-
ded from Communion by such Governours for
such a refusal of submission, guilty of the sin
of SCHISM.

Here are two Parts.

- a. I. That all are obliged to submit to all un-
sinful conditions of the Episcopal Communion
where they live, if imposed by the Ecclesiasti-
cal Government thereof.

This proved by these two degrees:

1. That the supposition, of their being less
secure of Salvation out of this Episcopal
Communion than in it, is sufficient to prove
them obliged to submit to all terms, not di-
rectly

rectly sinful, however unexpedient, rather than separate themselves, or suffer themselves to be excluded, from this Communion. Ch.I. § 7, 8, 9, 10.

2. That there is indeed less security of Salvation to be had even on performance of the moral conditions of Salvation, out of this Episcopal Communion than in it.

This proved from two things :

(1.) That they cannot be so well assured of their Salvation in the use of extraordinary as of ordinary means ; nay, that they being left to extraordinaries is a condition either very hazardous, or at least very uncomfortable at present, whatever it may prove hereafter. Ch.II.

(2.) That these ordinary means of Salvation are, in respect of every particular person, confined to the Episcopal Communion of the Place he lives in, as long as he lives in it.

This proved from two things.

(1.) That these ordinary means of Salvation are confined to the external Communion of the visible Church. A.

This proved from four things.

1. We cannot be assured that God will do for us what is necessary for our Salvation on his part, otherwise than by his express promises that he will do it. Ch.III. § 1, 2.

2. The

The Summary of

2. *The ordinary means how we may assure our selves of our Interest in his Promises is by our Interest in his Covenant, by which they are conveyed to us. Ch.III. from ¶ 5. to the end.*

3. *The onely ordinary means, by which we may assure our selves of our Interest in this Covenant with him, is by our partaking in these external Solemnities, by which this Covenant is transacted and maintained. Ch. IV, V, VI, VII.*

4. *The participation in these external Solemnities with any legal validity is onely to be had in the external Communion of the visible Church. Ch. VIII.*

B. (II.) *That this visible Church, to whose external Communion these ordinary means of Salvation are confined, is no other than the Episcopal Communion of the place where any one lives, whilst he lives there.*

This proved in both parts.

a. (I.) *That the visible Church, to whose external Communion these ordinary means of Salvation are confined, is the Episcopal Communion.*

This proved by these degrees.

(A) I. *That Salvation is not ordinarily to be expected without an external participation of the Sacraments.*

1. Ne-

I. Negatively, *Not by those other popular means which ordinary persons are apt to trust in, to the neglect of the Sacraments, that is,*

1. *Not by hearing the Word preached: Ch. IX:*

2. *Not by private Prayer, nor indeed by any, out of the Communion of the Church. Ch. X, XI, XII, XIII, XIV.*

2. Positively, *That Salvation is ordinarily to be expected onely by this external participation of the Sacraments.*

1. *Proved concerning Baptism. Ch. XV.*

2. *Concerning the Lords Supper. Ch. XVI, XVII.*

II. *That the validity of the Sacraments depends on the Authority of the persons by whom they are administred: Ch. XVIII. (B.)*

III. *No other Ministers have the Authority of administring the Sacraments; but onely they who receive their Orders in the Episcopal Communion. (C.)*

This proved by four degrees.

1. *That the Authority of administring the Sacraments must be derived from God. Ch. XIX.*

2. *That though it be derived from God, yet it is not so derived without the mediation*

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of

of those men to whom it was at first committed. Ch.XX.

3. *That it cannot be so derived from those men to whom it was at first committed, without a continued succession of persons orderly receiving Authority from those who had Authority to give it them, from those first times of the Apostles to ours at present. Ch.XXI.*

4. *That this Authority is not now to be expected any where but in the Episcopal Communion. Ch. XXII, XXIII, XXIV, XXV.*

b. (2.) *That the Episcopal Communion to which every particular person is obliged to joyn himself, as he would enjoy the ordinary means of his own particular salvation, is the Episcopal Communion of the place where in he lives, whilest he lives in it. Ch.XXVI.*

E. II. *That the nature of this Obligation to un sinful conditions of their Episcopal Communion is such as will make them guilty of the sin of SCHISM, who, rather than they will submit to such conditions, either separate themselves, or suffer themselves to be excluded from Communion by their respective Diocesan Ordinaries. Ch.XXVII.*

LETTER I.

The Contents.

What sorts of Disputes are, upon a virtuous account, to be blamed in Dissenters; and what way of managing them is commendable, ¶ 1. A short Account and Defence of the Preface to my Letters of Advice, ¶ 2. A short Defence of the Possibility of Discipline in a Diocesan Government, ¶ 3. The Epistles of Ignatius not question'd by all the Presbyterians, ¶ 4. My thoughts concerning the Reasons of Nonconformity mentioned in Mr. Baxter's Letter, ¶ 5.

Reverend and Worthy Sir,

I Have received your very kind Letter, wherein I hardly know whether I should be more thankful for your *Approbation* or your *Reproof*, both of them being in their kind so useful, and both of them being performed by you with so great Civility. I am confident that if our modern Disputes had been

¶ 1.

LETTER I.

moderated with that *candour*, men would certainly have been more *peaceful*, and very probably more *orthodox*, than now we find them. I could very heartily have wished, that the Opinions wherein we differ, had not been of that nature, as to *separate Communion*. For this I look upon as the onely Circumstance that can make such differences grievous to a *pious person*. For as for those others which exasperate many, that Dissenters are not so wise as to discern the truth, or so fortunate in avoiding prejudices, or lighting on faithful Informations in a time when they are capable of receiving them; or that they are not so submissive as themselves expect to that *Pope*, which *Luther* has long since observed in every mans heart, &c. They are reasons either *sinful*, or at least *unsufficient* to excuse the sin of *uncharitableness* upon such an account. But as they are, considering them as tempered with that *piety and moderation*, which may expiate their other malignities; that they are al-leaged rather as Apologies for your *selves*, than as Obligations on *others*, rather to excuse your *deformity* in not assisting at our *Altars*, than erecting others in opposition to them; that you are still *inquisitive and desirous* of further information, and ready
to

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to lay down your mistakes when you are convinced that they are such; that still you preserve a *peaceable* mind, and embrace our Communion it self *in voto*, though perhaps not *actually*; these are so valuable Considerations even before God as well as *Man*, for excusing from the *guilt of error*, as that whatever I may think of your *Opinions*, I hope it shall not hinder me from a cordial respect and veneration of your *person*.

AS I do very much esteem the good opinion of so great a Lover of *peace and piety* as your self, and should have been sorry to have given any *just* occasion of offence to you; so I am not a little glad, that upon a view of the *particulars* mentioned in your Letter, I find my self to be so very innocent. For as for my *Preface*, the main designs driven on in it are, that *disrespect* to the *Clergie* is shewn to have been an Introductory to the *Atheism* of the Age we live in; that the *conformable Clergie*, that is, such as would answer the *design* of the *Church*, not onely as to their *exteriour demeanour* in publick solemn Assemblies, but also as to the *qualifications* of their *persons*, and the conduct of their whole *lives*, could not prove either *trifling* in their *Preaching*, or *scandalous* in their

their *Examples*; and therefore that the *Church* is not responsible for their misdemeanours where they prove otherwise; and that the *Laity* are in their proportion obliged to the same duties with the *Clergie*, and therefore may make use of the Advice there prescribed; or to touch at the errors of our *modern School-Divinity*, are touched, and to make some proposals for their *reformation*. In these things I can see no occasion of offence, but rather some Preservatives against it. The onely thing I suppose you aim at is, my taxing some Opinions of *Nonconformists*, (and that with as little *personal* reflection as I was able) which I conceived prejudicial to *Church Authority*, which Opinions because you seem to disown, I do not see how you should apprehend your self as particularly concerned in what is there said; especially there being nothing in the discourse whereby you could conclude either your *self*, or any of your *moderate temper*, to have been intended, I assure you I intended none but such as were *guilty*, and with being so I charged none *particularly*. But that not onely the *old Puritans and Separatists* of *Queen Elizabeth's* times, &c. but also very many of ours now are guilty of them, is too
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notorious to suppose you ignorant of it. I could heartily wish that the number of *better principled* and more *peaceable* Dissenters were greater than I fear it is. Nor do I see that what is there said can make it unuseful, even to the persons truly concerned, that value *truth* more than any, however beloved *party*. Seeing it may let them see the evil *consequence* of their *principles*, and their influence on that *Atheism* and *Prophanness*, which I am confident themselves do most cordially detest, which I conceived to be more likely to prevail with them than any other Arguments, as being more suited to their *pious disposition*. Or, supposing that my fears were indeed groundless of the Introduction of *prophanness* by the *contempt of Government*, or of *contempt of Government* by their *disobedience* to it; yet might it at least warn them from *confining* on such dangerous *consequences*, or from coming to them *unawares*, by an abuse of *principles* generally true, but obnoxious to particular inconveniences, when unwarily managed. I mean, it may put them in mind of the greater Momentousness of *good Government*, and of *Peace*, than of many other differences, and consequently of the great Engagements

gagements incumbent on them for their preservation. Whence they would further find themselves obliged, so to oppose the particular *abusive* Constitutions of *Governours*, as not to bring their *Government* it self into *contempt*, nor to suggest unanswerable Apologies to *factious* persons for the future, when they are unwilling to be *obedient*. These are *abuses* which your self, I believe, would wish redressed in the causes of our *Church-divisions*. But if that part of my Discourse could not be *useful*, yet could it not be *prejudicial* to them, nothing being urged either *invectively* or *imperiously*, and therefore no harm being done, if I should prove utterly *mistaken*.

§ III.

THAT you should *marvel* how *reviving Discipline* could by me be expected from the constitution of our present Ecclesiastical Government, does seem no less marvelous to me; especially as to the Exception you make against it. For if it were impossible to maintain *Discipline* under a Government so far *Monarchical*, as to appropriate the *decretory* power of the Government of many to a *single person*, though the *execution* be intrusted to many; then it would follow, that the *Secular Discipline* under a *Secular Monarch* of any extent

tent were impossible also to be observed. Your same *reasons* will proceed as strongly here, as where you apply them. For it is every way as impossible for any such Prince to have a *particular cognizance* of every *particular cause*, much more of every *particular person* in his *Dominions*, as for a *Bishop* in his *Diocese*. As therefore it appears by experience (I shall instance a *Scripture-example* because I know that will be liable to least exception) that *David* (in an *extent* more *vast*, and a *people* more *numerous*, than that of the *largest Diocese*, 120 miles in length, and 60 miles in breadth, and rather better in *David's* days, where were accounted 1300000 Men fit for *war*, besides *Artificers* and such others not coming under that account) was yet able to give a good account of his *Government*, without *particular inspection* into all *causes*, or communication of his power to numerous *co-ordinate Presbyteries*. So I do not see why it may not hold as well for a *possibility of Discipline* under an *Ecclesiastical Monarch* of a much *narrower extent*. For the *reason* produced by you seems to proceed from the *nature of Government in general*, and therefore must proceed with the same force in *Seculars* as *Ecclesiasticals*,
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there being no ingredient peculiarly relating to *Religion*, much less to *Christianity*, which might alter the case, or argue a *disparity*. For certainly *Princes* as well as *Bishops* are responsible for the miscarriage of their *particular Subjects*, as far as they may be prevented by their *moral diligence*; and yet you will not thence conclude, that every *particular* must come under his immediate *personal* care and cognizance; nor is it proved, that the *Bishop* is otherwise obliged to such a care upon *peculiar respects*. Besides that, it is plainly against *experience* even in *Ecclesiasticals*: for as it hath fallen out in some places where there were many *Cities*, that the *Bishops* were proportionably multiplied, as in *Africa and Ireland*; so that it was not upon account of the *impossibility* of the managing the charge of much greater multitudes than the *Inhabitants* of those *small Cities*, appears in that even in the very same places the *greatness* of no *City* was thought sufficient for *multiplying the Bishops*, though it was for the *inferiour Clergie*. I need not tell you how great *Rome* was in *Decius* his time under *Cornelius*, and how full of *Christians*, which required the united endeavours of 1000 *Clergie*, as appears from

from the said *Cornelius* his Epistle to *Fabius* of *Antioch* in *Eusebius*; yet was one Bishop thought sufficient for all, nay the erecting another Altar in the same Church was thought to be formal Schism, as appears from the Controversies betwixt *Cornelius* and *Novatian*, and *S. Cyprian* and *Felicissimus*. The same also might have been shewn in

several other Cities, exceeding numerous and abounding with Christians, as *Antioch*, *Alexandria*, and *Carthage*, &c. which even in those earlier Ages, when Discipline was at the greatest rigour, were yet governed by single Bishops. Nay, whole Nations were sometimes governed by one onely, as the *Goths* by *Ulphilas*, and the *Indians* by *Ædesius*, and the *Arabians* by *Moses*; which is an Argument insisted on by some Presbyterians, for shewing the probability of Ordinations by mere Presbyters. Yet are there no Complaints of dissolution of Discipline in such places, upon account of the greatness of their charge. Which to me seem sufficient Convictions, that the multitude of persons governed is not the reason of

Οὐκ ἦν ἕνα Ἐπίσκοπον δυνάμενον ἐν καθολικῇ Ἐκκλησίᾳ· ἐν ᾧ ἕκαστος (πῶς γὰρ) Πρεσβυτέρους ἔχει πτωχεύοντα ἔξ, διακόνους ἔπειτα, ὑποδιακόνους ἔπειτα, ἀναγνώστους δύο καὶ πτωχεύοντα, ἑορταστές δὲ ἀναγνώστους ἅμα πυλαιοὺς δύο καὶ πνευματικούς, καὶ οὖν διὰ βουλομένους ὑπὲρ τὰς χιλιάς πεντακοσίας. *Cornel. ad Fab. Ant. apud Euseb. Eccles. Hist. 6. 43.*

our present Neglects in that particular.

¶ IV. WHEN I said that *Ignatius* his Epistles were question'd by the *Presbyterians*, I never said nor intended it concerning *all* (for I know of *Vedelius* his Apology for them) much less did I lay it particularly to *your* charge ; so that if you had here forbore assuming to your *self* what was spoken of *others*, (many of whose Opinions I am confident you will not undertake to justify) there had been no occasion of this Exception. That other *Presbyterians*, and those by far the greatest number, have denied them, cannot be questioned.

¶ V. AS for the Reasons of *Nonconformity* alleaged by you and your Brethren of the *Savoy Conference* in 1660, if I might without offence presume to interpose my own thoughts, they are as followeth : For the *approving*, not onely *submitting to*, such things as you disliked, and that by an *oath*, I am sure there are many *Conformists* themselves that understand no more to have been intended by the *Church*, but an *exterior submission*, not an *internal approbation* of the particulars. And particularly I have been informed by a Letter from a very worthy
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credible person, who pretends to have had it from the Bishop himself, that Bishop Sanderson, who was a Member of your Conference, interposed those words in the *Act of Parliament*, where it is required, that Ministers declare their unfeigned assent and consent to the use of all things in the *Book of Common Prayer, &c.* designedly that this Objection might be prevented. The new *Article of Faith* inserted in our *Rubrick* I do not know, nor can I now get the Book that past betwixt you at the Conference, to know what you mean. That *Lay-chancellors* were disused, and that the *Bishops* did more consult their *Presbyteries*, I could for my own part heartily wish. But I cannot think these *abuses* momentous enough to warrant *Schism*; and I know your self are for bearing with some things things that are not so well, rather than the *Church of God* should be divided for them. In brief, I do not understand any of the six Particulars mentioned as the *reasons* that keep you off, though you do indeed disapprove them, both because you do not undertake to determine what they might be to others, but onely what they are to persons of your mind, (though I confess this might be understood as a modest declining to judge

judge of others) and because you conceive *piety* the most likely means to unite us, which could not be if we imposed any thing on you against your Consciences. So that the onely one that may be presumed to have been thought sufficient by you to this purpose seems to have been another, which because you intimate somewhat obscurely, I do not know whether you would be willing that it should be taken notice of. But however (I suppose) that it self does onely deprive us of your *Clerical*, not your *Laical Communion*. God give us all to discern the things that belong unto *peace*. As for other Questions we may easily await our Lords pleasure, who when he comes shall tell us all things; and in the mean time preserve *charity*, and be wise unto *sobriety*. I hope, Sir, you will excuse my freedom, and let me know whether I may in any thing be serviceable to you; and above all things reserve a portion in your Prayers for,

Your unfeigned Wellwisher,

Trin.Col.
near Dublin.

HENRY DODWELL

LETTER II.

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Reverend Sir,

¶ I.

AS I have before expressed my sorrow for dealing in such a Controversie that divides *Communion* with a person of your *piety and candour*, and from whom I am so *unwilling* to differ upon any tolerable terms; so I am withall glad that we can still maintain an unpassionate way of debating it, which for my part I conceive not onely most *Christian*, but most *useful and succesful*. It is onely with this design that I am willing to continue it, wherein I hope you will not be displeased at me for venturing on that Liberty your self are pleased to take, and which I hope through Gods gracious assistance I shall never abuse. For my meaning is as much as is possible to abstain from all things *personal*, and to insist onely on the way proposed by S. *Augustine* to *Maximus*,

his, Ut res cum re, causa cum causa, ratio cum ratione decertet. And here it self I shall endeavour to avoid the multitude of unnecessary controversies, that we may be more accurate in the discussion of such as shall remain.

THE principal controversy of your Letter is concerning the possibility of reviving Ecclesiastical Discipline under a Diocesan Episcopacy. Where I am glad to find that the Dispute seems rather derived from your forgetfulness of your own Concessions and mine, than any real difference of our Opinions, when clearly and candidly explained. For I can perceive onely two things questioned betwixt us through your Letter. 1. *Whether the Bishop be obliged in his own person to a particular care of all the Souls contained within his Jurisdiction, or whether he may not assume Assistents and Coadjutors dependent on himself, over whom he is to exercise the Office of a Bishop, that is, an Overseer: not to take the whole burden on himself, but to oblige them to the performance of their duty, and to punish their Delinquencies?* 2. *Whether supposing this Delegation lawful, Lay-Chancellors be fit to be entrusted with it?* ¶ II.

The former you seem to have yielded when you say; "If this had been all our

"Dispute, whether a Patriarch or Arch-
 "bishop can rule 1000 Churches by
 "1000 inferiour Bishops or Church-
 "rulers, I had said something. Which
 is indeed the onely thing asserted by me
 in my Proofs, and the very Case in pra-
 ctice, no *Bishop* undertaking the parti-
 cular Cure of a whole Diocese, without
 the assistance of his particular respective
Parochians. When therefore you ask,
 "Whether it follows that our Church-
 "Monarch can oversee all *himself*, with-
 "out any *Suboverseers*, or rule them (by
 "Gods Word on the conscience) without
 "any *Subrulers*? Sure you cannot mean
 that this is the Practice of our *Diocesans*.
 And if your design be to assert, that eve-
 ry *Clergyman* is bound to a particular per-
 sonal care of all within his Limits, and
 therefore ought not to undertake a Cure
 too great for his *personal* cognizance, and
 which he cannot manage without *Assist-*
ants; this should have been more direct-
 ly proved than your Letter attempts.
 2. So also for the second, *Whether supposing*
this Assistance lawful, it were fit to be en-
trusted to Lay-chancellors? I expressly de-
 clined that question, (if you had remem-
 bered it;) as also, *Whether it were expe-*
dient that the Bishops Government were
 so

so *Monarchical*, as to exclude the *counsel of Presbyters*. But though we be thus agreed in the main (if not the whole) difficulty, if rightly explained; yet your Arguments and Answers, if allowed, do so *consequently* overthrow your *concessions* themselves, as that it is easie to observe how heat of Discourse does transport you beyond the equity of your more composed thoughts.

IF I may therefore securely take it for granted, that a *Bishop* with many *Subruters* (and such are the particular *Parish Ministers*) may govern a *Diocese* of as large extent at least as ours are, as your words seem to grant; I can then imagine no possible difficulty concerning the *possibility* of reviving Discipline under a *Diocesan Government*. ¶ III.

For by *Discipline*, I suppose, we mean nothing but *good Laws punctually executed*, both of which are necessarily implied in the nature of *good Government*. Either therefore you must deny that such *good Laws*, and such *punctual Execution*, may be had under such a *Diocesan Government*; and then you will destroy the *possibility* of such *Government*, contrary to your own concession; or you must say that such *Government* may be maintained

without *good Laws* or *punctual Execution*, which is alike absurd to affirm concerning a good Government, concerning which alone we are at present disputing. But because I find by some of your other Works, that you do indeed deny a *possibility of Discipline* under a *Diocesan Government*, nay sometimes deny the lawfulness of *communicating* with a *Diocesan Church* as *Diocesan*; perhaps this Confession may have slipped from you unawares, so that it may not be safe to take you at your word. If this later be your case, (as methinks it must, if there be any *real controversie* betwixt us) all that at present I am willing to undertake, (that I may not enlarge beyond necessity) is the Examination of your Answers to the Reasons produced in my former Letter. My first Reason is therefore for proving the *possibility of Discipline* under a *Monarchical Diocesan*, in the sense there and here already explain'd (which I could gladly wish you would keep in mind for preventing *misunderstandings* on your part, and unnecessary *repetitions* on mine) was, that your Reasons being not drawn from *testimony*, or any *positive and peculiar prescriptions*, which might make the case *singular*; but from *reason*, and that not par-

particularly drawn from the nature of Government as Ecclesiastical, but general, from the principles of Government as such) will proceed as strongly against the possibility of Secular Discipline under a Secular, as Ecclesiastical under an Ecclesiastical Monarch. Seeing therefore that in a Secular Monarchy as absolute as the Ecclesiastical we speak of, and as remote from a possibility of a cognizance of all particulars, and of a much larger extent than any Diocese, Secular Discipline may notwithstanding be preserved: it must needs follow, that no Reasons of this kind can prove it impossible under such an Ecclesiastical Monarchy, as is the subject of our present Discourse. Nay, as it hence appears possible, not onely upon particular accounts, but simply, as having been actually performed under Secular Monarchies: So it must upon these principles be presumed actually performable in Ecclesiasticals, which will not onely evince the falshood of your Reasons, but also the truth of the contrary assertion. In this Argument you seem to grant (what is also proved in my Letter from the Instance of Davids Kingdom of Israel, and good Government of it, (which I thought least liable to exception) that Secular Discipline

pline is preservable under *Secular Monarchy*. That also what agrees to *Ecclesiastical Government*, not by virtue of any *peculiar Ingredients* as *Ecclesiastical*, but by virtue of the *common principles of Government in general*, must agree to all other Governments; as also, on the contrary, that what agrees to *other Forms of Government* upon the like general accounts, must likewise agree to that which is *Ecclesiastical*; are so clear, that as I do not perceive that what you say tends to the denial of it, so I do not think it worth my time to prove it. The only thing therefore remaining, which you seem to question in your Answer is, that the *Reasons* produced by you proceed on Principles peculiar to *Ecclesiastical Government* as such. For your principal endeavour is to shew a disparity, why, though *Secular Discipline* be indeed maintainable under a *Secular Monarchy*, yet *Ecclesiastical* must not be presumed to be so under an *Ecclesiastical*. For which you refer me to my Lord Bacon; and your own Letter to *Ludovicus Molinaus*, besides what you add to that purpose in your present Letter. For the very supposal of a *Disparity* does necessarily proceed on *peculiar Considerations*, and is directly repugnant to the notion

notion of general and common Principles. Now to let you understand that your *Reasons* do indeed proceed on principles common to all Government of the same number of persons and extent of place, as that of the largest of our *Dioceses*, *Secular* as well as *Sacred*. I need onely to invert those *Topicks* of *duty*; which because you think impossible that they should be *discharged*, you thence infer an impossibility of *Ecclesiastical Discipline*, that you may see that none of those same instances of *duty* are to be exempted from the Cure of the *Secular Magistrate*.

I BELIEVE you will not question but that every *Secular Magistrate* is as responsible for his Cure as the *Ecclesiastical*; and that this Cure is not so general, but that all *particular* Misdemeanours of *particular* persons, that are capable of an exteriour cognizance, both as to their *prevention* and *punishment* are comprehended under it. If so, then certainly,
 1. As many persons will belong to the Care of the *Civil*, as the *Ecclesiastical Government*; nay, generally more, seeing that in the same precincts it is true what *Optatus Milevitanus* tells us, that the *Church* is contained in the *Commonwealth*, not the *Commonwealth* in the *Church*; there

§ IV.

Contr
 Parm. l. 3.

there being no Members of the Church not liable to the Civil Government, but many in the Commonwealth not being subject to the Church, as Pagans, Jews, Mahumetans, and other Infidels. And, 2. At least as many crimes will come under Secular as Ecclesiastical cognizance, nay generally more, both as to the individuals and kinds of Crimes. As to the individuals, because those who are not obnoxious to the power of the Church, as Infidels, are to be presumed generally more careless of themselves, and less capable of good impressions, as wanting those most powerful Motives for reclaiming men from a vicious course of life, which are taught by the Doctrines of Christianity. And as to the kinds of Crimes. For as for the Law of Nature, the punishment of Offences against that will as properly belong to the Magistrate as the Bishop, and that not onely as to the Second Table, (which does professedly concern Crimes against Secular Conversation) but also the First, as far as it relates to Natural Religion, the Interest of the State being so nearly involved in that of Religion, especially as far as it is natural, as that all Obligation of conscience is derived from thence, which is incomparably a better

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Preservative of the *Princes* Rights, than that of *external force*. As for the *positive Laws* of the *State*, they are far more numerous than those of *Christianity*; according to those who make the *Scripture* an adequate Rule of such *Positives*. For how extremely do these fall short of those *Volumes of Codes and Pandects, Charters and Statutes, Civil and Municipal*, of all the distinct *subordinate Societies* to which every *particular person* is related, by *multiplication* whereof his *duties* and possible *offences* must be proportionably multiplied? That I may not now mention all the *extemporary provisional commands* which are acknowledged obligatory, (even to the *sinfulness* of such *disobediences*) by virtue of the general Subjection due to *ordinary and extraordinary Superiours*? But yet the *positive impositions* of the *Scriptures* themselves, which may be conceived ordinarily and eternally obligatory to *sin*, are extremely short of the *Voluminousness* of the *Canonical Writers* themselves. For deduct first all those passages that are purely *historical*; for as for the obligation of *Scripture-precedent*, which is so much insisted on by some, themselves dare not maintain it in the *utmost latitude*. Nor have they

they yet established such Notes, whereby we might discern when we are concerned in them, and when we are not; and when we are, when onely its *imitation* is commendable, and when its *omission* is directly *sinful*; what is obligatory in all *circumstances*, and what onely in some *particular* ones; what are all the *circumstances* requisite for such obligation, and how we may know when they concur particularly in our *present case*; when their obligation arises from the *authority*; and when onely from the *prudence* of their *Author*; when they oblige as *Laws*, and when onely as *Rules*; when upon account of the *authority* of the *person*, and when onely of the *reason* of the *thing*. For when this obligation is derived from the *reason* of the thing, (as I might have proved it generally to be either as to the *establishment* of the *Rule*, or at least as to its *application* to the *particular case* to be ruled by it) then it cannot be proved without recourse to other *Laws* of Nature or *Prudence*, or *positive Constitutions*; so that such *precedents* will not encrease the number of *Scripture-obligations*. Deduct also all *promises* and *threats*, all *exhortations* and *dehortations*, which are not themselves *precepts*, but suppose the proof of
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the *precepts* which they concern by other *mediums*. And, even of that small part of the *Scripture*, which after these *deductions* will still remain properly *preceptive*, which (for the *Old Testament*) does according to the computation of the *Rabbins*, who are most minutely *critical* in such *punctilio's*, amount to no more than 643, including both *affirmatives* and *negatives*. If we still further consider, how many of them are onely *positive enforcements of natural Laws*, and so reducible to the forementioned consideration; how many of them that are *positive* concern the *Jews*, not as a *Church*, but as a *Commonwealth*; how all of them that concern them as a *Church*, are now evacuated by that *Evangelical Liberty*, which has abrogated the *Mosaick Authority*, from which they derived their *Sanction*; how, even of the *New Testament prescriptions*, many are onely *provisional*, and onely grounded on *temporary reasons*, and those such as are not suitable to our *present times and places*; how many are confessedly *antiquated*, and how hard it is to distinguish *Apostolical Connivances* from *Approbations*, their *Approbations* from *Constitutions*, their *Constitutions* as of ordinary *Governours*, and their *Traditions* as

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extraordinarily sent and impowered by our Saviour, for the *eternal and unalterable* obligation of the *Catholick Church*. When all these things, I say, are considered and allowed for, the *positive Constitutions* of the *Scripture*, which may oblige us *antecedently* to the *Churches Imposition*, (which the persons I am speaking of do not value) and that to *sin*, will be extremely short of the number of *Secular Laws*.

¶ V.

AND though we should, to increase the number, add the *Ecclesiastical Laws* to those of the *Scriptures*; yet neither so would they exceed the *Secular*. For to make this comparison with Justice, we should, 1. Compare onely such *Ecclesiastical Laws*, as do not derive their force from any *civil Sanctions*. For they that do must needs suppose those *civil Sanctions* at least as *numerous* as themselves, and therefore cannot be presumed to over-number them. And this consideration will be extended not onely to such Instances, wherein *Ecclesiastical Persons* exercise a Power confessedly *dependent* on the Concessions of *Princes*, as in *Marriages*, and *Wills and Testaments*, and the certain *proportion* of the *Ecclesiastical maintenance*, &c. but also to those *spiritual crimes*;

times, more immediately relating to their cognizance, as established under *Secular Penalties*, which will *de jure* include all affairs of that nature in *Christian Commonwealths*, where the Prince is acknowledged to be *custos utriusque juris*, and *de facto* does include the *Ecclesiastical Constitutions of our Kingdoms*, where the Clergie are not onely by *Law*, but by *promise* in King Henry the Eighth his time, (as far as that *promise* can *oblige* their *Successors*) *obliged* to make no *Laws* without the *Secular permission*. Seeing therefore that (with us at least) there are no *Ecclesiastical Laws* but what are seconded by the *Secular*, but many *Secular* not seconded by *Ecclesiastical*; it must needs follow, that *Secular Laws*, and consequently *Crimes*, must be more numerous than such as are *Ecclesiastical*. But, 2. Abate even out of the *Jus Pontificium*, which has swelled to the greatest Voluminousness in this kind, not onely such things as are undertaken by *Ecclesiastical persons* by the favour of Princes, but such as are usurped against their expresse consent; and wherein the *Romish Clergie*, who have so exceeded in this kind, cannot *de jure* challenge any *Legislative power*; and the number of such *Laws* will

Petr. de
Marca de
Concord.
Sac. 5
Imp. l. 3.
c. 6.

yet extremely decrease. And, 3. All such *Laws* as are grounded on *Ecclesiastical Usurpation*, such as are all those which abridge the power of *ordinary Bishops*, and ascribe all to the *omnipotency* of the *Roman See*, which seems to be the principal scandal that first alienated *Spalato* from them. I need not instance particulars of this kind, whose *Titles* abound with them as those of *reserved Cases*, of *Exemptions*, of *Appeals* from without the *Limits* of the *Roman Patriarchate*, &c. And 4. All such *Laws* as are grounded on false *Doctrines*, as those against the use of the *Cup in Laical Communion*, against *reading the Scriptures*, concerning *Indulgences*, and the like practices grounded on the supposal of *Purgatory*, &c. And, 5. All such as are misbecoming the *candour and equity* of a *Christian Church*: such as are all those relating to the *Inquisition*, in relation to the *delation and punishment* of the *persons* and *suppressing* the *Books of Hereticks*, &c. the very things the *Catholics* under the *persecutions* complained of, as *unequal* in the *Pagans*, and prejudicial to all just *Information*. And, 6. All, even *indifferent*, *Constitutions* which, though lawful to be obeyed, are yet either *imprudent* as to the things, or *burthen-
some*

then as to their number, and therefore unnecessary to be imposed; for if *S. Augustine* complained, that even in his time the *Constitutions* of this kind exceeded the *servitude* of the *Law*, we may do it much more justly now, when they are incomparably more *numerous*. These things, I say, and the like being retrenched, and no more being left, than what are absolutely necessary for the Government of a Church, reformed from all *encroachments and abuses*, would reduce the *Ecclesiastical Laws* into a narrow compass, as we find them in the several *Codices Ecclesia Universa Romana & Africana*, which though extremely short of the Voluminousness of the present *Canon Law*, yet were thought sufficient for several Centuries, before the *ambitions and factiousness* of private Prelates had dissolved the *unity* of the *Catholic Church*.

AND as the Crimes have thus appeared more *numerous*, that come under the cognizance of the *Civil* than *Ecclesiastical* Governours; so also, 3. The necessities to be provided for by the *Magistrate* are so too. Thus *Maries better part* (which was *Religion*) is represented by our *Saviour* himself as a *solicitousness* onely for *one thing necessary*; whereas

Martha was troubled about many things. For *Religion* teaches us an *indifferency* as to our *desires*, and an *unconcernedness* as to *events*, and a confident *acquiescency* in God for our temporal provision, the efficacious procurement and security whereof is the design of *temporal Laws*. It preserves us from *many* or *great* designs, from all *ambitions* or *competitions*, from all resentment and impatience of *injuries*; and for such persons very few *Laws* will prove sufficient, for *direction* onely, not for *coertion*: for the *Apostle* tells us, that the *Law* is not for the righteous. And as the *Necessities* are thus certainly *fewer* in persons of an eminent *perfection* in *Religion*, so the *means* of bringing them to that *perfection* are *fewer* and *easier* than those of a *secular conversation*; it being much easier to curb our *own desires*, which is the design of *Religion*, than to curb the *world* and the course of *providence*, which are many times necessary for their *gratification*; which is the design of the *world*. Besides, that the good things of *Religion* are not like those of the *world*, the less to *particulars* for being communicated to *many*, which is the great occasion of those many *controversies* concerning *meum* and *tuum*, which make the

the *cares* of men so intricate, and their *Laws* so very voluminous. And though the *things* themselves were more obnoxious to *injury* than they are, yet the *persons* are not so inclinable to offer it; *Religion* much more effectually uniting and endearing its Professors, than the most excellent *humane Laws*. To which may be added, that in case of *incorrigibleness* the *Church* is much more easily cleared of the prejudice of a *corrupt member*, than the *Commonwealth*. The *Church* is sufficiently cleared of his *scandal* by disowning him, and excluding him from Communion, and the blessings consequent thereunto; but the *State* is never secure from suffering by him while he lives, which is much the more difficult case.

IT had been very easie for me to have added many more difficulties in the *Secular Government* of a *multitude*, which have not place in the *Ecclesiastical*; and that without the partiality of insisting onely on the *conventiences* of one part, and onely on the *inconveniences* of the other, (which I confess very fallacious and unfit for a faithful representation of the Cause) but in such Instances as might be competent for an *absolute and equal* sen-

¶ VII.

tence concerning the whole. Nay, I might have insisted on your own Topics, and shewn you, 1. The many Requisites for making a good Subject, and wherein more *positive Laws* are concerned, than in making a good Christian. First, many *Laws* of the *Commonwealth* concern *Marriages*, that there may be no injury to the Friends or the Persons concerned, or the Children. When the Children are begotten, there are further *Laws* for preserving them in the womb; and when they are born, for securing them from *murder* or *exposing*, or unwholsom *nourishment*, or vicious *education*. The *æconomical* charge of Education does require more *care* and constant *attendance* of the *Nurse* than is ever pretended or required from any *Minister* in the conversion of *Souls*. Many are the *casualties* of their *childish* Follies, many the *distempers* of their *irregular* Actions, many the *dangers* they can neither avoid nor complain of, to such as might prevent or remedy them. And yet for all these their *Nurses* are made responsible if they happen by their *negligence*. Nay, so great is this *care* for some years, as to take up the *whole* time of the *Nurse*, which the *conversion* of no sinner does of a *Minister*.

Minister. Yet certainly you would not think your own Argument good if I should apply it here. If the *nursing* of *one child* take up the whole time of *one person*, then what *one person* can be able to govern as *many children* as are in ordinary *Families*? And if this Government of *many children* appear thus *impossible to one person*, then much more that of a *Family*, of a *Corporation*, of a *City*, of a *Province*, &c. And if to avoid this you reply, that although every *Master of a family* be not able *personally* to discharge the duty of governing *many children*, yet he can by his *authority* oblige the *Nurses and Tutors* to do their duty, and so at least *mediately* govern them; (as the *King*, though he cannot possibly be *personally* present in all places of his *Dominions*, where it is necessary that *Justice* be administred, can yet command such as may, and punish them upon *non-performance* of their duty, which *Subordination and Delegation* may be so contrived, as that they who come under his more *immediate* personal inspection may be proportionable enough to the *Abilities* of *one man*;) I pray consider whether the case be not exactly the same here: For if *one Minister* be able to govern

400, which is the lowest number mentioned by you as in a *Parish*, then why may not a *Bishop* govern 400 *Ministers*? especially considering that the *Gouvernement* of a *Bishop* over his *Clergie*, is onely in general to see that they do their duty, and does not require so particular an inspection into their performances, as that of a *Minister* over his *Parishioners*. For it is much easier for a *Bishop* to inform himself, whether a *Minister* perform the duty of his *Cure*, whether of *Preaching*, or *Praying*, or *Visiting*, and whether he be of a good *repute*, or at least not *scandalous*, with his *Parishioners*; than for a *Minister* not onely to inform himself of those *Quare's* concerning each of his *flock*, whether they discharge their calling justly and conscienciously, and what means may be used for their recovery in case of their default, who are not so easily to be cast out of the *Ministers* care by *Excommunication*, as *scandalous Ministers* are out of the *Bishops* by deprivation. Besides his catechizings of the ignorant, and his admonitions of the knowing, and his resolutions of perplexed consciences, and his awaiting fit opportunities and circumstances for rendering his persuasions more prevalent, are most expensive

penfive of time, and yet are not fo abfolutely neceffary to be critically obferved in Government, (where the *publick Service* may be promoted by other *Instruments*, if *persuafions* prove unfuccefful) as in *private difcourfes*, where the *perfonal* advantage of the party concerned is principally intended.

BUT then if you would be pleased ¶ VIII. to confider further, how few *Parifhes* are fo little peopled as to confift onely of 400, and how few *Dioces* confift of fo many *Minifters* that have proper and diftinct Cures; how that ufually the moft eminent men for Parts and Action are, or fhould be, chofen Bifhops, many of them upon *perfonal regards* able to perform the work of many ordinary *Minifters*, and may well be prefumed extraordinary, confidering the great advantage for choice from the difproportion of their number, fo few *Bifhops* being to be chofen out of fo many *Minifters*. If you would confider further how untrue it is, that the difpenfation of *discipline*, even as it is *practifed*, is managed by the *Bifhop* alone, who has his *inferiour Officers* for preparing things for his cognizance, befides the direction of *learned Lawyers* for his affiftance in point of *counfel*, (which is

is the main reason that may be pretend-
ed, for proving the Government of *many*
better than that which is *Monarchical*;) and for *counsel* in this kind the *Clergie* themselves are not *qualified as Clergie-men*, but as *Lawyers*, but would have much more of this assistance, according to my *Book*, where I have professed myself desirous, that the *Bishops* would more communicate the great Affairs of *Government* with their *Clergie*, which I confess I think more agreeable to the *primitive Form*. If, I say, you had considered these things, you would find *Discipline* much more *practicable* under a *Diocesan*, than a *Secular Monarchy*. And I wish you would consider whether your Arguments will not proceed with the same force; I do not say onely against those *numerous Parishes* of 30000 or 50000 persons, which is a greater number than I believe are in some of our *Irish Dioceses*, especially if onely *Protestants* be accounted, (and yet you do not pretend a duty of *separating* from the *communion* of such *Parishes*, as you do from our *communion* as *Diocesan*; though certainly a *Bishop* with a *multitude of Clergie*, more *subject* to him than ordinary *Curates* are to their principal *Parsons*, is much more
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able for the Government of a *Diocese*, than an ordinary *Minister*, wanting such advantages, is for the Government of such a *Parish*) but against *Provincial* and *National Classes* also. For it is as impossible for every particular *Elder* of even a *Provincial Class*, which were often of larger extent than our *Dioceses*, to inform himself particularly of every person and cause to be brought before him, so as to be able to judge distinctly of their merit, as for a *Diocesan Bishop*. And I can perceive nothing that may with any plausibility be pretended there, that may not with as much force be urged here.

IF it be pretended that there is a multitude who have their distinct Governments in their respective precincts mutually independent on each other, some of whom by advantage of their neighbourhood may have opportunity of informing themselves particularly of every cause belonging to their Jurisdiction. The same may be pretended here, the same number of Clergy being employed under a *Diocesan*, as under a *Classical* Government. But it is withall clear, that a much greater number of them will, even in such Classes, prove incapable of that advantage of personal information, who yet would

¶ IX.

would not be denied their decisive *vote* on the *testimony* of others. And in all *Polyarchical Governments* the *suffrages* of the *major part* is as *decretory* as that of a *single person*, in that which is *Monarchical*; so that still the Government is managed without *particular information*. If their *multitude* be urged for the *security* of their *counsel*, that is had also here, especially in the *Hypothesis* defended by me, where *Presbyters* are joyned in Government with the *Bishops*. But with this *advantage* in our case, that the same *security of counsel* is here joyned with *expediteness* in its *decision and execution*, and *security* from *equal suffrages*, the want of which do oftentimes more prejudice *polyarchical Societies*, than the *security* of their *counsels* do avail them. And it is plainly as impossible, if not more, for any *Class*, which can onely be convened *occasionally*, to execute its own *Decrees* without *Delegation* as for the *Bishop*.

2X. YOUR answers for shewing the *disparity* betwixt *Civil and Ecclesiastical Government*, as many of them as are *true*, (for all are not) do onely prove a *disparity* on other accounts, (which is not denied) but not such a one as may hinder the *governableness* of the same *multitude* by

by an Ecclesiastical, and that *in foro exteriori*, (which is the onely question I am concerned in at present) which is acknowledged governable by a *Secular Magistrate*. You have neither any thing of reason, nor of any positive revelation of God, which might make such a multitude less governable, by reason of some liberties restrained in the Church, but allowed in the Commonwealth. "Your 1. is, that "the standing of the *Magistrates office* is "by the Law of Nature, which therefore "alloweth variety and mutations of inferior Orders, as there is cause. But "the standing of the Clergy is by "supernatural institution; our *Book of Ordination* telling us, that there are "three Orders, &c. Whence you conclude, that men may not alter them, or "make more of the same kind. The force of this Answer, as far as I can apprehend it, seems to consist in these two things; 1. That the government of a Diocese cannot be administered without more than three Orders, for those three, you seem to allow from the *Book of Ordination*; and, 2. That it is not in the power of the Church to institute new Orders besides the three already established, though it be in the power of the State to
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innovate as they please by reason of the disparity by you mentioned. The former is so manifestly false, as that if ever *Discipline* were observed ever since the government of the Church was *Diocesan*, (which is hard to deny, since it has been *Diocesan* as far as *Ecclesiastical History* can inform us) it was under these three *Orders*. Nay, the *Presbyterians* pretend their *Classical Discipline* to be maintainable by one Order alone; for *Deaconship* they make onely a kind of *civil office* for disposing of the *alms* of the Church. So sufficient they account the *Subordination* of *particular* persons singly considered to the same persons, as considered *collectively* in an *Assembly*, without any distinction of *Orders* for Government. And why the *President* of these *Presbyteries*, though not of a *distinct Order*, as most of the *Schoolmen*, and many of the *Episcopal Authors*, maintain, especially those of the old *Prelatists*, (as your self have elsewhere observed) may not upon the same terms maintain *Discipline*, for my part I cannot understand. The ground, I believe, of your mistake is, that in the administration of our *Prelatick Episcopacy* you have observed some other Officers of *prudential Ecclesiastical Constitution*, which

which are intrusted with *Jurisdiction*, as *Deans, Archdeacons, Vicars General, Lay-chancellors, &c.* which you mistake for *Orders*, because they have different *duties* in the *subordination* of the *policy* of the *Church*. But, 1. I do not doubt but that you know better than I can tell you, that even *Diocesan Government*, as *Diocesan*, may and has been actually administered without them in the *primitive times*. Some of them being of *civil* constitution, for administering the power of the *Prince* in the *exteriour government* of the *Church*, as he is *Emperor &c.* (that I may use the language of *Constantine the Great*) and all of them of *prudential* use, onely *convenient*, not simply *necessary*, even in the opinion of them that use them. And 2. You cannot pretend, that the addition of new *Officers* (though possibly *unlawful* upon other accounts, yet) should make the *Discipline* of a *populous precinct* less, but rather more maintainable. For certainly in such a case the *multitude of Officers* is an advantage. And let me intreat you to remember that this is the real question, not Whether *Diocesan Government* be constituted by God, but Whether *Discipline* be maintainable under it. But, 3. Suppose it as inconvenient as you please,

please, even for the maintainance of *Discipline*, (which I am not willing at present to digress to) may even *unlawful* to be *introduced* by *Governours*; yet how can it be proved that it is lawful for *Subjects* to undertake its Reformation *without and against* the consent of *Governours*? And how can they be excused, even in such a case, for refusing *passive obedience*, for separating from them, and joyning with Parties formed *in opposition* to them? Which seems to be your case in separating from our *Communion as Diocesan*, and communicating with such who have cast off their *obedience*, and united themselves in a *communion opposite* to their *original Superiours*? And, 4. You may be pleased to consider, that as we do not call all these *prudential Offices Orders*, so there is no reason why we should do so in the *Ecclesiastical notion* of the word. For not now to make use of that distinction betwixt *Order and Jurisdiction*, which is generally followed by the Ancient and Modern *Papish Schoolmen*, that *Order* is *circa corpus Christi mysticum*, and *Jurisdiction* *circa corpus Christi verum*, according whereunto these offices will differ in *Jurisdiction*, not in *Order*. It is plain, that every rank of men in *Ecclesiastical Assem-*

Assemblies, are not by the *Presbyterians* themselves accounted *distinct Orders*, as *Scribes, Moderators, Lay-Elders, &c.* But onely such as by a *distinct solemn consecration* have a *distinct power* given them for the *dispensation of divine graces*, not to be *deprived or repealed* as to its *original right*, though it may be *restrained* as to its *actual execution*. In which sense it is plain, that these *Offices* neither are, nor suppose a *distinction of Orders*.

BUT then for the second proposition supposed in your Answers, That the Church has not power of constituting new Orders; though I doubt not you understand what Conclusion may be inferred from the Doctrine of that ingenious person, who has professedly disproved Dr. Stillingfleet's all divine unalterable right of any certain form of Church-government, because I confess my self not to be of his mind; yet if you mean by Orders all deputation even of Ecclesiastical persons to particular offices, executive of their general power; then I think you have no way disproved prudential Innovations in that kind. Nay, I doubt not but that it were easie to instance in all other Sects, as well as the *Presbyterians*, that have any face of Government, *unscriptural Officers*. The

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Scripture has not used the word, and therefore cannot be pretended to have condemned. Nor has the *Church* ever understood it in this sense, when she has owned but three or two *Holy Orders*. But if by *Orders* you mean the limited sense of the *Church* of that word, then I confess they are not multipliable by the *Church*, but conceive I have shewn the no-necessity of it in our *Prelatick Diocesan Government*.

¶ XII. YOUR second disparity is, "That
 "Kingly Power requireth not, *ad dispositi-*
 " *onem materia*, such *personal* ability as
 "the *pastoral office* doth. That a *child*
 "may be a *King*, and that it may serve
 "turn if he be but the *Head of Power*,
 "and give others *commission* to do all
 "the rest of the *governing* work. But
 "it is not so with a *Judge*, a *Physician*, an
 "*Orator*, or a *Bishop*, who is not *subje-*
 "*ctum capax* of the *essence* of the *office*
 "without *personal* aptitude. This seems
 to me a plain mistake even in the judg-
 ment of those Nations which are govern-
 ed by an *hereditary Monarchy*, who do not
 suffer their Princes, whilest *children*, to
 intermeddle; I do not say in the *execu-*
tive (which belongs not to them as *abso-*
lute Princes) but in the *decretory* parts of
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their Government, (which is their *Royalty*) but oblige them to perform all by *Regents and Protectors*, till themselves come to the years of *personal* aptitude, in the mean time reserving them onely the *honour*, without the *power of a King*. And this sense of the necessity of *personal* abilities, as it appears from the Scripture, which accounts those Nations *miserable* that are under *such Princes*, and the nature of the Office it self, which is as chargable with the *miscarriages* of their *Subjects* as *Ecclesiasticks*, as is excellently discoursed by *Socrates in Xenophon*; so *Mon. Sect.* the avoiding such *defects* in regard of *personal* Incapacity seems to be the reason of all those Nations who have made their Government *elective*; and even of those which are *hereditary*, who have excluded persons notoriously incapable, or at least so judged by them, as *Fools* in all places, *Women* in *France*, and even such as are judged fit in regard of natural endowments, till they come to be so *personally*. That *children* therefore are any where permitted the *honour of Kings*, is not because that they think them sufficiently *qualified*, or that they think it convenient to stand to the hazardous contingency of their *future qualifications*; but that it is

accounted a less evil so to be assured of their person, than to expose themselves to the danger of Civil Wars and Seditions on that account, if it were managed by *popular election*. And accordingly those Nations themselves onely make those Offices *hereditary*, which being *supreme* are supposed, in the *interregna*, not to leave a Power sufficiently preservative of the *publick peace*. Otherwise they that are consistent with such a Power, are even among them Elective, as all *inferiour Magistracies*. And upon these accounts of *avoiding greater inconveniences*, it is not repugnant to the *Ecclesiastical Magistracy* as such, to be hereditary, as appears from the *High Priesthood* among the *Jews*, which yet you will not conclude not to have required *personal abilities*. But still your comparison of a Prince wanting *personal abilities* with a Bishop having them, are not methinks to the purpose, for shewing a greater *multitude* to be governable by such a *Prince*, than such a *Bishop*. Nay, certainly in such a case the advantage will lie on the Bishops side, *personal abilities* being much more sufficient for the discharge of such a trust, than the want of them. Nor will it be sufficient for you to reply, That the defect

fect of *personal* abilities in a *Prince* is supplied by the assistances of his *Substitute* *Governours*, whose *united* aids are more considerable than the *personal* abilities of any *single Bishop*. For it will be requisite for making the comparison even, that the *Bishop* as well as the *Prince* be considered with the like assistances of *Substitutes*; and then the advantage will still remain as formerly on the *Bishops* side. For certainly the *Bishop* having *personal* abilities to judge of the sufficiency of his *Substitutes*, and to call them to *an account* in case of their default, must needs be able to perform more work than such a *Prince*, who must not be supposed able to assure himself of the *sufficiency or honesty* of his *inferiour Officers*.

IF it be pretended, that *Princes* have power to *nominate* such *Substitutes*, but that *Bishops* have not; and therefore that the comparison is rightly formed betwixt *Princes with their Substitutes*, and *Bishops singly* considered; I pray remember,
 1. That the question is not, Whether *Bishops* may lawfully *use* *Substitutes*, but what were *possible* to be performed by them in the *nature of the thing*. For of this kind were your Arguments from the many requisites for dealing with a *single*
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Soul, much more will so many *Souls* as are included in a *Parish*, and more yet for as many *Parishes* as are comprehended in a *Diocese*. These, I say, if they prove any thing, prove the *impossibility* of discipline in a *Diocesan Government*, not onely its *unlawfulness*; and the proving its *possibility* not onely *lawfulness*, was my design in this Argument drawn from the good Government of *Secular Monarchy*. Now this is clearly granted me in this Answer. For if a *Prince* without *personal* abilities may yet govern a *Kingdom* by his *Substitutes*, much more might a *Bishop* with the like *Substitutes*, and *personal* abilities besides. And, 2. It is plainly the case in *practice* among us, for *Bishops* to govern their *Dioceses* not alone, but by the *assistance* of other *Officers*, besides the distinct subordinate *Parochians*. And to this Government as thus established, I believe you objected the *impossibility* of discipline. And, 3. The *lawfulness* of such *Substitution* was, you know, the thing principally debated; and therefore you ought not so confidently to have urged your sense of it as a disparity.

¶ XIV. YOUR third and fourth disparities are onely against *Bishops* substituting *Laymen*; which because I did not undertake

take to defend, shall not look on my self as further concerned in. Your fifth is, "That either it is the *Bishops* work that is delegated by him, or some other. If properly his *own*, then either he maketh more *Bishops*, (and that you say is all you plead for) or else a *Presbyter* or *Lay-man* may do a *Bishops* proper work; and then what need of a *Bishop*? This is an Exception so easily answered, as that I verily perswade my self, that such a Wit as *yours* is would have easily defended us against it, if it had been objected by another Adversary. And if I might be so bold, I would humbly beg you not to exercise your *wit*, in bringing needless and weak Arguments *ex abundanti*, but onely to insist on such as are in your own judgment *convictive*. For certainly if you had but cursorily *reflected* on this Argument, you would readily have discerned, that this is so far from being a *disparity*, as that indeed (if it prove any thing) it will proceed with as much force against the *possibility* of *Secular Discipline* under a *Civil Government* of the same *extent* with a *Diocese*. For may it not as well be urged against the power of *Delegation* in a Prince, that either it must be his *own work* that is delegated by him, or some

other? If that which is properly *his own*, then he must either make *many Princes*, (which were directly destructive to his *Monarchical Government*) or else he who is *no Prince* may do a *Prince's* work, and then what need of a *Prince*? Besides that, your pretended Contradiction will proceed with as much force *here* as in the *Church*. Consider, I pray, what you would answer in behalf of a *Secular Monarch*, and see whether it will not be equally applicable to that which is *Ecclesiastical*. I believe your self would deny, that every *inferiour Officer*, who is *delegated* to do the *Prince's* work, is thereby made a *Prince*, seeing that though he do exert the same power, yet he does not do it *adequatly* (some Acts of *grace* being still reserved to the *Prince's person* incommunicably;) or if *adequately*, yet at least not *independently*, all other *Officers* being subject to the *supreme*. For these two are the *formal constitutives* of a *Prince's* power as such; so that they who want them, how many soever of his *commands* are *executed*, or how much soever of his *power* is *administred* by them, will not therefore prove *formal Princes*. Besides that, upon these Principles it may be affirmed, that though the *Prince* may indeed im-

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ploy others in all the Services of the Commonwealth ; yet it does not thence necessarily follow, that he *delegates* that which is properly his *own work*. For to do all things himself is so far from being his *proper*, as that it is *none* of his *work* as a *Prince*, but onely to take care that the *supreme Officers* entrusted *under him* do their *duty*, and to *punish* them in case of default ; so that *audencia*, or *irresponsible power*, is that which is *proper* to him, and which if it be communicated to *others*, must make *them* also *Princes* ; and this care of obliging *others* to the performance of their *duties* is so inseparable a *Royalty* of the *Supreme Power*, as that those *Princes* who have entrusted *others* with it, have been judged by all prudent persons *Princes* onely *in name*, not *in effect*, as *Chilperick of France*, *Sardanapalus*, &c. This *proper work* therefore of the *Prince* being reserved to himself incommunicably, it will plainly appear that this *Deputation* will not supersede the necessity of the *supreme Monarch* ; and that there will be no contradiction in the case, the *inferiour Officers* still remaining *Subjects*, not *Princes*, notwithstanding whatsoever *Deputation* that does not make them *absolute* and *unaccountable*, and *unobnoxious* to the
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care and cognizance of the Supreme. The Application to our present case is easily made. For when I mentioned the *Delegation* of the *Bishops* power to particular *Parochians*, I onely meant such a *subordinate power* for governing their respective *Parishes*, as *Viceroy*s and *Lieutenants* have under *Secular Monarchs* for the Government of particular *Provinces* ; but this *subordinate power* is so far from being the *proper work* of a *Bishop* as such, as that it would make him *no Bishop* to suppose it in him at all. That therefore which is *proper* to a *Bishop* as such, that is, the power of *compelling the Parochians* to the performance of their duties, is not communicated to any *Parochian* ; and when it has been communicated to any *simple Presbyters*, it has been counted as great an *effeminacy* and betraying of their power, as the like case in *Seculars* was reputed in the *Secular Princes* now mentioned. For this was the occasion of the Abolition of the *Co-episcopi* about the ninth *Century*, that the *Bishops* made use of them as pretences for their own sloth in the performance of their own duties. If therefore any thing of this kind have crept in in the *later ages*, I will not defend it ; but onely shall desire you to remember,

ber, that it is not pertinent to your design of making all *Presbyters* as such, without any such particular *deputation*, equal with them; and that your Arguments, if they proved any thing, are more directly levelled against *Diocesan Episcopacy* as such, without any such *abusive deputation*.

BUT this at present may suffice to shew, that that *power* which is by the *Bishops* permitted to *Parish Ministers*, does not make them *Bishops*, nor make them who are so *properly* unnecessary; which methinks your self might easily have understood, if you had but reflected on what your self know concerning its *practice* among us, without such *dilemmatical uncertainties*, which would make one think you a stranger to it. The other member of your *dilemma* you do not prosecute, whether because you forgot it, or that you thought it of it self sufficiently evident, I know not; I suppose your Argument would have been, that if the *power* delegated by the *Bishop* to the *inferiour Clergy* were none of his *own*, then he could not *delegate* it, seeing that none can justly dispose of that which is *not his own*. To this the Answer is easie, from the parallel *power of Princes* already insisted on, that this *power* is the *Bishops* the same way

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way as that of *inferiour Magistrates* is the *supreme Prince's*, not to be executed by his own person, but by others obnoxious to his election and censures, which is sufficient to shew, that the disposal of it is his, though not the Execution.

¶ XVI. YOUR sixth Answer, which you call your *chief* one, is that which I before observed to be a Concession of all that I pretended to prove, that a *Bishop* with *inferiour Church-rulers* can govern a scope as large as a *Diocese*. But when in application of it to our purpose you ask, "Whether it follows, that our Church-Monarch can oversee them all himself, without any Suboverseers, or rule them (by Gods Word on the Conscience) without any Subrulers. I wonder that you should seem so to forget the practice of our *Ministers* of ruling our *Parishes* as *Subrulers* under the *Bishop*. It may be your meaning is, that our *Parish Ministers* were not allowed a part in the *Supreme Government* of their *Churches*, as if that were sufficient to deny the name of proper *Church-rulers*. But you might have remembred, 1. That my desire was, that the *Bishops*, as in *S. Cyprians* time so now, would more communicate their affairs of any considerable importance with

with their *Presbytery*. And, 2. That even according to the *Rubricks* of our *Church* the *Parish Minister* or *Curate* is allowed the power, not onely of *dissuading*, (which yet is all that is allowed the *Church* by severall of our *Nonconforming Brethren*) but also of *hindering notorious ill livers and uncharitable persons* from the *Communion*, onely with a provision that they *signifie* such their proceedings to the *Ordinary* within fourteen days at the furthest, which was no more than necessary for keeping them to the notion of *Sub*, not *principal Rulers*. This quick and easie dispatch in case of the *Ministers* concurrence, would make one wonder at your complaints concerning the *dilatory* proceedings of the *Ecclesiastical Courts* in this affair, if the *Clergy* could be persuaded to be unanimous and vigorous in the performance of their duty. And, 3. As it is plain that there are many *Subrulers* under *Princes*, who are not of their *Privy Council*; so you cannot therefore conclude the *Parish Ministers* not to be *Subrulers* under the *Bishop* even now, because all great affairs are not originally transacted by their *Council*. Nay, 4. Your self confess *Legislation* it self to be communicated to the *inferiour Clergy* in the *Lower House*.

House in Convocations, when they make *Canons*, which are *Church-Laws*. And this which is one of the *highest* acts of *Government* being communicated to them, can you yet complain of their *exclusion from Government*?

¶ XVII WHEN I described the *Ecclesiastical Monarchy* I spoke of, to be such as does appropriate the *decretory power of Government* to it, *communicating* onely the *executive* to others, you bid me *hold to that*. What your meaning is thereby I do not know; for neither do you seem to persuade me to hold to it as *truth*, seeing you afterwards seem to dislike it. Nor can I think that you would have me to hold to an *error*, that you might have advantage of disputing against me. What you except against a mere *Executioner's* being no *Governour*, might easily have been prevented, if you had considered that the word [*mere*] was none of mine, and that the *executive* power was by me opposed to that which is *decretory*, that is, which is *absolute*, and *unaccountable* to any *Superiour on earth*, at least within such *limits*. Which as it may include much more power than that which your self call *more than executive*, that of *reproving*, *exhorting*, *convincing*; &c. So that decretory in
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this sense can agree to a *subject*, I believe your self will hardly affirm. And indeed if you had been pleased to follow the *analogy* in the *civil power*, where I do not find you so scrupulous in *Ecclesiastical*, you would more clearly have understood my meaning, and its *unconcernedness* in your Exceptions. For in *civils*, at least the *decretory power* (from whence all *Laws and Rules* of proceeding are *originally* borrowed, and to which all *appeals*, in case of difficulty in their sense or partiality of *inferiour Judges*, are finally resolved) will I believe be owned by your self as proper to the *supreme Magistrate*. And how will you call that *power* of the *Subject* as such, that is, as *depending* hereon by a more proper name than that of *executive* (though it may withall include something *decretory* in affairs of *inferiour concernment*, which though *decretory* in respect of their *Inferiours*, is yet onely *executive* in relation to the *sense and design* of their *Supreme* to which they are even in such cases confined) for my part I do not understand. If I knew what were more, either *indeed* expressive of my *meaning*, or likely to be understood so by *you*, though indeed *less proper*, I would rather have used it, than have given you

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occasion to leave my *sense*, and onely to dispute the impropriety of my *expressions*.

¶XVIII BUT you pretend your Arguments to prove the *Bishop* "uncapable even of
 "the *judicial work*, (by which I suppose
 "you mean the same that I called *decretory*) because the *exploration* is part of
 "that, which you seem to imply to be
 "neither *fit* to be entrusted with *others*,
 "nor yet *possible* to be managed by the
 "*Bishop* in his *own person* in so large a circuit as a *Diocese*. This Argument also would have been found false if applied to the *Secular Power*. For by the same reason you may prove, that a *Prince* cannot govern a *Diocese*, because he cannot explore every *particular crime* committed within his *Jurisdiction*, which according to you he must do in his *own person* if he be a *Judge*. Consider, I pray, whether what you would answer in defence of the *power of Princes*, which may not be as plausibly urged in behalf of *Bishops*? Would you not say, that there is a two-fold *judicial power*; such as determines *Laws* and *general rules* of proceeding, and such as does apply them to *particular facts*; and that the *former* is that onely which reserved as the *prerogative* of the *supreme power*;

power, the *later* onely (which is that alone which alone includes *exploration* particular and personal) is *communicated* to inferior Officers? And you might have discerned, that the *former* onely was that which I called *decretory*, and which was by me appropriated to our *Supreme Ecclesiastical Monarch*, which you see does not necessarily include *exploration*. And even concerning that *exploration* which is requisite for pronouncing Sentence in our ordinary *Secular Tribunals*, you might have answered in behalf of *Princes*, that it is not necessary that it be so minute and exact as might be had from a *personal* acquaintance with the *person*, and observation of his *humour and behaviour* in the course of his *life*; but for the *Judges information* that is thought sufficient which is *publick and juridical*, upon the *testimonies* of honest persons, who have known the *person* and his *fact*: for upon these Evidences our ordinary Judges do generally proceed in sentencing such as they never saw or knew before. Nor is it onely usual in *practice*, but in *reason* it is thought abundantly *sufficient*. And, I pray, what may be the disparity that may make this *just* in our *Secular*, and *unjust* in our *Ecclesiastical proceedings*? Is it that the

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credit of the *witnesses* may as well be suspected as *partial* or *mistaken*, (even where no grounds do appear sufficiently *convictive* of such a *suspicion*) as the persons themselves? Or is it that there have been frequent Experiences of their deceiving such as have relied on their Testimony? And are not these difficulties as great in *secular causes*, where yet they are not thought *considerable*? For *humane* affairs are not capable of *demonstrations*, but proceed generally on onely *moral certainty*, oftentimes onely on *probabilities*, which are therefore after the utmost humane *diligence* acknowledged *fallible*: Yet it is thought *prudent* to rely even on such *proofs*, where the *publick advantage* by the decision of such causes is more considerable, than the *prejudice* that may redound to the *person* concerned by a particular mistake, when such proof is the best that the *matter* is capable of, or that can be had, and that its *failings* are more rare and unusual. And the same Reasons are as cogent for the like proceedings in *Ecclesiastical Courts*. Or is it that some *crimes* are so secret, as that they cannot be *juridically* discovered with such Evidence as may *satisfie* a prudent person without *personal* and *particular*
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information? But you may remember that *all crimes* do not come under the *cognizance of publick discipline*, but onely such as are *great and notorious*, concerning which this cannot be pretended. And as *Governours* have thought it just and prudent in some *criminal causes*, to proceed on *conjectures and presumptions*, which themselves confess harsh in some *instances*, as judging it fitter that some few *Innocents* should suffer some *prejudice* rather than that *many guilty* should escape; so in others, where the *probabilities* are more frequently fallible, they have rejected them, as conceiving it more *just* that some few *Nocents* should escape, rather than many *Innocents* should suffer. Besides that, where this *publick Evidence* does not appear, the *crime* cannot be so *scandalous*, nor consequently can the *Church* in such a case be so nearly concerned for its *punishment*.

INDEED in some attempts it has been found, that persons have used much more liberty *in private* for venting and propagating scandalous Reports, than when their *oath* has been required for *publick service*, by which means they have at once made the *crime very scandalous*, and yet rescued the *criminal* from

§ XIX.

justice. But then the blame of such *impunity* is not to be imputed to the *negligence* of such a *Judge*, but the *prevarication* of such *witnesses*, and therefore will not be pertinent to our purpose. And then for other *less or less notorious Crimes* the private power of *exhorting, reproving, &c.* (which you call *more than executive*, and is no more denied a *Minister* in his own *Parish* under a *Diocesan*, than any other Form of *government*) *may and must* prove sufficient, because no other is either *convenient or possible*. Or is it that the *penitence* of the *criminal*, which is requisite to his *absolution*, (which is equally an act of *power* as that of *censure*) cannot be so certainly known by this publick *Juridical Evidence*? This (besides that it may be as plausibly objected in *Secular Causes*, where *personal penitence*, at least that which is *judged so*, is as much required to *absolution from secular penalties*, and where these *Juridical Evidences* are perfectly as fallible) will not appear so difficult as it may seem, if it be considered what *kind of penitence* is requisite for this *Ecclesiastical Absolution*?

1. Not a *universal penitence for all sins*, but onely those which he had been before *censured for*.
2. These not *secret*, but *pub-*

publick and notorious. For none but these can be *scandalous*, and none but *scandalous sins* do fall under publick Ecclesiastical Jurisdiction. And, 3. Not *real penitence*, even for *these* themselves, but onely so far as it may be signified to the satisfaction of a *prudent person* by *exteriour indications*. And, 4. These *exteriour indications*, not *private* but *publick*, such as *publick confession* of the sin, and *asking forgiveness* for it, and giving *publick satisfaction* to the *injured party* and the *Church*, and her *scandalized enemies*, and all circumstantiated with such pregnant evidences of *sincerity*, as may be thought sufficient *probabilities* of it in the judgment of *equal prudent persons*. And, 5. These *publick indications*, such as may satisfy even *strangers*, who have been *scandalized* with his *crimes*, though unacquainted with his *person*. Now why a *Bishop* may not in this *publick juridical* way of proceeding *explore the penitence*, even of *particular criminals*, without *personal acquaintance*, as well as the *scandalized multitude*, and as well as *secular Judges*, as you have produced none, so for my part I see no cogent Argument. And yet further, 6. Considering that it is not the *personal sin*, but the *publick scan-*

dal of it, which brings it to a *publick cognizance*, though these signs should fail of signifying his *real personal* penitence; yet if they satisfy the *multitude*, though *erroneously* they take off the *scandal*, and therefore give a just reason of revoking such publick *censures*? For every cause that may be *sufficient to dissuade* a person, upon an account of his own *interests*, to abstain from *communion*, will not be so for *depriving* him of it *authoritatively*. For they are not all sorts of *crimes* that put us out of the *state of grace*, as they ought to be that deprive us of our *right to communion*; not all that can deprive us of that right, that have not Evidence enough to warrant a *coercive involuntary* punishment; nor all that have that Evidence, that are fit to be punished *publickly*, and I believe you will not question but that *Excommunication* is a *publick* punishment. And thus, I believe, by this time you may understand, how that though the *Bishop* sentence upon *other mens words*, (which your self confess may *perhaps sometimes* be done) yet there are as good *prudential preservatives* against that inconvenience which you thence infer, *That he must excommunicate all that some body else says he must excommunicate,*
as

as there are against the like in *Secular Tribunals*, which do confessedly sentence on *other mens words*, and yet do not therefore condemn all that *some body saith they must condemn*.

YOUR seventh Disparity is, "That
 "in the Kingdom there is not one *Subject*
 "of an hundred, or many hundred, who
 "hath *Law-suits* with others once in a
 "year, or seven years, or his life; not
 "one of some hundreds where you have
 "lived, that findeth the *Magistrate* work
 "as a *criminal*, &c. But we are all of a
 "sinning corrupt disposition, and that the
 "*Pastor* hath few of his flock that need
 "not some personal Applications in one
 "degree or other. And even as to *gross*
 "*sins* lived in, and ignorance, or *heresie*
 "against the very essence of *Christianity*, it
 "is a good *Parish*, where a considerable
 "part of it are not guilty. To this it is
 easie to reply, That though the case
 were as you have represented it, that
 men were, not onely where *you have li-*
ved, but generally more guilty of crimes
 obnoxious to *Ecclesiastical* than *Secular*
 cognizance; yet it would not follow,
 that more were governable by a *Secular*
 than by an *Ecclesiastical Magistrate*;
 1. Because I have already shewn, That
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¶ XX.

there are even in the *same precincts* very many more persons, if not crimes, subject to the *Magistrate* than the *Church*, as *Infidels*, *Excommunicated persons*, and such as are *incorrigible by Ecclesiastical censures*, &c. Besides those who are *religious*, who are not the less subject to the *Magistrate* for their being Members of the *Church*. And, 2. There are many other *ends of government* besides the *punishment of criminals*, such as are the *prevention of the crimes*, the *promotion of unanimity and industry*, and *publick generous designs*, and the *determination of disputable controversies*, wherein *good and well-meaning men* may *bonâ fide* differ from each other, and the like. They must as well *build* as *take away the rubbish*. And therefore there is a *government* where there are no *crimes*, over the *Angels and beatified Spirits*. But especially among men, where *crimes* are at least acknowledged possible, the *prevention of crimes* may be a work of no less diligence than their *reformation*. And, 3. The freedom of good men from these more ordinary *scandalous crimes*, (which I perceive you to instance in) though it may less frequently exercise the *secular power*; yet where it does, it will most *dangerously*. For, 1. *Virtue* raises

raises the *spirits* of men, and makes them *active and industrious*, that they may *satisfie* themselves of their *usefulness* in their *generations*. Whereas, on the contrary, *Vice* does *emasculate mens spirits*, and make them *slothful and sluggish*, and lovers of their own *ease*, and more unfit for *commotions*. And, 2. *Virtue* makes men publick spirited, whereas *Vice* does debase them to *private and little Interests*. So that the Adversaries of these are onely such *ordinarily* as may oppose them in their *limited and particular designs*, and therefore onely *private persons*; but these having the same object with the *publick Magistrate*, that is, the *publick concernment*, must more directly clash with him in case of *different persuasion*. And, 3. The very *authority of Virtue* with the *multitude*, (who cannot but *reverence* it in *others*, how little soever they *practise it themselves*) cannot chuse but very much advantage *virtuous persons* for the forming of a *party* more than such as are *vicious*, who, though they may be flattered and loved by such as are *gainers* by their *vices*, yet cannot in prudence be thought so *fit* for management of their *publick concernments*, even by *vicious persons* themselves, who act upon principles

ples of worldly *prudence*, as they who are more *honoured*, and *publick-spirited*, and *honest and sincere*, and so every way as well more *fit*, as more *able* for the discharge of a *publick trust*. And, 4. The onely *curbs* of the Supreme Powers, whether of *rewards or punishments*, are less regarded by *virtuous* than *vicious* persons, and therefore must needs be less able to *restrain* them. For how can he who undervalues Death and Fear, and all deprivation of *exteriors*, be governed by any *humane power*? Besides, 5. The great courage, and that not *precipitant* but *rational*, which animates *good men* to the susception of great Attempts, from the satisfaction of their own *consciences*, and their strong confidence of the *present assistance or future rewards of God*, of which *wicked men* are wholly destitute. These considerations, I say, and many others, may suffice to shew, that the mistakes of *good men* are of more *mischievous* influence on the *Commonwealth*, than the crimes of *debauched persons*, and therefore far from *diminishing* the care of the *supreme Magistrate*. And accordingly you may find the most *virtuous ages* of the *Romans* more troublesome for popular Broils and Seditions, than those later ones

ones of *wickedness*. Witness the almost perpetual clashing betwixt the *Senate* and the *People*, the popular envies against their *Hero's*, *Coriolanus*, *Camillus*, *Scipio Africanus*, &c. But, 4. Though the *generality* of people were *actually* every where as little troublesome to the *Magistrate*, as where you have known them (which I doubt you can hardly undertake for;) yet you must not thence estimate the *qualifications and duty* of a *Magistrate*. For as none would think it *prudent* for a person putting to Sea in a calm, to choose a *Pilot sufficient* onely for that season, but *unprovided* for a Storm; so certainly a *Magistrate* ought to be *prepar'd and qualified* with abilities for governing a *criminal and unquiet* people, even then when he lies under the *actual* obligation for exercising them, especially considering it as a case so very *ordinary*, and so *probably* to be expected. If therefore a *Bishop* may not undertake the charge of a *Dio-cese*, because impossible to be performed by him; I may as well by the same *points of reason* conclude, that a *Magistrate* may not take that of a *Province or Kingdom*, even when in the good humour you suppose them, because he must not in *prudence* venture on that, unless he be *prepared*.

red for them when *vicious*, which you suppose impossible, and therefore unfit to be engaged on. And, 5. You do not propose the case with any *equality*; for if you would do so, you should not compare a *Prince* governing a *regular* people and a *Bishop* with an irregular scandalous *Diocese*, but have supposed the *Subjects* in both cases *regular*, or in both *irregular*. And if you will needs suppose in favour of the *Prince*, that his *Subjects* are as little *criminal* in his Courts, as you have found them where you have been acquainted, to shew the *possibility* of his governing such a people, though in a large *precinct*; why can you not suppose in favour of the *Bishop*, that the *Subjects* of his *Diocese* behave themselves as innocently in reference to *crimes* obnoxious to the *publick cognizance* of his Courts? Is it either because that even persons so supposed equally innocent in relation to the charges of *both Courts*, are yet more *difficultly* governable by an *Ecclesiastical* than a *Secular Magistrate*? This is not as much as pretended, I am confident, not as much as plausibly proved, in your present Discourse. Or is it that the Supposition it self in relation to *Ecclesiastical crimes* is more difficult, it being more
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to Mr. Baxter.

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rare and improbable to find a people innocent in *crimes* of publick *Ecclesiastical*, than *Secular* cognizance? If this later be your meaning, I doubt neither of the *reasons* intimated by you will maintain you in it. Not that of your own *experience*; for I believe you would have found those *good persons* of your acquaintance as little troublesom to the *Bishops*, as the *King's Courts*, as little guilty of incestuous *Marriages*, forging *Wills and Testaments*, *Simony*, &c. as of any acts of *secular injustice*. And as for the other concerning our *propensity* to *actual*, deduced from the *original*, sin; you have not as yet proved this propensity greater to *Ecclesiastical* than *Secular* crimes. But it is rather probable, that as the *crimes* cognoscible in the *Ecclesiastical Courts* are generally more heinous, so they are more easily avoidable. If you have any inclination to think so, for preventing it I pray remember what I have already intimated, that they are not all sorts of *sins against God* that are cognoscible in the *Bishops Courts*, but onely such as are *great*, and *scandalous*, and *notorious*. And then consider whether it be not as easie to suppose a people innocent of *great*, and *scandalous*, and *notorious sins against God and Religion*,

gion, as of *injustice* towards *Men*. For this indeed will be the true state of the question. 2. Therefore it will not be so easily proved, that the *crimes* cognoscible in the *Secular Courts* are so few, in comparison of those that are *Ecclesiastical*. This I have already proved before, and am not willing to repeat what I have there said. At present methinks your own Concessions, if closely reflected on, would have prevented your pretending otherwise. For, besides that those multitudes of persons guilty of *crimes* obnoxious to the *Bishops Courts*, (which I have said every *impenitent sinner* is not, and have given my reason why I said so) are I doubt guilty of many more *civil crimes*, for which I shall onely appeal to your own experience; I pray consider how many of the crimes cognoscible in the *Bishops Courts* are originally *civil*, as those concerning *Marriages*, *Wills* and *Testaments*, *Tithes*. &c. which are mere arbitrary concessions of *Princes* in favour of the *Church*, as protected by them. And the rest that are not, yet come under the *Princes cognizance*, as the *Churches Canons* are made *Laws* of the *Commonwealth*, and her *Censures* are seconded by *coercive secular penalties* imposed by
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the *Prince* on such as have proved refractory against her *Spiritual Authority*. Upon which account it is impossible but that the *Secular causes* must needs prove more *numerous*, as including all *Ecclesiasticals*, and many proper to themselves besides. So that this Disparity is every way unconvictive of your purpose. For if you mean those persons who are so *innocent of secular crimes*, to be different from those who are supposed so very *guilty of Ecclesiasticals*, then there can be no just *disparity* pretended, because there is indeed no equal *comparison*. But if you mean the *same persons* in both cases, then the Disparity cannot be pretended true, because the Supposition is false.

BUT you object in favour of me, ¶ XXI.
 "That the *Parish-priest* is to reprove, exhort, and convince [sinners] first, till he prove them *impenitent*; and that he is to instruct the *Ignorant, Infidels*, and *Hereticks*; (which must needs considerably lessen the number of *criminals*, who onely in case of their convicted *impenitency* in the use of these *means*, should be further impleaded in that severer way of proceeding in the *Bishops Courts*.) To this you answer, 1. That this is more than an *executive power*. If it be so, I do not know any

any that denies it you, so that you have no reason that I know of to complain on that account. None hinders you from *reproving, exhorting, convincing, and instructing* whom you please, especially such as are *intrusted* to you as Members of your *cure*. But I am sure this is not more than that *executive power*, which I said was *communicated* to the *inferiour Clergie*, in opposition to that which I called *decretory*, reserved to our *Ecclesiastical Monarch*; for I believe you will not call this power of *reproving, exhorting, &c. decretory*. I believe you meant a power *merely executive*. But you may remember, that that was neither my *word nor meaning*; nor do I for my part think this power mentioned by you to be more than that which were *merely executive*. My reason you will suddenly understand.

¶ XXII. SECONDLY, therefore you answer, "*That you desire no more at all from Bishops or any*. If so, you need not desire it, for none denies it you. But you say, "*You know no other Episcopal power over the people, but thus personally to convince men, and to declare to the congregation upon proof, the fitness or unfitness of men for their communion by*"

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penitence or impenitence. If you know no other power than this, you know none at all. For this power of *convincing* men will as well agree to the meanest *Laick* who has reason on his side, as the greatest *Bishop*; seeing either of them may *convince* if furnished with such *reason*, but neither can without it. And yet sure you will not say, that the meanest *Laick* has any *power* over him whom he may thus *convince*, at least not coherently to your own principles, who in opposition to our *Lay-chancellours* make *Jurisdiction* inseparable from *Orders*. So also if the *power of Excommunication* be no more than declaring a person *unfit* for the *communion* of the congregation as being *impenitent*, and *Absolution* be a declaration of his *fitness* for such *communion* as a *penitent*; then every *prosecutor* of a *criminal*, every *witness* produced against him, every prudent skilful *Canonist*, every *Laick* that is sufficiently informed of the sense of the *Law* and *matter of fact*, may as well *excommunicate* as the *Bishop* or the *Presbytery*. For every such *skilful person* may know the *fitness* or *unfitness* of such a person for *communion*, and knowing it may *declare* his knowledge with the *reasons* of it; and upon such *declaration* the

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people may, if they please, do as he would have them, either *communicate* with, or *separate* from such a person. For indeed no *declaration* of it self *formally and precisely* understood is *obligatory*, but as it is a *promulgation* of that which *antecedently* has a just *obligative power*, *In actu primo*, yet is not *in actu secundo* obligatory *quoad nos* till we know it. As though the King and Parliament have a power of making *Laws*, and therefore what has passed all their Votes, in the first moment when it has done so, is immediately a *Law*; yet it is not *in actu secundo* obligatory on the *Subject*, so as that its *violation* by him does incur the annexed *penalty* till it be legally *promulged*. Yet so it is, on the contrary, that this legal *promulgation* it self, that is, such a *promulgation* as is performed by the person *authorized* by Law, with all the requisite *circumstances*, cannot make any thing really *obligatory*, that has not formerly been decreed by the *Legislative Power*. Unless therefore there be in the Church a *power* antecedent to such *declaration*, the *declaration* can make none, seeing every one may *declare* his own sense as well as the *Governour*; and *declaration* does onely make that *obligatory quoad nos*, which was so *in se* antecedently.

cedently. I did not before charge you with any of those pernicious Doctrines to *Church Authority* taxed in my *Preface*, and am sorry now you give me so just occasion to do it. It may be I may misunderstand you, and shall be very glad to acknowledge my mistake when you shall call it one.

AND I beseech you, who have so XXIII
publickly professed your self a Friend to *publick peace*, and an Enemy to *Church-divisions*, to consider whether those *disparaging Doctrines* concerning the power of the *Church* be not *Seminaries of infinite and eternal Schisms*. For if the Church have no other power but *persuasive and declarative*, then he who either actually persuaded of the *equity* of her particular *Impositions*, or at least *pretends* it, may freely *remonstrate* against them, and refuse *obedience* to them, and cannot be restrained from *seditious* behaviour by *Excommunication*, unless at least the greater part of *Communicants* be satisfied, and *profess themselves* to be so, that it is their *duty*, not in obedience to their *Superiours*, but on account of the particular *reasonableness* of the thing, to withdraw themselves from his *communion*. And even then it self, if he can persuade a few to

his Party he may upon these principles, without any *scruple of conscience* erect a new *communion* for himself. For indeed what can hinder him when *government*, which is the principle of *unity* in all *Societies*, is thus deprived of all other awe of *conscience* to oblige him to *obedience*, *distinct* from his particular satisfaction of the *reasonableness* of the things ; or of any coercive means of his restraint, be his cause never so *bad*, and his dissatisfaction never so onely *pretended*? And when the *unity* of the *Catholick Church* is thus made to depend on so *hazardous* and *rarely-contingent* a condition, as the persuasion of its many thousand *members*, of infinite *interests* and *capacities*, of the reasonableness of every particular *indifferent* or *probable* Constitution, who can ever secure it for so long a time, as the *Government* of the *Church* was designed for by him, who first did *constitute* it? I know for prevention of these inconveniences you would have *Governours* cautious in determining any thing but what is *clear* and *necessary*. And for my part I wish it so too, that for matters of *belief* (it not being in Subjects minds to *believe* what they please) they would determine nothing but what were very *evident*, and even

even for matters *indifferent*, that they would neither determine more of them than were *needful*, nor such of them as were not *convenient* in the circumstances, and *suitable* to the dispositions of the age of their determination, nor be too *tenacious* in maintaining them when their inconveniences should be found greater than their advantage. Though I confess withall, that it were in prudence much *safer*, to make any such change by their own *free Election*, than to seem *necessitated* to it by mutinous and seditious *Remonstrances* of their Subjects, such a *compliance* being of greater consequential prejudice to *government*, and consequently to *Ecclesiastical Unity*, than a maintenance of a thing *indifferent*, though *inconvenient*. But withall you know, that *Unanimity* even in things indifferent (much more in matters of Faith) is in general and indefinitely *necessary*, though not *particularly* determined in the Scripture; that this unanimous observance of things of such a nature is not morally possible by the particular *conviction* of every Subject of their *fitness*; that therefore there is no security for their *unanimous* observance but that of *authority*, and no *authority* so proper as that which

is *Ecclesiastical*; that when it is so imposed, it is an instance of *obedience* to the *authority* imposing; that being so, whatever it may be in its own *nature*, it cannot still remain *indifferent* as to its use, seeing it is not indifferent whether Subjects ought to be obedient to their lawful Sovereigns. And therefore methinks it would become you in healing *Church-divisions*, to take a care of *preserving* as well the *Prerogatives* of Governours, as the *Christian Liberty* of Subjects, seeing *extremes* on both sides are alike prejudicial to *Ecclesiastical Unity*. Indeed I confess many of our first Reformers not to have been so cautious herein as the *Interest* of the Church would have required, who feeling themselves oppressed by a *Tyrannical Ecclesiastical Power*, and being extremely exasperated by their violent and rigorous proceedings, were almost onely solicitous about *Negatives*, never satisfying themselves with any reasonable retrenchments of such exorbitancies; onely shewing how far *Ecclesiastical Power* might not presume, but not how far it might proceed. And they were then the more excusable for not proceeding to such *positives*, because the ends of such *Ecclesiastical Power*, the preservation of *unity* both

both in *faith and practice* were then more easily attainable without the Interposition of the *exercise* of such a *power*. For their first zeal against the common Adversary will oblige them in prudence to conceal their lesser Animosities, and the danger of weakening themselves, whose united strengths were no more than necessary for their common *preservation*, which was a *mischief so great and imminent*, as might make many *less*, at least comparatively, tolerable, and might keep them from being so dogmatical in imposing or opposing Opinions of inferiour concern. And for matters of *practice*, the zeale of their first beginnings, and the watchful eyes of their Adverlaries for observing their *lapses*, and the great use of good personal Lives for the propagation of their *opinions*, made them at first less sensible of the *loss of Discipline*, whilst upon these accounts they performed those things of *themselves*, which *Discipline* should have compelled them to, as far as *Ecclesiastical Censures* might compel them, that is, as far they valued the *opinion* of so many *wise and good men*, and as far as they feared the loss of the *ordinary means of grace*, and those *dangers* they were exposed to when cast out of that *Society*,

which could alone entitle them to the *Divine Protection*, and all the *terroures* that are signified in their *delivery to Satan*, I am necessitated to interpose this *Explication of the compulsion of Ecclesiastical Discipline*, because I see you otherwise apt enough to misunderstand me. And even for the observation of things *indifferent*, the very great *opinion* they had entertained for some of the first *Reformers*, and the little leisure for reflection on their own condition, when they were so diverted by their hearts against the *common Adversary*, and the little *willingness* they had to *dissent*, at least to make a *breach*, for little things, from them whom they loved so dearly, for their *unanimity* in their common and greatest *cencern*, coagulated the *multitude* in a *willing observation* even of *indifferent punctilio's*.

¶ XXIV YET we find those *Hero's* themselves complain of this defect. Our *Church of England* wishes that *Discipline* might be restored in her *Commination*, a sign that she was sensible of its *want and necessity*; and *Luther* commends it among the *Bohemians*, and wishes also that it were restored among his own; and the want of *positive constitutions* in this kind seems to have been the greatest scandal to *Erasmus*,

mus, to alienate him from the *Protestants*, to whom he had formerly been well affected. But *Bullinger* and *Gualther* do, as I remember, in their Epistles to *Erastus*, confess their *Helvetian Churches* to have no other discipline than what was exercised by the *Civil Magistrate*. But when upon a deservescency of their first *zele*, and a *liberty* occasioned by their great successes against the common Adversary, men at length got the leisure to enquire with the same freedom into the Doctrines of the *Reformers*, as the *Reformers* themselves had into those of the then extant *Ecclesiastical Governours*, and so divert that *zele* which had been enkindled and heated in the prosecution of the common cause against *each other*, in the prosecution of their own *private sentiments*; and when they grew more *remiss* in the care of their *lives*, and began by degrees to take *advantage* of their freedom from their former yoke of *Ecclesiastical Governours*, and to relapse into their former *dissoluteness*, and to be curious and critical in inquiring into the *merit* of every *Ecclesiastical observance*, and to make themselves Judges of the *expediency* as well as *lawfulness* of things *confessedly indifferent*, and not to content themselves with their

own thoughts, but to discountenance their dissenting Brethren, and to divide the Church, and to disrespect their Superiours, who in later times were not held in that great veneration as their predecessors; then at length at Geneva, and other places that were swayed by the authority of Calvin, it was found as well in prudence, upon account of its experienced reasonableness and use; as in duty, upon account of its Institution in the Scriptures, necessary to revive Ecclesiastical Power, that might for future Ages prevent and restrain the exorbitancies of men abusing their liberty, and secure the peace of the Church. And whatever they had before disputed against their Adversaries, prejudicial to Ecclesiastical Power in general, it is plain that the authority which that very wise and prudent person thought necessary for the preservation of peace and piety in the Church, is more than persuasive and declaratory, even coercive of persons otherwise persuaded. I shall not mention those excesses which I believe you will not approve, their encroachments on the Regal Authority in Scotland, and the burning of Servetus and Gentilis at Geneva, and the Book written by Beza to justify that action. It is very plain that the Presby-
ries,

ries, where ever they have been set up, have exercised a power coercive, whether in defining Heresies, or censuring prophane or refractory disobedient persons. And if Calvin found the necessity of this coercive power then, I am sure, as our experience since his time is much greater, so we have found much reason to approve the truth of what he onely foresaw. For all the later Sects have prevailed on the concessions of the former. And by the same reason, as the first Presbyterians, who broke the peace of the Church, thought themselves to be excused, because they professed themselves unsatisfied with the Churches persuasions to her Impositions; so every later Sect has pretended the same against the Presbyterians. And as long as there is any unanimous observance of the Church, that is not particularly expressed in the Scripture, at least not clearly, with that evidence which may be presumed sufficient to satisfy every well-meaning person as well as ourselves, (which I doubt will be found as long as such a thing as communion with the Church as a body politick is owned, that is, as long as it is not dissolved into mere Enthusiasm) we shall never be secure of the communion, not onely of pretended, but really dissatisfied

tisfied pious persons. And till you make a *power* in the *Church coercive* of mens *practice*, as well as a *belief of Fundamentals*, a requisite condition to *unity*; If ar you will never be able to reach what you are so zealously and commendably attempting, the *Cure of our Church-divisions*.

¶ XXV BUT that which makes me most of all wonder is, that you should pretend that this *persuasive declarative power* is denied to *Parish Ministers*; and the reason you give for it seems to me more *paradoxical*: “That the *Minister* can have no “access to the *guilty* by their *own wills*, “and that there is no *law nor penalty* that “you know of to constrain any to come “to you, or receive you, to *hear or answer* you. Here one would think that you did approve of *coercive means*, as necessary for doing good to those that are *unwilling to be persuaded*. For if you did not, why should you blame our *Diocesan Discipline* for not allowing you that which you would not have allowed? But presently after you take occasion from these *coercive means*, “which you confess are used among us, to inveigh “against us, as if our *Prelatick Christian Profession* were onely to choose rather to

“to be Christians and communicate,
“than to lie in Gaol, and have all our
“Estates confiscate. One would think
that you were desirous to find Objections
against us, when thus almost at the same
time you blame us for *having* that, which
immediately before you blamed us for
wanting. For the difference is not (as
one would think) from the most candid
interpretation of your words, *That you*
would have such guilty persons forced to con-
fer with you, but not to profess themselves
Christians, and communicate without your
leave: for you afterwards profess simply,
that *you would have no force at all*. Be-
sides, what *force* is it that you mean? is
it that *exteriour* one of *laws and corporal*
penalties? (this your words seem plainly
to imply.) This you know does not be-
long to the *Church*, but the *civil Magi-*
strates power *circa sacra*, who is therefore
to be blamed for it, and not the *Church*,
if it be a *crime*, and some body must needs
bear the *blame*. Or are they the *spiritual*
coercions of the *Church*? I know none
of that kind but *Excommunication*, which
is of no force with those who do not *va-*
lue the advantage of *communion*; and
they who *do*, need not to be *forced* to
confer with their *Minister*. Besides that,
your

your self know and have confessed, that the power of *Suspension* of unworthy persons from the *Sacrament* is allowed to the *Parish Minister* even in our *Church*, so that even in that case he has his remedy in his own hand, as far as it can be proved *expedient* that he should under a *Monarchical Government*. But methinks your description of a *Prelatick Christian* is very *harsh*, and (though for my part I am resolved to take nothing *ill*, because I verily believe, not onely by this *Letter*, but your other *publick writings*, that the *heat* of your *style*, and the *extraordinary expedition* you make use of, not allowing your self time for *second thoughts*, do transport you to such expressions, as your serious *reflections* would not approve; yet) would, to other less *favourable Judges* of your *good meaning*, rather tend to exasperate than cure those *divisions*, for which you are justly so much concerned. And besides your own acknowledgment of many good *Prelatick Christians* on other occasions, “you cannot be ignorant, that
 “many of them have been *Christians* of
 “that which you call the *old profession*,
 “that is, [have been *Christians*, and held
 “*communion* with the *Church*, though
 “they have gone to *prison* and *death* for
 it]

"it] not onely in Queen *Maries* days, but even in your own memory in *England* and *Ireland*, when their being so has brought sufferings on them, not rescued them from them. So that I do not understand why you should stigmatize them with the name of *Prelatical*.

INDEED if you could shew, that XXVI
it was rather the extraordinary good influences of God, and their own good inclinations, that made them voluntarily good, against their worldly interests, notwithstanding their malignant principles, which of themselves would have made them otherwise; I confess your commendable inclination to speak of things as they are might have excused the rigour of such expressions. But, 1. You cannot but know that these exterior compulsions have not been proper to *Prelatists*, but common to all those that have owned such a thing as discipline, *Presbyterians* as well as *Papists*; so that there is no reason to appropriate to such Christians as are made so by coercive discipline the invidious name of *Prelatical*. And, 2. You have not, and I believe you cannot, prove that such external force must needs of it self make *Prelatists* dissemblers: 1. Because all that are of themselves good, will
not

not need such force, this being onely a secondary reserve for reducing such as are desperate, as to that power which alone you allow the Church, that is, of persuasion, none being this way compelled, but they who cannot be persuaded. And certainly for such persons it is at least a less evil to profess themselves Christians, though dissemblingly, than not so much as to profess themselves so, both in regard of the honour which is done Religion even in professing it, and the edification of others, who may be moved by their example, and that they are by this means taken from the sins of open hostilities against the truth. And, 2. You must not presently condemn all of dissimulation, who are brought to a sense of their duty by fear. Otherwise you will condemn all the penal laws of the Commonwealth, as tending to make their Subjects dissemblingly loyal, and all Gods providential crosses and menaces of hell, as tending rather to make men profess themselves Christians rather than be damned, &c. For frequent experience cannot but have informed you, who are so very experienced, that the fear of Man, as well as of God, has to many proved the beginning of true wisdom; that good Christians have found

found more occasion to bless God for their crosses than their consolations ; that the terrible vengeance of God against sinners, even in this life, under the *Old Testament*, was a great restraint to that hard-hearted people, to deter them from their sins, and to reduce them to *solid real* piety, whom we find less efficaciously moved to their duty by any other means. For I pray consider, 3. That this *disimulation* which you seem to suppose to be the ordinary consequent of exterior compulsion, cannot indeed have any place but upon these conditions ; that, 1. The sufferer do believe his cause to be good ; and, 2. That such belief be grounded on conscientious motives, (whether really or apparently conscientious I now dispute not, seeing the person must act according to the evidence of his own conscience, however really erroneous, after he has used his best endeavours for its information ;) and, 3. That this persuasion of his conscience be unalterable ; or at least, 4. That such exterior compulsion be neither a means nor a probable occasion to make men alter their opinions, at least not to make good and conscientious persons to alter, at least not ordinarily ; so that it be presumed, that the multitude of goodmen cannot be altered up-

on such terms, and therefore that if the multitude do, they cannot be generally presumed to do it on just and conscientious motives ; and yet , 5. That, notwithstanding his being persuaded as formerly , he be by his exterior compulsion wrought on to make an unveracious exterior profession.

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XXVII. NOW to shew briefly that none of these hold, at least not all of them, which is requisite for your purpose ; I must premise, 1. That the design of this kind of discourse against these coercive means, if it be to hinder them, must be to persuade them in whose power they are, that is, the Church or the Magistrate, that their practice were sinful to them. That, 2. Nothing can be imputably sinful to Governours, but what either does or may, in the use of their utmost moral diligence, appear to them to be so. So that it is not your opinion of the sinfulness of such coercion, that can prove it sinful to them, unless they be of the same mind, or neglect the moral means of information, which if you suppose the case evident, you must presume such as would infallibly bring them to be so. 3. Therefore what are the real thoughts of Governours, and whether they have made use of the means of in-

information with integrity and diligence, none can for their own satisfaction (which is principally to be taken notice of in order to the imputableness of sin) judge of so well as themselves. Nor, 4. Can we better be assured of their sense herein than by their word, unless it be by the evidence of the thing. It is not therefore every proof that may seem satisfactory to our selves, that may warrant our presumption of their sense, unless it be such as is thought cognoscible by them, and whose evidence is presumed inevitable upon a sincere examination. And, 5. It is not sufficient as to the matter in hand, that it appear that some persons have indeed been made hypocrites for fear of this exterior coercion, but it must further be shewn that its natural tendency is to do so, or at least that it is its most usual consequent. And, 6. That it is an occasion of their hypocrisie by virtue of it self, not of the disposition of the Subject. For the sins that are derived from the disposition of the Subject, they that give the immediate occasions are not responsible for. Otherwise when the wicked turn Gods grace into wantonness, and those things which should have been for their good into the occasions of falling, and the word preached turns to

be the *savour of death unto death* to its *unworthy hearers*, and the blessed *Sacrament of the Lords Supper* to its *unworthy receivers*; you might conclude God, who gives those abused favours, to be the *proper* occasion of the *abusers* sin. And (because there are some who will with less scruple grant of God, that he is the *designer* of his *creatures* sins, than they would grant it concerning any *good men*) S. Paul had been the *culpable* occasion of the *perjury* of those *conspirators*, who had *sworn not to eat* until they had killed him, onely by making use of *just means* for his *own preservation*. And these you may easily believe to be the *thoughts* of *Governours*, concerning those whom they are pleased to *prosecute* for their *opinions*. That they do as seriously believe, that the *reasons* which *satisfie themselves*, are as sufficient to *satisfie all others*, that use their *moral diligence* for finding satisfaction, as the *sufferers* believe it concerning their *own reasons*, that they are sufficient to *satisfie* their *Governours*; and therefore that such dissenting *hypocritical Subjects* are as faulty in *not using their diligence* in the use of the *means*, if they find not *actual satisfaction*, as such *Subjects* believe the same concerning their
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Governours. And, 7. That this *personal hypocrisie* of such dissembling persons is a *greater inconvenience* to the *publick*, than the *toleration* of their *seditions behaviour*. For as it is certain that *Governours* no more than other *good Christians*, may design any *sin* for any *good* whatsoever; so it will not be easily disproved either by *reason* or *authority of Casuists*, that they may design that from whence they know a sin will necessarily follow, for the *avoidal* of a *greater* both inconvenience and sin, such as is *sedition* in respect of *hypocrisie*. For though it be unlawful to *choose any evil* where it may be avoided; yet it is not so when two occur, whereof at least one is *inevitable*, to make choice of the *less* before the *greater*. And now upon these supposals it were easie to shew, from these conditions of *disimulation*, that either there were no necessity that the *sufferer's* under these *coercive means* must needs *dissemble*; or if there were, yet at least not such as would make it *imputable* as sin to *Governours*; or if it were a sin to them *absolutely*, yet not such under such a *streightned election*.

BUT I must avoid prolixity, and therefore at present shall onely briefly XXVII.
make Application to the forementioned

conditions of dissimulation. 1. Therefore it is not necessary that every *sufferer* for *his opinions* must believe his cause to be good; for there are *bad* as well as *good* of all much received *opinions*, that maintain them not upon account of their *truth*, but because they are themselves *factiously* disposed, and love *contradiction*, especially to *Superiours*, (a humour such people of the *vulgar* are usually too much addicted to) or affect *popularity* or *singularity*, or promise themselves some great *advantages* by publick Innovations and Disturbances, or engage in a party out of kindness to their Friends that are concerned in it. Much less, 2. Is it necessary that every one who does indeed *believe* his own Opinion *true*, must do it upon Motives, so much as *apparently conscientious*. For *education* and *custom*, and the *authority* of a person respected, or a vainglorious *ostentation* of his own Wit, or the *shame* of being mistaken or convicted, may at first incline many to defend Opinions *fortuitously* taken up, and afterwards the *love* of their own *arguments* may delude many to believe what they have once asserted. And God knows whether the *vulgar* of most Opinions be not acted thus, whatever pretences they make of *conscience*,

ence, (for custom may go very far in making men abhor *unusual*, innocent, or commendable things as prophane and picaresque, as appeared in the Experiment of *Darius Hystaspis* in *Herodotus*, who found the *Scythian* to pretend as much conscience for eating, as the *Grecian* for burying his dead Relations.) And we have reason to believe, if of too many, whom we find the most zealous maintainers of *opinions controverted*, and yet the most negligent practisers of such as are *undoubted*, which certainly would not be, if *Gods sake*, or *conscience*, or a sense of their own duty, were the *reasons* inducing them to believe them. Now these Deductions being made, the number of *conscientious* Dissenters would I doubt be generally found the *smaller*. And it is a *general and just* rule of publick proceedings, not to forbear that which may *generally* do good, though it may prove *inconvenient and prejudicial* in some rarer Instances. Nor would these *coercive means* oblige these Dissenters upon Motives *not conscientious* to *dissimulation or hypocrisie*. But even for those *fewer truly conscientious* Dissenters which would remain, it is not necessary, 3. That if they have been of a different Opinion, they should persevere in it *unalterably*.

terably. And as their minds may *alter* at any time, so as well when they are *prosecuted* for their Opinions as otherwise, in which case their conversion may be *veracious*. And possibly the number even of *good converts*, even upon such an occasion, would be more, if they did not some of them, for fear of being censured as *time-servers*; not allow the contrary Opinion the same favour of an *equal hearing*, when it is countenanced by Authority as otherwise, or at least not *express* their sentiments so *freely* and *ingenuously*; not heeding that hereby instead of *courage and constancy*, they onely choose their *conquerour*, being more awed by the persecution of the *tongue* than of the *sword*. Nor, 4. Is it true, that this *coercion* is not a *probable means* of bringing even *good men* to a *conscientious change* of their Opinions. For, 1. It is of it self likely to allay that *tumour and rigour* of spirit, to which even *good men* themselves are frequently betrayed by *prosperity*, which does usually alienate them from all sober thoughts of *accommodation*, and even of sober and impartial *inquiry*. And I believe you who have so well studied the *peace of the Church*, do very well understand, that in very many things mens *spirits*, are at a greater

greater distance than their *principles*, in all which for making *peace* it is sufficient to make men *peaceable*. Indeed for a while such a way of proceeding may rather *exasperate than calm* them; but by that time that the *strangeness* of it is over, and the sudden *tumour* has evaporated and spent it self, they are at length reduced to a more *composed temper*. And I believe your own experience, which is great in the late and present posture of Affairs, cannot but let you understand the much greater *moderation* of those *Presbyterians* of your temper and acquaintance *now than formerly*. For it is natural for men, as well in wars of *opinions* as of *swords*, when they have wearied themselves with *fighting* to desire *peace*. And, 2. As this *coercion* brings *good men* themselves to this more sedate and candid temper, which makes them more competent Judges of *rational discourses*; so it usually obliges them to a more faithful and accurate *inquiry* than formerly. For *good men* can no more than others endure afflictions *willingly and patiently*, unless they be animated by the goodness of the *cause*, and that they cannot so well satisfy themselves of, without an impartial inquiry into its *merits*. Besides that *good men* them-

themselves, and that reasonably enough, are unwilling to *suffer*, unless it be indeed necessary for the preservation of their more *momentous interests*, and therefore are willing to admit of any satisfactory favourable *construction* of their *duty*, that may dispense with such severe performances, which cannot be attained but by a more close *inquiry* into the *merit* of the thing, and the *nature* of the Obligation. And hence it follows, 3. That they must upon *prudential*, and yet *just and rational* accounts, be favourably enclined to the Opinions of their *prosecutors*, as far as any favour may be *just and conscientious*. And this may do much for determining them in all such cases, as are not either very *evident* or very *momentous*; and such not very *many* would be found on a severe examination. And, 4. Affliction does very much quicken good mens *consciences*, to approve themselves to God when they are destitute of *humane consolations*. And this also may exceedingly contribute to a *conscientious* change, when by this they are freed from those carnal *prejudices*, which before had blinded or diverted them from a clear discovery, and are excited to a greater *industry* in the inquiry of *means*, and obliged to a greater *sincerity*.

ty in following *conviction*, when they consider how much their greatest Interests are concerned in it, and how vain it is to hope to escape *his* discovery in case of *negligence or dissimulation*, who is the immediate Lord of *conscience*. Upon all these accounts therefore *Governours*, who are to be presumed to believe their own Opinions *true*, may justly believe *external coercion* to be a means of reducing others to them, *conscientious* as well as such as are not. But, 5. Though you might with more plausibility pretend, that *dissimulation* would indeed be the ordinary consequent of *coercive means* alone, they being alone no *rational arguments* for working a *conscientious* change; yet when they are not designed as the *principal arguments* inviting to such a change, but merely as *dispositions to prepare and qualifie* the persons for receiving *conscientious arguments*, the case will be clearly otherwise. Now this I believe you do already know to be the case with us. Besides what *coercive means* may have been pretended, the *means of information* are freely communicated to any that desires them. Our *Books* are extant, our *learned men and Parish Ministers* are freely to be consulted with; and why these may not

not ordinarily be presumed likely to make a conscientious change, onely because people are necessitated to use them, I do not understand. And, 6. The case is not such as you have proposed it. None was obliged to be *Christian rather than go to Gaol, &c.* I believe you cannot instance any *Law* lately in use, that obliged people to *profess* any thing not believed by them. All I think that can be pretended was to *restrain* persons, not from the *publick profession*, nor from the *private practice* of their Opinions; but onely from practising them in *publick or great assemblies*, that might create suspicion to the *State*. Otherwise I know nothing restrictive of those persons you are concerned for, from being commonly known to be such as they were. And I pray, what *necessity* is there then of *disimulation*? The onely *Canon* of that kind that I can think of, is that of *communicating* once a year at *Easter*, the exacting whereof whether by infliction of *Civil or Ecclesiastical penalties*, whether of *Non-conformists*, or even *Conformists* themselves, has been at least where I have been, so generally neglected, that I do not know any reason you have to complain of it. For any other *coercive means* for
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compelling Dissenters to communicate with us, I know none that have been rigorously executed to my knowledge in *Ireland*. What has been done in *England* your self know better, and therefore I shall very willingly leave you to your own information, wherein I hope you will be ingenuous. Yet, 7. Suppose that *coercive means* were not for the good of the persons concerned, but did indeed make them *Prelatical Christians*, as you call them, that is, *dissemblers*; this were not sufficient to shew that they are therefore not to be used, if their *punishment and dissimulation* it self may prove for the advantage of the *publick*. For you know that *Governours* are not to heed private advantages any otherwise, than in subordination and coincidence with the *publick*, and that even in civil affairs there are some few *punishments* imposed, which are known to be utterly inconsistent with the *civil interests* of the party punished, (and their *civil interests* are properly obnoxious to the care of *Governours*) for such are all that are *capital*, especially such of them as are withall *rigorous and painful*. For in *publick punishments* there are other ends more considerable than *private emendation*, namely the prevention of future
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offences from the same person, and the terror of others by his example. Nor is this way of proceeding blamed by any just (however favourable) Judge of such things, when personal emendation has been first attempted, and no criminals are subjected to such censures, but such as have been found, in the use of all other prudential rational means, incorrigible. To such it is not thought any more cruelty to be severe for the good of the Commonwealth, than it is for a Chirurgion to cut off a gangreened member for the preservation of its owners life. And such is the design of the Church, who is not for using even her spiritual coercions (which onely belong to her) but onely on such persons on whom her rational inducements have proved desperate and successless.

§ XXIX BUT notwithstanding your former contrary intimations you say, "You desire no force nor Church power; but not to take these, 1. for Christians; 2. for your special Christian flock; 1. who are no Christians; 2. who themselves refuse it. But this power you desire here is more than that which alone was allowed by you to Bishops, of reproof, exhorting, instructing, and declaring persons fitness or unfitness for communion by their
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penitence or impenitence. For what if your people believe those penitent whom you think impenitent, or on the contrary? What if they be not *satisfied* with your Declarations, or resolved not to *observe* them? What if at least the *greater part*, which is always predominant in *popular Governments*, be not of your opinion? Would you think your self obliged in such a case to make your *peoples* opinion or your *own*, the *rule of your practice* in receiving or rejecting persons from your *communion*? If you follow your *people*, then you are as capable of being *imposed on* against your will, (for receiving such persons for *Christians*, and for part of your *Christian flock*, who are *no Christians*, and who themselves *refuse it*) by them as you are now by the *Bishop*. And it does not appear that the *greater part* of your flock (especially if such as you describe, whereof *whole Parishes* have been presented by the *Churchwardens*) are likely to stand with you in opposition to your *Bishop*. And if they stand for him against you, you can have no reason to obtrude your own judgment and complain, according to this principle? But if notwithstanding their *dissent* from you, you yet resolve to follow your *own judgment*,
in

in receiving or rejecting according to your own thoughts of the *penitence or impenitence* of the person obnoxious to your Discipline; then you will indeed be so far from desiring *no Church power*, as that you would desire more than you seem willing to grant the *Bishops*, which is onely *declarative*. And then if you may as a *Governour* impose on the *people*, why may not the *Bishop* as your *Governour* impose on *you*? Indeed there can be no such thing as Government without such an Imposition as you speak of. For the *reason* of all Government is the *inequality* of mens Judgment in their own causes, and the inconvenience of deciding their differences *by force*, which is many times the greatest on the *unjust side*. The design therefore of all Government is to entrust a *third person* or *society*, supposed impartial to the litigant parties, with a power sufficient to *compel* either of them to submit to her decision. For seeing it is not ordinarily to be expected, that differences should be decided by a *persuasion* of both parties of the *equity* of decisions, but that both parties will frequently prove tenacious of their own Opinions; therefore it is necessary that the *guilty*, whatever he be, who will seldom believe his

his own condemnation just, be *imposed on*; and such an Imposition being thus thought necessary, common prudence will suggest, that it is much more *equal and secure* for the party imposed on, that he be imposed on by the *common arbitrator* of their differences than by his partially affected *adversary*. And accordingly where there is no need of *imposition* there is none of *government*, and the *seat of government* is finally resolved on them, who have this power of *imposing* their own sentiments on others; so that to deny *Ministers* this power over the *people*, or the *Bishops* over the *Ministers*, is to make neither the one nor the other properly *Governours*. Besides, the power of *Excommunication and Absolution* (which you seem to mean in this your complaint, that the *independent* use of them is not communicated to the *Ministers*) are so incommunicably proper to the *supreme governour*, (who, as having the power of a *Society*, must also have that of *admitting to, and rejecting* members from it) as that it were impossible for him to give an account of his charge, if others may *admit and reject* at pleasure without *dependence* on him. So that to complain of being *imposed on* in this kind,

is indeed in effect to complain of the *Bishops* superiority over you. And if this reason were of any force, it would proceed as much against the *Presbyterian* government as the *Episcopal*, for even among them the *Minister* may as well be overvoted, and consequently overruled, by the *Classes*, as with us by the *Bishops*. So inseparable this power of imposing on *Parish Ministers* is found from Government, as that is indeed admitted by all them who own a Government superiour to single Parishes?

§ XXX. BUT, I pray, *quo jure* do you challenge this *Parochial* power of *Excommunication* and *Absolution* independent on your *Ordinaries*? I shall at present give you leave to say, (not because that I think you can prove it, but because I am unwilling at present to dispute it) that *Presbyters* were not onely *counsellors*, but *coordinate governours* with the *Bishop*. But how can you shew the least likelihood that the *Bishop* had not at least a *negative vote* among them? That as he could not do any thing without their *suffrages*, so they were able to conclude any thing without *his*? Much less are you able to prove, that every *particular Presbyter*, singly taken, ever had within his

his own *Jurisdiction* the power of determining so momentous a thing as *Ecclesiastical censures*. Whereever you find any *Presidents over Presbyteries* in the Scriptures, whether *Apostles*, or *Evangelists*, or *Angels*, you cannot find any Precedent of any thing carried by the *major vote* against the consent of the *President*, as at least one of the prevailing number. And for the *Ignatian Episcopacy* and so downwards to *S. Cyprian*, which you seem to approve, it is very plain that all the power of *Presbyters* was dependent on the *Bishop*. Thus *Ignatius* (in his genuine uninterpolated Epistle to the *Ephesians*)

εὐχαριστῶ ἡ ἐν τῷ ᾧ συνάκρονον, ὡς περὶ τῷ ἀρχιεπίσκοπῳ. Edit. V.

And that that *συνάκρονον* is the Communion ser. p. 3.

of the *Bishop*, appears from the sequel, whence he concludes, *καταδ' αὐτῶν ἐν μὴ ἀνα-
τάσσοντες τῷ ἐπισκόπῳ, ἵνα οὐδὲν δεῖ ὑποτασσάμενοι*:
whence you may easily guess what he would have thought of *Presbyters* communicating in opposition to the *Bishop*, that even such Communions being *without the altar*, must needs have been destitute of the *bread of God*. To the same

purpose also the same blessed Martyr advises even *Presbyters* not to despise the Ep. ad
Magn.
p. 11.
youth of *Damas* the Bishop of the *Magne-*

sians, *ἐμὲν ὁ ἐπίσκοπος αὐτῶν τῷ ἡγεμένῳ ὡς ἐπισκόπῳ,*

(the word *ωσχεῖσθαι* translated appositely to the sense of this place, *familiariter uti*, seems to argue a greater distance than you would I believe think consistent with the *parity* you are so desirous of) ἀλλὰ καὶ δευτέρω πάλιν παρὰ τὸ πρῶτον αὐτῷ ἐπινέμεν (observe I pray again the word ἐπινέμεν *reverence*) καὶ οὕτως ἔσται καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις πρεσβυτέροις, (hence it appears that *Presbyters* as well as others are concerned in this his Exhortation) ἢ προτεληρότας τῶν νεωτερικῶν τῶν, (this is the *νεωτερικὴ τάξις* so much disputed of, the *youthfulness* of their Bishops *person*, not the novelty of the *Institution* of his Order, for it was that youthfulness which they were likely to *take advantage of*, which is the notion of *προσλαμβάνεσθαι*) ὅτι αἱ φρονήσεις συγχωρεῖν τὰς αὐτῶν, ἐκ αὐτῶν δὲ, ἀλλὰ τῷ πατρὶ Ἰησοῦ χριστῷ τῷ πάντων ὁπισκώπῳ. Ἐκ τῆς αὐτῆς ἐν ἐκείνῃ τῇ διελύτῳ ὁμοῦς πρίν ἐπακείν καὶ ὑπερβαίνειν ὑποκρίσιν. Ἐπὶ ἔχ ὅτι τὸ ἐπίσκοπον τὸν τῶν τῶν βλαπτικῶν πλανῶν, ἀλλὰ τὸ ἀόρατον παρρηγορίζεται. Τὸ δὲ πῶς, ἢ πρὸς σάρκα ὁ λόγος ἀλλὰ πρὸς θεόν, τὸ καὶ χρύσεια εἶδός τα. You see here that even *Presbyters* are not to *take advantage* even of a *youthful Bishop*, either for presuming on too much *familiarity* with him, or denying him the *reverence* due to his *Order*, though in a *youthful person*. That they are to yield to *him*,

or

or rather to *Jesus Christ*, whose person is represented by *him*, (and sure you would not think much to be imposed on by *Jesus Christ*.) That this duty is to be paid without all *hypocrisie* to the *Bishop* for Gods sake, whom it is impossible to *deceive*. That *hearkning* to him (for that is the notion of ἐπακούειν, which in the *Hellenistick* style then in use, is the same with *obedience*) is part of that. And that the *disrespect* to him in any of these duties, redounds to the *dishonour* of God, for whose sake he is to be honoured. And now I pray consider how you can reconcile herewith your desired liberty of *excommunicating* without his *privity* or *consent*. Immediately after he blames them who give their *Bishop* the honour of an *empty name*, and yet *do all things without his privity*, and expressly censures them as οὐ σωτηριώδεις, men of no good *consciences*, διὰ τὸ μὴ βεβαίως κατ' ἐν- πολὺ σωαθῆναι. Where, besides the coherence formerly noted, it is plain, that even *Presbyters* also are included, because he speaks of *Assemblies*, which could not be celebrated without some act of *priestly power*. And if such *Assemblies* be not according to the *command*, nor the rules of *good conscience*, how

your proceedings without the *consent or*
privity of your Bishop can be excusable I do
 not understand. In the Epistle *ad Tral-*
lian. after having enjoyned respect to
 all the three *Orders*, he concludes,

p.17.

χρεῖς τῶν ἐκκλησιᾶν καλεῖσθαι, whence you may
 easily conclude his thoughts concerning
 such *Assemblies*, which are maintained
 without one of them, that is of *Episco-*
pacy, as they must needs be who take
 upon them to act *independently* on their
Bishop. So in the Epistle to the *Phila-*
delphians, he says expressly that as many
 as are on *Gods part* and *Jesus Christ*,

p.28.

ἔτι μὴ ἑπισκόποι εἰσὶν, by which you may
 see what he would have thought of
 those who should have joyned with any
Presbyter, exercising an Authority *differ-*
ent from, and *independent* on, that of
 the *Bishop*. Nay, he confidently char-
 ges them, not as from his own *private*
sense, but *inspiration*, (and those extra-
 ordinary χαρίσματα had not as yet failed
 in his time)

p.30.

χρεῖς τῷ θεῷ καὶ τοῖς ἀποστόλοις καὶ τοῖς ἑπισκόποις
 καὶ τοῖς πρεσβυτέροις, and after teaches that *God gives remission*
of sin to them that are penitent, onely
 on that condition, ἐὰν μετανοήσωσιν εἰς ἐλεῖσιν
 θεοῦ, καὶ σωθῶσιν τῷ θεῷ καὶ τοῖς ἀποστόλοις καὶ τοῖς ἑπισκόποις, which if it be so,
 how can the *Absolutions of Presbyters* at-
 tempted without the consent of their
 Bi-

Bishop be valid? But what can be more clear against your Independency of *Parish Ministers* in the exercise of *discipline*, than that excellent passage in the Epistle to the *Smyrnaeans*; Μηδὲς χεῖς ᾧ p.36.

ἐπισκόπου, ἢ πρεσβύτου ἢ ἀρχιδιάκονος εἰς τὸ ἐκκλησιάζειν. Ἐκείνη βεβαία ἀρχιερατικὴ ἡγεσία, ἢ ὑπὸ τοῦ ἐπισκόπου, ἢ ὑπὸ τοῦ πρεσβύτου.

And a little after; ἐκ δεξιῶν ὄντων χεῖς ᾧ ἐπισκόπου ἔπε βαπτίζειν, ἔπε ἀγαπᾶν ποιεῖν, ἀλλ' ὅτι ἐκείνῳ δοκιμάσῃ, ὅτε τοῦ καὶ τῷ θεῷ εὐχρεσθῇ, ἵνα ἀσφαλὲς ᾖ καὶ βεβαίον πᾶν ὁ πρεσβύτερος.

So again; καλῶς ἔχει, θεὸν καὶ ἐπίσκοπον ἐκδικᾶν. Ὁ πᾶς ἐπίσκοπος, ὑπὸ θεῷ τετέμεν. Ὁ λαὸς ἐπισκόπου ἢ πρεσβύτου, τῷ διαβόλῳ λαβδῶν.

You see how expressly all persons (*Presbyters* themselves not excepted) are forbidden to meddle in *Ecclesiasticals* without order from the *Bishop*. You see what *Ecclesiasticals* he means by his enumeration of the *particulars*, not onely *Baptism* and the *Feasts of Love*, but the very *Eucharist*. You see how clearly he disowns the *validity* of that *Eucharist* which is not received either from the *Bishop himself*, or some person authorized by him. Which both may serve to let you see, that even *Presbyters* themselves are included, seeing your self do not allow the power of admitting to *communion Laicks or Deacons*, though au-

thorized'; and that the power you seem to challenge of *communicating* whom you please, without the *Bishops* Licence is again censured as *invalid*, as a *dishonour of God*, nay as a *service of the Devil*, which would have been thought *harsh and passionate* expressions, if the Age he lived in, before the starting of our modern Controversies, had not put him beyond any just or probable suspicions of *partiality*.

¶ XXXI I HAVE the rather insisted on the Testimony of this blessed Martyr, because you seem to seem to have been willing to have condescended to the *Ignatian Episcopacy*, and were therefore concerned, because in my Catalogue of the *ancient Writers*, I said *Ignatius* was decretory against the *Presbyterians*. I might have descended *lower*, because you said you would have yielded to the *Episcopacy* practised in *S. Cyprians* time, to shew that this *liberty* you desire, of *admitting* to, or *excluding* from, your flock whom you please, was not even in those Ages allowed to bare *Presbyters*. At present I shall onely note a passage or two, because I am desirous of hastening. *Baptism* therefore, which has always been thought to require *less power* than the *Lords Supper*, was not in *Tertullians* time permitted to *Deacons* nor *Priests* themselves,

selves, without the Authority of their
 Bishop. These are his words ; *Dandi*
quidem (viz. Baptismi) habet jus summus
sacerdos, qui est Episcopus. Dehinc Pres-
byteri & Diaconi, non tamen sine Episcopi
authoritate, propter Ecclesie honorem. Quo
salvo, salva pax est, &c. Exactly herein
 agreeing with *Ignatius*. And the same
 seems to have been the sense and pra-
 ctice of the *Asiatick Churches* in the time
 of *Firmilian*, who, though indeed he
 mention the *maiores natu præsides* (under
 which word, according to the use of
 that Age, I confess *Presbyters* may be
 included) as having the power of *Bapti-*
zing, Imposition of hands, in reconciling
penitents especially, and of *Ordination*,
 which we do not deny them ; yet he
 seems to intimate their dependence on
 the *Bishop* in the administration of that
 power which properly belonged to them,
 which is all that we desire. For thus he
 afterwards expressly asserts the power of
remission of sins, (either in *Baptism* or
Absolution of Penitents, as appears from
 the occasion of the Dispute concerning
 the *validity* of both among the *Here-*
ticks) to have been given to the Apo-
 stles, & *Ecclesiis quas illi à Christo missi con-*
stituerunt, & EPISCOPIS qui eis
 or-

Ep. 75.
 apud S.
 Cyprian. p.
 182. ed.
 Pamel.

p. 184.

dinatione vicariâ successerunt. Where it is to be observed, 1. That no *exclusive* particle be expressed, yet it must necessarily be understood from the whole design of his Discourse, which is to exclude the *Baptism of Hereticks* from being *remissive of sins*, because the power of *remitting sins* is not granted to them, which would not follow unless all which had that power conferred on them, had been adequately enumerated by him. And, 2. That by the *Churches* here mentioned cannot be understood a *Society* *contradistinct* from the *Bishops*. For I believe you cannot produce a precedent of *that age*, where the word is taken for the *other Clergie*; so that there are onely two other Senses that I can think of reducible to this purpose; either for the *Laity*, and that your self I believe will not think intelligible here, that the power of *remitting sins by Baptism*, or otherwise, does agree to them; or for the *complex* of both the *Laity* and the Body of the *Clergie*, in *contradistinction* to the *Bishop*. And to this his proof of the *power of remitting sins* given to the *Apostles*, being also given to the *Church* in this *contradistinct* sense, must have been impertinently urged from its being given to the
Apo-

Apostles, seeing that the Church in the *Apostles time* must have been as contradictory from the *Apostles*, as the *later Churches* from their *respective Bishops*. By the word *Churches* therefore are only meant *Orthodox Societies*, including *Bishops* as well as other *members*; whence it will follow, that the Church is only therefore said to have this power, because the *Bishops* have it; and therefore that no *Ecclesiastical Member* can have it independently on them. 3. Therefore that by the word *Bishops*, to whom this power of *remitting sins* is given, to which all other *Ecclesiastical Power* is consequent, *Presbyters* are not included; will appear probable, if you consider, 1. That though the word *Presbyter* and *Sacerdos* be attributed to *Bishops* properly so called, yet at least in *that age* I believe you will hardly find that a simple *Presbyter* is called *Episcopus*. Blondell himself I think will not furnish you with an Instance. And, 2. That these *Bishops* are such as are called *Successors of the Apostles*. And that by these *Successors of the Apostles*, single persons are understood in the language of that age, appears in that when they prove *Succession* from the *Apostles*, they do it by catalogues of single persons, as those

those in *Irenaeus, Tertullian, &c.* and that *Bishops* in the confined sense are so frequently said to be *Successors of the Apostles*, which is not said of *simple Presbyters*. See *S. Cyprian* ep. 42, 65, 69. and the Author *de Aleatoribus*, with many others usually produced in the Disputes concerning *Episcopacy*.

¶
XXXII. AND then for the sense of *S. Cyprian*, he was as resolute in vindicating his own right, as condescending in his practice. He it is that asserts *the unaccountableness of the Episcopal Office to any under God; that makes the Church in the Bishop, as well as the Bishop in the Church; that charges the contempt of the Bishop as the original of all Schism and Heresie, and parallels it with the Sin of Corah, Dathan, and Abiram; that spares not even Presbyters themselves, when presuming to act without his order, but puts them in mind of his being their Superiour, and charges them with rebellion, when they took that liberty you desire of acting arbitrarily and independently.* Instances of all these kinds might have been produced, if I were not afraid of being too tedious, These things may at present suffice to shew, that the liberty you desire of admitting or rejecting whom you please from your own flock, is not more unreasonable

*In Concil.
Carthag.
init.*

*Ep. 4. ad
Cornel.*

sonable than *dissonant* from the *practice* of those Ages for which you profess a *reverence*. Nor do I understand your design in the use of that liberty you desire. If it be that you would have those whom you think unworthy of your *flock* excluded from your *cure*; that is as improper as if a *Physician* should desire to be excused from visiting those who are most *dangerously*, though not *desperately*, sick. Certainly the contrary would rather follow, that as they need most, so they should have most of your *care*. It is our Saviours own saying, *that the whole need not a physician, but the sick*; that is, at least not *comparatively*: and generally his *greatest* pains and favours were extended to those who had *least* deserved them. Nor is their *unwillingness* to deal with you in affairs of this nature a sufficient reason to exempt them from your Cure; for this *unwillingness* it self is a most considerable ingredient in their distemper, and that which makes them most *truly pitiable*, and it would be as great a piece of *inhumanity* for the *spiritual* as the *corporal Physician*, to *desert* them on that pretence, I am sure very different from the behaviour of *Christ* and his *Apostles*, who found the *World generally* as much prejudiced against,

against and unwilling to hear, them concerning affairs of that nature, as you can with any probability presume concerning a *Christian Auditory*. If your meaning be, not to be excused from the use of all other good means for their recovery, but only from admitting them to the *blessed Sacrament*, which ought to be the privilege of such as are already deserving; I pray consider, 1. Whether though you deny them to be *Christians*, yet their very *Baptism* and *exterior profession of Christianity*, be not at least sufficient to entitle them to *exterior privileges*, if on their own peril they will venture on them; and that *Sacramental privileges* are but *exteriour*. They are invited to the *marriage feast*, and none may exclude them if they *come*, though it is at their own *hazard* if they *presume* to do so without the *marriage garment*. And, 2. That this does at least hold till they be convicted and censured by their due *Superiour*, and you know it is questioned whether *you*, as a private *Presbyter*, ought to have that *power*. But, 3. That you have a power of *suspending* refractory persons till you acquaint the Bishop, and with him you have that power of *convincing and persuading*, which seems as much as your self desire, so that
even

even upon this account you have no reason to complain.

MY second Argument was from *experience even in Ecclesiasticals*; to which you answer, that "It's hard then to know
"any thing, and that you dispute all
"this while as if the question were, Whether men in *England speak English*; that
"therefore if you herein erre, you profess
"your self incurable, and allow me to despair of you. If I had disputed from
present experience in England, I should have confessed your Answer proper, that I had endeavour'd to *conquer your sense and experience*, as you elsewhere expresses it. But I wonder how you could understand me so, considering that our present *want of discipline* was the reason of my *desire of its revival*, whence you took the occasion of these Disputes. My meaning was, that in the *primitive times*, when *Bishops* were indeed *laborious and conscientious*, and were willing and desirous to do what they could do, *experience* shewed that *discipline* was actually maintained under such a *Diocesan Government*; and therefore I concluded, that the *multitude of persons* governed was not the reason of our present neglects. And what is it that is scrupled in this Discourse, or need put you

you to those unequal resolutions of being *uncurable*? Is it whether the number of *Christians in Dioceses* were equal then with what we have now? This was proved in my former Letter. Or that the *Bishop* then challenged the same power over the *Presbytery* as now? This I have but lately proved. Or that *discipline* was then maintained. This I do not find that you deny. Nay certainly your self thought *discipline* maintainable under it, when you professed your self ready to yield to such an *Episcopacy*. Or that what was then performed by the *same Government*, is still performable, if men would be the same? The admission of this would not oblige you to question your self or experience. Nor indeed is any thing of this kind concerning *antiquity* as notorious to you, as what men do at present in *England*.

δ
XXXIV FOR proving the great multitudes then subject to Diocesan Discipline I said,
 “That the *greatness* of no City was
 “thought sufficient to *multiply Bishops*.
 “To this you answer, 1. That *Gods Institution* was, that every *Church* have a
 “*Bishop*, for which you quote *Acts* 14.
 “23. &c. But, 1. The place you refer
 me to has no mention of a *Divine Institution* }

tion; for *Apostolical practice* is not a sufficient proof of that, and this is all which is so much as intimated in this place. 2. It does not as much as mention the word *Bishop*, but that of *Presbyter*. And though the words were granted to have been then confounded; yet you know they were so afterwards when the things were certainly distinct. And therefore you cannot conclude from the word *Presbyter*, that a *Bishop* was meant, especially in the sense wherein it was afterwards appropriated. Nor, 3. Is it evident that by *πρεσβυτέριος καὶ ἐκκλησία* is meant a *single Presbyter* in every particular Church, as in a *Parish*; but it may as well be meant of *Presbyteries* as *Presbyters*. And when afterwards the *Presidency* of a *single Monarch* was introduced, no Churches had *Presbyteries* but such as had *Bishops*, and were *Diocesan* in the sense we now understand the word. And if they were *Presbyteries*, you cannot hence disprove the *presidency* of one over the rest, as we find it soon after practised. Nor, 4. Is it evident that by *ἐκκλησία* must needs be meant a *Parish*, as it concerns you to believe. For the word *Church* is as applicable to great as small *Societies*, and the great ones may as well

be called one in their kind, though they be capable of a further subdivision into many *Churches* of smaller denomination. Thus the *Catholick Church* is called one in the *Constantinopolitan Creed*, though consisting of many *national*, and the *Church of England* but one *national Church*, though consisting of two *Provincial*; and the *Province of Canterbury* but one *Provincial Church*, though consisting of several *Diocesan*; and every *Diocese* but one *Diocesan Church*, though consisting of several *Parishes*. And even in the Scripture there are several notions of the word of different proportions. There are the *ἐκκλησίαι καὶ οἱ δῖκον*, and there are the *two or three gathered in the name of Christ*, which from the coherence, and the *Jewish* notions of *Assemblies*, seem to make up a *Church*, and accordingly *Tertullian* calls an *Assembly of two or three a Church*, though consisting onely of *Laicks*. And yet these *Churches* are so little serviceable to your purpose, as that I believe you would not be for confining a *private Presbyter* to so small a *cure*, I am sure they are much beneath those populous *Parishes* which you do not seem to disapprove. Supposing therefore I should grant you, that every *distinct Church* should have a *distinct*

Exhort.
last.

distinct Bishop ; yet how will you prove with the least plausibility, that this *Church* must be understood of a *Parochial* one, that the multitude of *Bishops* may answer that of *Parishes* ? Especially considering that the notion of the word for a *Parochial Church* will not be so easily deduced from *Scripture*, as that for a *Diocese*. For thus much the *Independents*, I think, do prove sufficiently, that a *whole Church* in those times did generally meet in one place ; but they fail in proving *distinction of Churches in Cities*, though never so *great and populous*, which two put together do plainly amount to our notion, not of a *Parochial*, but *Diocesan Church*, there appearing no footsteps in those times of any *Subdivisions* allotted to *particular Presbyters*. Besides, if we may believe the $\piρεσβυτεροι καὶ ἐκκλησίαι$ here parallel with those $\kappa\tau' \pi\acute{o}\lambdaιν$, *Tit. 1.5.* as in all likelihood they are ; then a *Church* will be that which will extend to the Liberties of a *whole City*. And because you find no mention of *distinct Presbyters for Villages* recommended to *Titus's* care, it seems very probable that they were sufficiently provided for by those of the *City*, and therefore that they had some dependence on them. That the name of *Churches*

ches was attributed first to *Cities*, see proved by the Excellent Dr. *Stillingsfleet*, *Iren.* p.2. c.7. § 2,4.

δ FOR that the *Apostles* did take care
XXXV. even for *Villages* we have the exprefs Te-
stimony of *S. Clemens Romanus*, (that

p. 54. edit. *Ἡ χώρα καὶ πόλις κληρονομία καὶ διαίρεσις τῆς ἀρχαίας*
Ἰουλίας. αὐτῶν δοκιμασάντες τὸ πρῶτον εἰς ἐπισκοπὰς καὶ διακόνους

τῶν πολλῶν πρὸς αὐτὴν) if these words be understood as commonly they are. But I confess it does not seem to me so clear, that by *χώρα* here is understood those *Country Villages*, which are obnoxious to the *Jurisdiction* of the *City*; but rather *Regiones*, as it is translated, not as *Rome* and *Constantinople* were divided into their *Regiones* answerable to our *Wards*, but as it may in a larger sense signifie whole *Provinces*, under which many *Cities* might be comprehended (my Reasons I would give if I were not unwilling to digress;) much less am I satisfied with *Blondell's* Conjecture, who conceives it to relate to the *Chorepiscopi*, and thence concludes that they were not originally subject to the *City Bishop*. For though *χώρα* were indeed taken in the sense he is concerned it should be; yet there is no necessity that it should be referred to *καθίστατον*, as if *distinct Bishops* had been
im-

imposed over them from those of the *Cities* to which they were related, but may conveniently enough be joyned with *κρυάων τις*, to signifie their preaching in the *Villages* as well as *Cities*, and their *election* of fit persons from both for *Bishops* and *Deacons*, to be disposed of where they thought convenient. However it were, it seems very probable that the *Apostles*, as they planted *Christianity* first in *Cities*, so they seemed to have settled the *Government* there first; and as they generally left the *Villages* to be converted by excursions from the *Cities*, so it seems most credible, that the influences of the *Government* must have followed that of the propagation of their *Doctrine*. Certainly the *πρωτοῦ τοῦ ποιμενίου* mentioned by *Ignatius*, in his *Inscription* of his *Epistle to the Romans*, over which the *Church of Rome* is said *πρεσβυτέρω*, cannot in the narrowest exposition choose but include a *Precinct* as large as our ordinary *Dioceses*. But, 5. Supposing all had been as you would have them, that it had been enjoined by the *Apostles*, that every *Parochial Church* should have a *distinct Bishop*; yet how can you prove that it was an *Injunction* of an *immutable and eternally-obliging* nature, (as it is clear that

some, that of abstaining from blood, *Ath* 15. was not.) For if they be not, you ought not to urge them to the prejudice of *superinduced Constitutions*. But lastly, all that you can hence pretend for your purpose is onely, that the having onely *one Bishop* in the appropriated sense in a *Diocese*, was not conformable to the sense of the *Apostles*. But it does not thence follow, that *discipline* is not maintainable under such a Government, which was the onely thing for whose proof I produced it. You answer, 2. "That a *particular Church* was a Society of *neighbour Christians* convened in *personal communion* for Gods worship. I confess *personal communion* was generally practised with the *Bishop*, but I have proved it to be of *whole Cities*, and such *great Assemblies* as could not be served by a *single person*, (without the assistance of a *Presbytery*, which the *Bishop* had for his help;) and therefore could not be *Parochial* in the sense of the word now commonly used. If you think otherwise, when you prove it I may then, and not till then, be concerned to think of a further Answer.

ð YOU answer 3. "That for 250 years
XXXVI" you think I cannot prove, that any one
Bi-

“Bishop in the world (save at *Alexandria* and *Rome*) had more such congregations and altars than one; nor there for a long time after the *Apostles*, nor in many Churches for some hundred years longer. This is the same mistake as before, to think them answerable to our *Parishes*, who did then all communicate at one altar; whereas indeed the same circuit and number of Inhabitants, who had first been governed by the Bishop and his *Presbytery* in common, no particular *Presbyter* having any proper portion assigned him, but by the *provisional commands* of the Bishop, was afterwards distributed into parts proportionable to the number of the *Presbytery*, that so every one might know his own work. And I pray, what essential difference is there betwixt the same *Presbyteries*, as acting in common as they did at first with the Bishop; and distributed into several divisions as they are now, unless it be that this latter is more convenient? And if the Bishop was *major universis* when they acted in conjunction with him; why must he be *minor singulis*, or at least *aqualis*, when dispersed to their several distinct Employments? If all of them when united might not attempt any thing without his

consent and privity ; why must *each* of them be allowed that liberty when deprived of their united forces ? And if *discipline* was maintainable by them, when by acting in common they were more *remote from particular exploration* ; why should it not be much more so when none is invited to be *negligent* by trusting to another, as men are apt to do in cases of *common concernment* ; and when each of them has a task proportionable to his *own abilities* ? But, 2. Suppose that this *subdivision* of the *Diocese* into *Parishes*, (which is all that you can pretend to have been attempted at *Rome* and *Alexandria*, for by this means it fell out by accident, that there were *several altars* under the Jurisdiction of the *same Bishop*) had not answered the *primitive example*, nay had been a *culpable*, not a *lawful prudential* Innovation ; yet will you say that *discipline* was not maintained, when it was *actually* (however upon other accounts) *culpably* introduced ? If you grant it was, that is sufficient for my purpose, to shew that the *experience of those times* has evinced the *possibility of discipline* under a *Diocesan Government*, and therefore that it is practicable even *now* if men would but endeavour it. If
you

you say it was not, you must then charge the most celebrated Churches in the purest earliest Ages with want of discipline. For in Rome the first division into *Titles* (answerable to our *Parishes*) is attributed to Pope *Evaristus*, (who came into his See Anno Dom. 112.) by the Author *de Vit. Pontif.* commonly ascribed to *Damasus*. For afterwards in the two Epistles of *Pius* (which are of better repute with *Blondell* than the others that bear his Name) to *Justus Viennens.* we find mention of two *Titles* then newly established by *Emperia* and the *Pastor*; so that I think this division there (if we may trust these Authors for it; and if we may not, you will have no ground of charging the Romans of those Ages with plurality of *Altars* more than in other places) will appear to have been as soon as they had any settled places to meet in. For before that their meetings seem to have been ambulatory and uncertain; sometimes in the Temple, sometimes in the *insula*, sometimes in secret places, particularly in the *Cæmeteria*, (for of some of these may the passages of 1 Cor. 11. and the ancient Author of *Philopatris* in Trajan's time, who bears the name of *Lucian*, be understood) and then it was not so convenient

Under
Domitian
in the
year 83.
according
to Euse-
bius.

nient to subdivide into *Parishes*, when there were not any *settled places* peculiarly designed and convenient for Parochial Assemblies. Upon which account there will be no reason that the necessary examples of the former Age should prejudice against the prudence and conveniences of this. But the *Titles* mentioned by *Pius*, as left by *Legacy*, seem to have been *perpetually* alienated to the use of the *Church*, and therefore fitter for this purpose. Which if it be supposed, then the antiquity of *divers Altars* in the *same Diocese* will be equal with *Churches and Parishes* which you do not condemn, and as ancient as they could be with any tolerable *convenience*, and you cannot blame them for being no sooner. And sure you will not deny, that even then, and a long while after, *discipline* was maintained among the *Romanists* themselves. If you do, you must contradict all the *histories* of that Age, which mention the *Martyrdoms* of their *Bishops* of those Ages, together with very many of their other *Clergy and Laity* for several Successions; and the great Elogies of *Tertullian* and *S. Cyprian*, and the confident Appeals to the *Roman Church* as well as others, for the Assertion

Tertul.
Præscr.
Iren. l. 3.
adv. Hær.

on of *Apostolical Tradition*, used frequently by the Fathers against the Hereticks; whereas a sensible decay in *discipline* would have weakened their credit even in *Doctrinals*. And for the other Instance of *Alexandria*, the first mention that we find of a *subdivision* there is in the time of *Arius*, who is said to have been *Presbyter* of a Church called *Baucalis*, upon which occasion *Epiphanius* tells

us, That the Churches of the Catholick Communion in *Alexandria*, under the Jurisdiction of the same Archbishop, had their particular Presbyters assigned them, for the Ecclesiastical necessities of the Inhabitants, which divisions were

Ὅπου Ἐκκλησίαι τῆ καθολικῆς Ἐκκλησίας ὑπὸ τοῦ Ἀρχιεπισκόπου ἦσαν, καὶ ἰδίαν ταῦταις ἐκκλησιαστικοῖς ἐπὶ Πρεσβυτέροις, διὰ τῆς ἐκκλησιαστικῆς χρείας τῶν οἰκητόρων, καὶ ἀμερότων, ἢ τοῦ λαοῦ (so it is to be read) ἐπιθαλασίου καὶ ὑμῶν ὑπὸ τῆς Ἀλεξανδρίων κατημένων πόλιν. *Epiphanius. Heres. 69. N. 1. Vide etiam Heres. 68. N. 4.*

by the Alexandrians, according to the custom of their Country, called ἀμερόν or λαοταί.

But it is not mentioned as an Innovation in or near his time, and therefore is in all probability to be presumed much more ancient. And if the custom of the eldest Presbyters succeeding in order to the Episcopacy, was in *Alexandria*, (where it seems observed as a *special custom*) practised from the *Apostles* time to *Heraclas*, (who was Scholar to *Origen*) as S.

S. Hierom and Eutychius say it was, and there ceased at S. Hierom seems to intimate, then it would be very probable that this subdivision into *λαυεας* was introduced at least before that time of Heraclas; because some reliques of that practice remained even in Arius his time, whose place as Presbyter of Baucalis is made next to the Bishop. (So Gelasius Cy-
At. Concil. Nicen. l. 2. *ricenus* speaking concerning Alexander,
6. 1. κατίσθαι τὸ Ἀρειον πρεσβύτερον ἔγγιστα αὐτοῦ.)
 Whence also the relation in Nicephorus Calistus of the quarrel of Arius with one Baucalus, being the first and second Presbyters of that Church of Alexandria, which is given as an occasion of his Heresie; a story very probably raised by occasion of his mistaking Baucalis the name of his Parish for the name of a Man, who is made second because Arius was known to be the first. For this Precedency of Arius is no way probable to have been because of his longer standing in his office of Presbytery, seeing Alexander is said expressly to have given him it, who was the first that made him Presbyter, for he was only made Deacon by Achilles the Predecessor of Alexander. Now Alexander himself is by Baronius thought to have succeeded Achilles in the Year 311, and if he

he be mistaken, seems rather to erre in placing him too soon after *Peter*, and the difference betwixt him and *Arius* arose about the Year 315, not above four years after, too small a time to make him in course the *senior Presbyter*. This Precedency therefore seems to be upon account of his Parish, which at the first distribution had in all probability been allotted to that *Presbyter*, who had been *senior* in due course of standing, which therefore seems to have been introduced whilst that *seniority* was observed, that is, at least before the time of *Heraclas*.

AND how long before *Heraclas* his time this distinction might have been introduced you cannot tell; yet I believe you will hardly say, I am sure much more hardly prove, that *discipline* failed there in the time of *Heraclas*, or for a long time after. After *Heraclas*, how much the Church of *Alexandria* and himself particularly suffered for *Christianity*, you have fully related by his Successor *Dionysius* in *Eusebius*, in the time of *Decius* and *Valerian*; and how severe they were in their Fasts, appears from the *Canonical Epistle* of that same *Dionysius* to *Basilides*, besides his other *penitential Treatise* now lost. What the *Alexandrians* also suffered in the

XXXVII.

Apud Euseb.
 lib. i. c. 4.
 40. 41. 42.
 10. 11.

L.8. c.10,
12,13.

the most bloody Persecution of *Dioclesian*, you may find in the same *Eusebius*, and particularly in *Thebais*, (which by the *Nicene Canon* establishing the *ἀρχαία* we find to have been influenced by the *Alexandrian Discipline*) the number of *Martyrs* was so great as to denominate a famous *Epocha*, which those Countries observe to this day, called the *Annus Martyrum* or *Dioclesiani*. Which severity is by so much the more remarkable, because it followed an intervall of rest, which usually corrupts that discipline which is onely voluntary, and unseconded by good *Laws*. I need not mention the *Martyrdom* of their Bishop *S. Peter* in this Persecution; his very severe *Canonical Epistle* is sufficient to shew how rigorous discipline was then practised, when in the heighth of persecution such severe Penances against lapsed persons were not judged unseasonable to be exercised on such persons, over whom they had no coercive power, but the obligation of the Penitents conscience. I might have proceeded to have shewn the same severity still maintained in that City, (which you so particularly reflect on as unworthy to be made a precedent) during the Prelacy of *Alexander* and the great *Athanasius*,
from

from the great Elogies given to those excellent *Prelates* by the *Fathers*, and the courage shewn by them, in ejecting and keeping out *Arius*, and the very slight Exceptions urged by the *Arians* their Enemies against them, especially in the several *Synods* convened in the cause of *Euseb. l. 9. c. 8.*
Athanasius. But for evincing the general severity of the *Lives of Christians*, that memorable Example of their great diligence in providing for those who had been formerly their severest *Persecutors*, in the great *Plague and Famine* which immediately followed the *Persecution of Dioclesian*, and venturing many of their own *lives* in the service, when they had been deserted by their nearest Friends, may be an illustrious evidence. Besides the Controversie betwixt *S. Pet. of Alexandria* *Epiph. Hares: 68. N. 3.* and *Meletius*, the occasion of the *Meletian Schism*, shews how generally the *Alexandrians* were affected to *discipline*. For when *S. Pet.* though severe enough against *lapsed persons*, as appears by his forementioned *Epistle*, yet thought it a necessary Indulgence to admit *Penitents to Communion* during the *Persecution*, even *Priests* as well as others, that they might be the better animated to new occasions of sufferings; *Meletius* opposed it, and was fol-

followed by much the greater part of the *Clergie*. Nor ought you to conclude, that the like *subdivision* was not introduced into other *Churches*, because we have no Records attesting it to have been so, seeing there is so little extant of the *Histories* of those *earlier Centuries*, much less any thing so minute and particular in describing the Customs of particular *Churches*, as that it would be safe to argue *negatively*, from their *omission of a custom* to conclude that there was *none*. For my design, it is sufficient that the ancient *Dioceses* had as many *Presbyters*, besides other *Clergie* requisite to rule them, in conjunction with the *Bishop*, as are now thought sufficient, since their *distribution into particular Parishes*; besides the *Chorepiscopi* and the *Clergie* under them, all subject to the Government of the *City Bishop*. Which is enough to shew, that the charge of a *Diocese* was as great *then as now*, and much beyond what you would have it, the abilities of a *particular person* without *Parochial Subrulers*.

δ
XXXVIII. 4. YOU say, "At *Antioch* (the third *Patriarchate*) *Ignatius* professeth that "every *Church* had one *Altar*, and one "*Bishop* with his *Presbyters* and *Deacons*, "*Fellow-servants*.) If you mean every *Church*

Church at Antioch, as if that or any other *City in that time*, had more than *one Bishop* presiding over a *Presbytery*; that is more than you will find in *Ignatius*, or any Authentick Writer of that time. But if you meant at *Antioch* as a *Patriarchate*, that is, within that *circuit* which was afterwards subject to the *Bishop of Antioch* as a *Patriarch*, including the whole *Oriental Diocese*, there were many *Cities* that had in them but *one Altar* with *one Bishop* and his *Clergie*, that I have already granted probable; but have withall shewn how little it will *advantage* your Cause, or *prejudice* mine, and I am not desirous to trouble you with *Repetition*. The name of *Fellow-servants* I doubt you misunderstand; it is indeed true if related to *God*, that persons of all *Orders* in the *Church* are his *Fellow-servants*; but if you mean it (as I doubt you do) that they are *Servants coequal among themselves*, that is clearly against the whole current of *Ignatius* his *Epistles*, and against the supposition of their being *distinct Orders*; and, I believe, against your own opinion concerning *Priests and Deacons*, whom I think you will not say to be thus *coequal*. But for what you add further, (as if you had it out of the same

R

Ig.

Ignatius, though indeed you have not scored it as you did the former part)

"That in this one *Church* the *Bishop* must

"enquire * all by name,

"even *Servant Men* and

"*Maids*, and see that they

"absented not them-

"selves from the *Church*;

"whence you ask, Why is not

"*Ignatius* confuted if he erred? and

"refer me to *Mr. Mede* on the point. I

am confident that you will find no such

thing in *Ignatius* or *Mr. Mede* that will

need *confuting*. For this *inquiry by name*

need not have been performed by *personal*

visitation of them, but by *Schedules*

delivered to him by his *subordinate Cler-*

gie, which if any of our *Bishops* would

do, I should be so far from offering to

confute, as that I should highly honour

and reverence him for it.

δ . BUT you say, "5. That *Alexandria*

XXXIX "and *Rome* by not *multiplying Bishops* as

"*Churches* or *Converts* needed it, began

"the great sin and calamity which hath

"undone us, and therefore are not to be

"our *patern*. If you mean by *Bishops*

your *Parish Ministers*, (as you seem to

do) who must have no greater charge

than

* The place intended is I believe *Ep. ad Polycarp.* Ἐξ ὀνό-
μας πάντας ζήτες. Δέλαις
καὶ δέλαις μὴ ὑποφάνει, &c.
p.139. Ed. Usser.

than *one* particular person, unassisted with a *Presbytery*, may give a particular account of; then sure you cannot but know, that as they are by you thought *singular* in introducing this distinction of *Altars* in the same *City*; so they must have been so in *multiplying* such a kind of *Bishops* that might attend them, at least in more accurately *proportioning* them to the *multitudes of Churches and Converts*. But if you mean a multitude of *Parish Priests*, whom you would fain call *Bishops*, independent on a principal *President*; then it would concern you to prove, 1. That *Alexandria* and *Rome* were herein *singular*, which you will find impossible to be done. And, 2. That their guilt herein was not onely an *occasion* (for *occasions of evil* cannot be proved *evil*, and so unfit for being *paterns*) but *natural causes* of that grand *sin and calamity* you so lament.

Y O U answer or rather argue; ¶ XL.
 “6. That were *Bishops* necessarily to be
 “distributed by *Cities*, the Empires that
 “have few or no *Cities*, must have few
 “or no *Bishops*; and an Emperour might
 “(*actual agents*) depose all the *Bishops*
 “by disfranchising the *Cities*. This
 “does not shew the *impossibility* of a Bi-
 shops

shops maintaining *discipline* in a *City* that is *great and populous*, (which is indeed our question) but onely the inconvenience of *scrupulously multiplying Bishops* according to the multitude of *Cities*. And that, as it is not to our purpose, so I know no Adversary you have in it. For there are no humane Establishments whatsoever that can fit all *circumstances*; yet are not such *possible* inconvenient cases thought sufficient to abrogate them though known and foreseen. And therefore it were not *in prudence* a sufficient reason for the *Church* to alter her general rule of *multiplying Bishops by Cities*, because the cases mentioned by you are but *rare and improbable*, which kind are not taken notice of by *humane Legislators*. They are *rare*; for where will you find that *Empire* that hath few or no *Cities*, at least in those *civilized* parts of the world they were then acquainted with? They are *improbable*; for the *administration of justice* among Subjects, and the *encouragement of traffick*, which are the Governours Interests, do require such Privileges to be given to places not *too distant* from each other. But if the *inconveniences* were greater than indeed they are, and sufficient

ent to persuade a deviation from such a general rule in such cases. Yet, 1. The *Church* never acknowledged any *unalterable* divine obligation to observe it, but has always reserved a power to her self of deviating in such cases, of which she might be satisfied that they were sufficiently *momentous*. And, 2. She has in such cases actually taken the liberty of *exerting* her own power; as in those Nations which had but *one Bishop*, though *many Cities*, of which instances were already given; and in those places where *Cities* too numerous, and too little frequented, against which she has made those express *Canons*, that *Bishops* should not be placed over them, *nè vilesceret nomen Episcopi*, which those of your Persuasion do so often take notice of with offence.

Can. 6. Concil. Sandicens.
Can. 57. Conc. Laodic. Epist.
1. Pseudo-Clementin. ad Jacob. ep. 1. Pseudo-Anacleti & Dist. 80. ep. 3. Pseudo-Anacleti n. 2.

BUT, 7. You say, "Every Corporation, *Oppidum*, like our Market-Towns, was then truly *πῶλις*. And if we will procure every such City with us to have a Bishop, and the office of such Bishops to be to drive men from sin, and not to it; and to silence Blasphemers, not faithful Preachers of the Gospel; all

¶ XLI.

“our Controversies of *Prelacy* are then
 “at an end. But I fear though you had
 your desire, that in analogy to *Cities Bishops*
 should be multiplied according to
 the number of *Cities*, (which Rule you
 lately seemed to dislike) and that every
Market Town should be accounted a *City*,
 as you conceive it to have been practised
 among the *Ancients*, and that *Bishops*
 discharged their *duty* as you have de-
 scribed it ; yet you would hardly suffer
 our Controversies to end so, especially if
 you acted *consequently* to your own Prin-
 ciples. For you know, by the same rule
 that *small Cities*, as you have described
 them, must have *distinct Bishops* ; the
 greatest that are, *London* it self for ex-
 ample, must have *but one*, together with
 the *Villages* about it ; and I doubt that
 would be found to be a charge as dispro-
 portionable to the abilities of a *single man*,
 as some of our *Country Dioceses*, especi-
 ally here in *Ireland*. Nay, by Captain
Grants Calculation *London* bears a great-
 er proportion to all *England* than any
single Diocese, which is onely the 25th.
 part. Now according to your Prin-
 ciples, our Communion *quâ Diocesan*, that
 is, if I understand you as exceeding the
 abilities of a *single man*, is not to be em-
 braced.

The 15th.
 part in
Taxes,
 14th. real-
 ly, p. 83, 84

braced. Therefore even in this case you must refuse to *communicate* with the *Church of London*. And considering that in communicating with a *particular*, you do communicate with *all* with whom that *particular Church* holds Communion, (for Communion with a *particular Church* is no where understood as a profession of union with her alone, but also with all such whom she accounts *orthodox* members of the *Catholick Church*) you must by the same sequel conceive your self obliged to decline the Communion of all *particular Churches* communicating with *London*. Unless therefore you suppose a *Schism* of all other *Churches* from her, you must make one from them; and so be in the same condition wherein you are at present. I confess you do not act consequently to this later Principle, whilst you refuse not our *Parish Communion*, which communicates with our *Diocesan quâ Diocesan*; and so I had much rather *decline* the Dispute, than urge you too far to approve your self more *rational* by your being more *uncharitable*, which may too probably be the event if you should prove too tenacious of your present Opinions. But I believe, Sir, if you would be pleased to examine, you

would certainly find your self mistaken in thinking their *ordinary Cities* to have been no more considerable than our *ordinary Market Towns*; for sure you know that then as well as now *Cities* were the highest denomination; and that in those flourishing Countries, proportionably much more *populous than England*, it is likely their *Cities* were accordingly frequented. Nay, most of the *Cities* of those times, especially the *Oriental* the *Greeks* and *Asiatics*, had been little *Republicks* among themselves, before the success of *war* had subdued them to the yoke of a *common Master*, which must in all likelihood have made them more considerable, when their Governours care and interests were more *confined* to them, than if they had originally been included in a *greater Society*. Besides the *wars* waged by them, and the *resistance* made against numerous Armies, and the multitude and capaciousness of their *Temples* and *Theatres*, then so frequent in *ordinary Cities*, (as you may see for the small Tract of *Greece* very fully in *Panfanias*, besides what other Authors have mentioned occasionally concerning that and other places) are sufficient Arguments of their ordinary *populousness*.
And

And considering that those *Cities* that were among them *eminent for greatness*, did rather *exceed* than *fall short* of those which are accounted so now ; we have reason to believe that the *common Cities* did likewise hold the like proportion.

N A Y, according to all the qualifications of our *modern Cities*, those *ancient* ones were every way as considerable as ours. They were *Towns corporate* among themselves. This appears from the *Government* mentioned as exercised among them ; the ἑννομεῖς ἐκκλησίαι, *Acts* 19. 39. the ἐκκλησίαι, and δῆμοι, and γερουσίαι, so very frequently mentioned in *Greek Cities*, and the *Prators* and *Ædiles* among the *Latines*. They were *walled*, whence the ordinary Etymology of *Urbs quasi Orbis*, from the compass allotted for the *walls* by the *plow*, and the customs for *plowing*, for *founding*, and *demolishing* their walls, so famous among the *Romans*. And the same you may observe to have been the general custom ; for you will, I believe, never meet any mention of *City* a *unwalled*, though possibly not with those ceremonies and formalities. And this seems to have been one of their principal distinctions from places of a near, but inferior account ; that the *Obvula* among the
La-

XLII.

Latines, and the *κωμότητες* among the *Greeks*, were not walled as our *Market Towns* usually are not. They had *Suburbs* subject to their *Jurisdiction* frequently mentioned in the *Scriptures*, particularly those of the *Levites*, *Numb.* 35.5. have 2000 *cubits* on every side without the walls, which is near a *mile*. So the *Romans* had their *Pomæria* and *Suburbana*, and the *Greeks* their *περὶ στα* or *περὶ στα* obvious in Authors. And besides these *Suburbs* there were several places of inferior denomination subject to the *ancient Cities*; these you have frequently mentioned *Josh.* 16. and in several other passages of that and other Books of *Scripture*, and are rendered *Towns* in our English Translation, *Vici* and *Villule*, *Castella*, and sometimes *Oppida*, in the *Vulgar*; *κῶμαι* and *ἐπαύλεις* in the LXXII. And expressly *Aristotle* defines a City *ἡ ἐν ἀριστῶν ἀνθρώπων κοινότης τέλει*. And as the *Grecians* had their *κῶμαι* subject to their *Cities*, so the *Romans* particularly had their *Pagos*, places of some natural advantage for strength, to which the *Rusticks* might have a ready recourse in time of danger, instituted by *Servius Tullius*, yet subject to their City, as you may see in *Halicanassaus*; whence you know the name
Pa-

Polit. 1, 1.
c. 2.

Paganus first signified a *Country Clown*, in opposition to a *Citizen*, or a person of civil education. And generally through *Italy* you may find mention of *Vici* and *Villa* and *Oppida*, and the *Ager* denominated from the *City*, who in all affairs of consequence had recourse to their *neighbouring Cities*. And besides the Examples now mentioned from the *Scriptures*, the same practice seems to have been observed in other *Oriental* parts, as appears from *Isidorus Characenus*, who in his *Parthick Stages* mentions not only *κώμας* but *κωμοπίλεις*, in contradiction to *Cities*; as also in *Xenophon in exped. Cyr.* And that they were subject to the *Cities* might have been shewn from the manner of their *Census* described by *S. Luke 3.2.* that they were to be taxed in their own *Cities*, which seems to have been the common custom of the whole *Roman Empire*, and the ordinary practice of the men of those *Ages*, to denominate themselves from the *City* they had relation to, though born in the *Villages*, and their usual recourse on solemn occasions to the *City Sacrifices*, a practice very much conformed to their *secular dependences* by the *ancient Legislators*; besides their repairing thither for *secular justice*. But besides all
this

this, the *right of a City* was given to places, not upon account of their *greatness and populousness*, but by special Charter. A clear instance hereof we have in 13 *Action of the Council of Chalcedon*; there we find *Anastatius Nicæus* pleading a right to *Basilinopolis*, because it had been formerly a *Region of Nice*, (what *Regions* were, is notorious from the divisions of *Rome* and *Constantinople* into them) till it was made a *City* by *Julian* or some other Emperour. Here we see a place so considerable, as that it was afterwards made a *City*, yet formerly onely a *Ward* of another *City*, which *Ward* was in all likelyhood equivalent our ordinary *Market Towns*. Nay more than that, for he gives instances of two such others, *Tatienus* and *Doris*, that were then acknowledged *Regions of Nice*. We see also this *Region* raised to the dignity of a *City* by the *Imperial Rescript*. And further he proves the dependence of *Basilinopolis* on *Nice* by this argument, that the Emperour who made it a *City* took *consulares* or *Curiales*, (whence the *Imperial Rescripts* themselves are frequently called *Pragmatica*) from *Nice*; and that the custom was still observed, that the Vacancies of *Basilinopolis*, as they fell, were supplied from *Nice*,

Nice, and that they were frequently translated from thence back to *Nice* again; and that *thus* that which had formerly been a *Region* became a *City*. Where several things are observable to my purpose: 1. That that which made the *Region* a *City*, was the having *Court-officers* of their own, whence it appears that *Courts* were appropriated to *Cities*, and that therefore all other *Towns* not thus *privileged* must have been subject to the Jurisdiction of the *Cities*. 2. That these *Courts* were granted by special Charter of the *Emperour*. And, 3. that the borrowing these *Officers* from another *City*, if constantly observed, signified some *secular dependence* of such a place on such a *City*, from whence they were borrowed. And now I pray what an such a *Town* walled, incorporated, and having Jurisdiction, not onely over *Suburbs*, but a proportion of the *Villages* and *Towns* adjacent, by special *Imperial Charters*, want of our modern notion of a *City*, even as contradistinct to our *Market Towns*?

AND that the Government of the Church was proportioned to that of the State is so commonly observed by learned Men, as that I cannot think it necessary to be tedious in proving it. And that in this

this very particular of the *subjection* of the ἀγροικὴ παροικία to the *City Bishop*, appears from the 17th. Canon of this *same Council*, where it is not onely for this, but all other affairs of a like nature, established as a general Rule, (very probably occasioned by the forementioned Controversie;) Εἰ πρὸς βασιλικῆς ἑκαστῆς ἐκκλησίας πόλιν, ἢ αὐτῆς κληρονομίαν, τοῖς πολιτικοῖς καὶ δημοσίοις π' ποίς καὶ τῇ Ἐκκλησιαστικῇ Παροικίᾳ ἡ τέχνη ἀκολουθεῖται. And though we had no express Testimony, yet the *multitude* of the Clergy requisite for the Government of their ordinary πόλιν, a whole *Presbytery* in the *City*, besides the *Deacons*, and the other inferiour Orders there, and others in the *Country* subject to the *Chorepiscopus* or ἀγροεικὴς, and all subject to the *City Bishop*, do plainly shew that the *Bishops Jurisdiction*; if not as large as now, was at least much larger than our ordinary *Market Towns*, which usually have but one *Parish*, and are therefore thought sufficiently governable by an ordinary single *Presbyter*. And this form of governing *Cities* was so universal, as that your Assertion to the contrary is not credible even in *Africa*, or any other place where *Bishops* or *Cities* are observed to have been most frequent or numerous.

But

But if it had indeed been otherwise in some singular places, yet it is plain that the general rate of *Cities* among the *Ancients* was equal to ours. Whence it will follow, that the *Dioceses* generally designed were such as *ours are now*, though in some particular more anomalous Instances they were (it may be) as small as you would have them. Whence two things will follow very apposite to my design: 1. That the Judgment of those Ages themselves were certainly more for *us* than *you*, seeing their *judgment* is onely to be concluded from their *general rules*, not from their particular *anomalous practices*. And, 2. that the case of *discipline* must have been the same with *them* as *us*. For the *general* observation of *discipline* cannot be effected by *singular*, but *general practices and designs*. Whence it will be easie to infer, that if *discipline* was then generally observed, then it is observable under a *Diocesan Government*, in the sense we are now disputing concerning it. For such I have proved to have been generally *practised* then, and if it was *observed* then, you can give no disparity why it may not be so *now*, if *Governours* would be equally *industrious*.

YOUR

¶ XLIV. "YOUR intimation concerning the
 "Bishops you would have in your Pa-
 "chial Dioceses; (that their office must
 "be to drive men from sin, and not to
 "and to silence Blasphemers, and not
 "faithful Preachers of the Gospel;) as if
 our Bishops were guilty of the contrary,
 is methinks very sharp and uncharita-
 ble. We are all agreed, you as well as
 we, that this is our *Diocesan Bishops office*.
 Our onely difference is, that you con-
 ceive their *actual practice* to be other-
 wise. But I pray consider seriously what
good meaning you can have herein if your
 desire had been granted? Is it that the
 Bishop must not do that which himself
 thinks to be *driving men to sin*? You
 cannot but know that they pretend, (and
 how can you know that they do not re-
 ally believe) their prosecutions of Dissen-
 ters to be not a driving them *to sin*, but
from it, from disobedience to that which
 they think *lawful Ecclesiastical Govern-*
ment, and from those *Separations* which
 themselves judge *Schismatical*, and from
 the defence and malice of *unlawful Oaths*.
 And certainly what they think to be *Dis-*
obedience and Schism, and the maintain-
 ing of *unlawful Oaths*, your self cannot
 blame them if they believe them high-
 ly

And the Preachers silenced by
 they do not by them thought faithful
 Preaching of the Gospel, at least not in the
 manner of their silencing; but Preachers of
 Blasphemy and Founders and Fomenters
 of parties, to the great weakning of the
 common Interest of the Gospel. And can
 you think it *just* in them to be *zealous*
 against them, whom they conceive to
 be such *enemies* to the Gospel, at least
 while they think them so, and profess
 themselves unable to find any *reason* to
 think otherwise? Or do you mean that
 the Bishop must not drive to that which
 the Criminal will pretend to be a *sin*, or
 prosecute that which he calls *faithful*
Preaching of the Gospel? If so, you had
 dealt more plainly to have denied the
 Bishop any power at all to drive men from
 sin, or silence *Blasphemers*; than to grant
 him it, and yet to make it *useless and un-*
practicable, as it must needs be if he must
 not practise it till the *Sinner or Blasphemer*
 confess themselves so; for how rarely
 do you find real *Criminals* plead *guilty*
 at the Bar? Besides that, by this means
 the most *innocent* if any must *only suffer*;
 and the most *dangerous* must generally
 escape. For they who *confess their crime*
 must generally be presumed *penitent*, and
 they who are so are *almost innocent*, if we

may believe the *Tragedian*; but he who denies his guilt, aggravates it by the *dissimulation* of his *Apologie*. Besides, he who confesses himself a *Sinner* or a *Blasphemer*, is onely chargeable with a *personal* guilt; but he who denies *sins* and *blasphemies* to be sins, sins more heinously, not onely sinning himself, but *teaching others to do so too*. Nor is the *multitude* onely more considerable, that is drawn aside by this later sort of *dissingenuous sinners*, but the quality of the *persons seduced*, and the greatness of their danger is much more considerable, than in those who are prejudiced by the former. For none are likely to be seduc'd by *professed debauchees*, but such as are *ill-inclined* themselves. But they who are deceived by them who teach *ill principles*, not onely defending *sins* ad excusing them, but pretending them to be *duties*, are usually such who are of the *best lives*, and the most *innocent* meaning, whose Errors are like to be *authenticated* by their *personal authority* and *reputation*. And those who acknowledge *their sins* are more easily recoverable, their *own consciences* being ready upon any occasion to joyn with *external conviction* whensoever offered to them; but they who mistake their *sins* for the *service of God*, do both alienate their minds from

conviction, by laying out their zeal against *hearing or impartial considering* that which they look on as a *temptation*; and in the event resolve their conviction into an issue of more difficult proof. For it is generally more easie even to the *meanest most popular capacity*, to prove a *matter of fact* than a *matter of right*, how unquestionable soever. Certainly you would your self acknowledge him to be much the greater and more dangerous person, who should *preach for drunkenness*, and maintained it to be an *evangelical duty*, and call this his *Preaching a faithful preaching of the Gospel*, and accordingly be guilty of it, without any thing of *remorse or shame*, than he who should *ingenuously confess his guilt and blame-worthiness* for it.

NOW this you know is the sense of XLV
Superiours concerning Dissenters; they think that to be their *Subjects duty*, which their *Subjects* pretend to be *sins*. And can you blame them for *obliging their Subjects* to perform their duty? If you do, you will thereby make their *Government* useless and insignificant. They think *Schism* to be a sin really much greater than those which sound louder in the *vulgar esteem*, than *drunkenness, &c.* and more nearly relating to their trust as *Governours*, as
S 2
being.

being more directly prejudicial to the publick, to take care of which is their peculiar office as Governours. They think that which is called *faithful preaching of the Gospel*, not to be for *reforming of mens lives*, which is the great design of the Gospel; (for God be praised we do not differ in Subjects of that kind, but men may be as *zealous* as they please against vice, though *Conformists*) but the constituting and perpetuating of *Schism*, which is by so much the more *dangerous* by how much it is more palliated by *specious titles*, such as is that now mentioned; so that though themselves may believe them faithful in other things, yet in this they are far from thinking them so, and therefore as far from prosecuting them as *faithful Preachers*. And I believe your self will hardly pretend, that their *fidelity* in some things must excuse their *unfaithfulness* in others. Or do you mean, that persons of a *pious conversation and conscientious*, must not be driven to that which they *think sin*, or from that which they *think faithful Preaching of the Gospel*? If you mean that all truly *pious conscientious* persons ought to be treated with all *candour and respect*, before severer means be used; or that the use of severer

verer means is utterly to be forborn, as far as may be, that is, as far as such *forbearance* may be reconcilable with the *publick Interest*, which is to be preferred before the *private* of any *single person* how *pious* soever; I could for my part heartily wish it were so too, and I believe most of the *Bishops do practice* accordingly with those concerning whom they have entertained such a *good opinion*, and do endeavour to shew the same *charitable* demeanour to them on *earth*, which they think God will in *heaven*.

BUT, Sir, you know that they who XLVI are indeed free from *carnal vices*, and such as are obnoxious to observation, may yet be guilty of *spiritual*, such as *Obstinacy in yielding to conviction*, or *Disobedience to Superiours*, or *Negligence in inquiry*, or too much prejudice or aversion to the *persons or reasons* of their *adversaries*, before they have given them an *equal hearing*, or some such other prejudice, which unawares seduces the very *best and wisest persons*; and their *guilt* upon some of these accounts may be discerned and judged by their *Superiours*, from their perverse demeanour under those *wilder Treatments*. And when it is discerned, though their *innocence as to carnal crimes* may

indeed, in prudence and charity, be thought sufficient for the *expiation or pretext* of smaller delinquences, yet they can upon neither account be judged so, in regard of *crimes* of a more heinous nature than their *virtues* are eminent, and of such a kind would *Schism and Faction* appear to such as would equally and soberly consider them. But suppose that *Governours* do indeed believe, that their *Subjects* do *bonâ fide* believe as they profess, and conceive themselves obliged *in conscience* to deny their *due obedience*, and to follow those *factions* courses they were engaged in; yet sure you cannot think but that *well meaning men*, as well as others, may be *mistaken*, and that very *dangerously*; nor does their *goodness* secure their *judgment* from error, in thinking that *evil* which is *good*, and on the contrary; but onely their *practice*, that they are not likely to be guilty of what *themselves think evil*, nor to be negligent of what *themselves think good*. One would verily think, that *Ravillac* and several such resolute persons, who engaged themselves without any *private provocation*, on dangers they could never hope to escape, and much greater than any possible *secular ends*, if in their wits, could

could have been animated by nothing to such desperate enterprizes, but onely a strong persuation of the *goodness of their cause*, and the hope of *future rewards*. And yet you would not think *that* a sufficient reason to exempt them from the severity of the *Law*. God may indeed be merciful to such in regard of their *pious intentions*. But, 1. Their *practices* by being acknowledged to need mercy, must be supposed *blamable*, not *commendable*; S. Paul confesses himself *the chief of sinners*, in regard of those *persecutions*, for which he owns his *ignorance* as the reason of his *pardon*. And, 2. Even God himself does often chastize them for the *terror of others*, with *temporal afflictions*, whom he intends to spare in the *world to come*. A clear example hereof we have in *David*, 2 Sam. 12. 13, 14. where after his sins of murdering *Uriah*, and defiling *Bathsheba*, had been forgiven him; it is yet expressly added, that because by this deed he had given occasion to *the enemies of God to blaspheme*; the *child* that had been born of that adulterous mixture should *surely die*. And therefore *good men* themselves, when guilty of *Schism*, giving the like scandal to *the enemies of the truth*, and drawing

others to the like sin by their persuasion or example, may in this life be punished for the good of others. And, 3. God himself cannot be thought merciful to men good for all other things, and perccant onely in one kind, especially if of so heinous a nature, as Schism without their repentance, either particular by an actual explicite confession and reformation of it when known; or general and implicite, and *in voto*, when they are penitent for all sins unknown as well as known, and are in a ready preparation of mind to use and accept of all moral means of discovery, and to reform what might be convicted by such discovery, how dear soever otherwise. And this you know is the case of the Church in punishing well meaning persons who are guilty of Schism. It is plain, that they are so far from being penitent for what she thinks to be sin, as that they defend it, and draw others to it. And as to general repentance, she thinks she has not reason to believe it in them, when upon proposal of her reasons they shew themselves perverse, and factious, and incorrigible. If it be pretended, that the Church may be mistaken in censures, I pray consider, 4. That she must act according to her own conscience, though erroneous;

conceded; and though God may prove indeed indulgent to many persons, whom he as a *searcher of their hearts* may know to be *penitent*; yet the Church being obliged to accommodate her demeanour to them, to her *own knowledge*, may at the same time *justly and commendably* prosecute them, if they seem otherwise to her. And I believe you will find it a general occasion of your *mistakes* in this kind, that you look upon *Superiors* as obliged to act according to your *own private conscience*. But if your self had been a *Governour*, and had to do with a person of a reputation otherwise *unblamable*, but yet notoriously guilty of some very remarkable *offence* coming under your cognizance, and so far from being *penitent* for it, as that he should *defend* it, and *preach it to others*, and call such Preaching a *faithful Preaching of the Gospel*; I believe you would think your self more secure in acting according to your *own conscience*, than that of the *criminal*, though you might confess your self as liable to *mistakes* as him. And believe it, that it is the most equal way to clear your self from prejudices, and to prevent *unheritable censures* to represent *their case* as if it had been *your own*.

YOU

¶ XLVII. YOU answer, "8. That I must re-
 member that *great Cities* had long but
 "few *Christians* in comparison of the
 "Heathens till *Constantine's* time, and
 "mostly long after. But, 1. Though this
 had indeed been true, yet it will not fol-
 low that the *Government* must have been
 proportioned onely to the necessities of
 those few, both because *Heathens* as well
 as *Christians*, the reducing of *Infidels*, as
 well as the government of *Believers*, be-
 longed to *their charge*. Which must
 have been by so much greater rather than
 less, as there was much more difficulty in
 reducing one from his *vicious* practises
 as well as his opinions, to the severe rules
 of *Christianity*, than to govern many, espe-
 cially such good and excellent persons as
Converts were generally in those times,
 when actually reduced; and because
Christianity was in a growing condition,
 and therefore the *Government* was to be
 proportioned to their *future hopes*, as well
 as their *present fruitions*. But, 2. The
 supposition, That *Christians* were so few
 till *Constantine's* time or afterwards, is a
 great mistake. In the *Church of Jerusa-*
lem we find 3000 converted by one *Ser-*
mon, *Acts* 11.41. besides those who had
 already been converted by our *Saviour's*
 per-

personal Preaching, (which may be supposed to have been very many, by the multitude that sung *Hosannas* before him, which amazed the whole City, and the terror of the *Pharisees*, who durst not seize on him by force for fear of the people, and their profession, that all the world went after him, &c.) and those who were afterwards daily added, ver. 47. besides 5000 men more expressly said to have been converted by another Sermon, *Acts* 4.4. and multitudes of men and women, chap. 5.14. added through all *Judea*, under which *Jerusalem* was also comprehended) *Acts* 9.31. And in the same place after *Herod Agrippa's* death the Word of God further grew and multiplied, *Acts* 12.24. and many thousands are mentioned (though imperfectly, for in the Greek is *μυριας* ten thousands) *Acts* 21. 20. Yet were all these under single Bishops, *S. James* and his Successors, as far as *History* can inform us, though in all likelihood this number was vastly increased, when most of the refractory Jews, who most of all hindered the progress of the Gospel, were destroyed in the Siege of *Titus*, and generally banished, when it was reedified by *Adrian*, and by him called *Ælia*. This is very observable, because it is most likely to have been esta-

established by the *Apostles* as a pattern for other Cities. But it was not herein singular even in those times; for *Samaria* seems generally to have been converted. This appears, in that *all the people* are said to have been deceived by *Simon Magnus*, *Acts 8. 9.* *all from the least to the greatest*, ver. 10. and the same number seems to have been converted by *S. Philip*, and to have been baptized both *men and women*, ver. 12. and therefore *Samaria* is said to have received the word of God, ver. 14. Now the least that can be understood by these expressions is, that much the greater part received the faith, which must have very much exceeded the Government of a single solitary person. In the Church of *Antioch* *Ignatius* his charge, (by which you in some part understand the extent of the *Diocesan* Government mentioned in his *Epistles*) a great number is said to have believed, *Acts 11. 21.* and after *Barnabas* his coming, much people is said to have been added to the Lord, ver. 24. who are therefore to have been supposed distinct from the former. And again, ver. 26. *Saul* and *Barnabas* together for a year together taught much people, who there first received the name of *Christians*, very probably from the great

multitudes observable there above other places adjacent, which could hardly have been so likely, if they had not held some great proportion to the Inhabitants, which if they did must have very much exceeded our ordinary *Parochial Cures*. For *Antioch* was the *third City* of the *Roman Empire* in *Secular* as well as *Ecclesiastical Dignity*; so in *Antiochia Pisidia* many of the *Jews* and *religious Profelytes* followed *Paul* and *Barnabas*, *Acts 13.43*. And afterwards almost all the *City* came together to hear the word of *God*, *ver. 44*. and with what event may be conceived from that which follows, *ver. 48, 49*. That the *Gentiles* were glad, and glorified the word of the *Lord*; and as many as were ordained, to eternal life believed: and that the word of the *Lord* was published in all regions. Which, besides the opposition mentioned onely by the *Jews* and devout and honourable women, (that is, *Profelytesses of the Gates*, as some understand) acted by them, *ver. 50*. must imply the number of *Converts* to have been extremely considerable in proportion to the whole, which must have included a great multitude, this *City* being a *Metropolis* of a *Province*. In *Thessalonica* some (of the *Jews*) believed, and of the devout *Greeks* a great

great multitude, and of the chief women not a few, Acts 17.4. And in Berea, another remarkable City, they were more noble than those of Thessalonica, ver. 11. And accordingly many of the Jews believed; also of honourable women which were Greeks, and of men not a few, v. 12. In Ephesus S. Timothy's Diocese, S. Paul himself disputeth first three moneths in the Synagogue, Acts 19.8. afterwards two years in the school of Tyrannus; so that all which dwelt in Asia (that is, the Lydian or Proconsular, whereof Ephesus was the Metropolis) heard the word of the Lord Jesus, both Jews and Greeks, ver. 9. 10. fear came upon all of them; and the name of the Lord Jesus was magnified, ver. 17. And you may guess at the great multitude of Converts by the vast summe which their conjuring books then burnt were valued at, 50000 pieces of silver, v. 19. which is observed by the Holy Ghost himself, as an Argument how mightily the word of God grew and prevailed, ver. 20. And it must argue a very great number, considering that books were a commodity which is not to have been presumed a considerable part of the riches of each, much less of that particular subject, (however the *Epistolæ xianorum* be celebrated among the Ancients) and
the

the total number of the persons concerned must needs be greater, by how much the particular proportions to be distributed among them are likely to have been *less to the particulars*; and it is accordingly observable, that no *particular* is noted to have been considerably *impoverished* by so great a loss.

THESE are the most remarkable XLVIII
Cities mentioned in the *Acts*, which we have reason to believe to have abounded with *numbers of Christians*, too great for the Cure of a *single person*. And it is to be considered, that as in their *preaching* you find little mention of their *preaching in villages*, but in *Cities*; so it is most credible that they left *them* to the care of the Government established in the *Cities*. Whence it will follow, that the *Ecclesiastical* as well as the *Secular Government* of *Villages* depended on the *Cities*, and that therefore they were *Dioceses* in the modern extent, and that the Government established in *Cities* seems to have been most agreeable to the design of the *Apostles*. And of all *Cities* those are to be supposed most accurately provided for by the *Apostles*, which were converted by their *personal preaching*, and which in their times had *numbers* sufficient for Government;

vernment; and therefore if other places
 had deviated from the examples of these,
 as those in *Africa* and *Ireland*, which
 you cannot prove to have been convert-
 ed by the *Apostles*, you ought rather to
 have corrected those by these, than as
 you preposterously do, to confine the
Dioceses converted and established by the
Apostles, to the dimensions of them which
 were not. But besides these *Scripture*
 Arguments evincing the great number of
Christians, even in the times of the *Apos-
 stles* themselves; another may be drawn
 from the *multitudes* of *Heresies*, which
 must have needs drawn great numbers
 from the Church, not only that swarm
 which rose immediately after the decease
 of the *Apostles*, as the *Basiliidians*, *Valenti-
 nians*, &c. but also those who were con-
 temporary with the *Apostles* themselves,
 as the *Simonians*, *Nicolaitans*, *Ebionites*,
Cerinthians, &c. For though some few
 of these did, even in the *Apostles* times
 themselves, separate, as is clear from
 1 *John* 11. 19. and several other places
 of the *Epistles*, where they are blamed
 and confuted, and the *multitudes* of them
 that perished in *Jerusalem* in the *Capti-
 vity*; yet most of them did then act
 more covertly, and were followed by
 smaller

smaller parties, in regard of what was done after the *decease of the Apostles*, which is the reason why *Hegesippus* in *Eusebius* calls the Church a *pure Virgin* till the time of *Trajan*, in whose time *S. John* the last of them died, not long after his return from *Patmos*. Now if the *Christians* were so *numerous*, as it appears they were, even after these deductions of their own members by *relapse*, and the hinderance of the conversion of others, whom we find to have been *alienated* at a greater distance by this scandal of the multitude of their *Seets*, (for about that time we find it objected by *Celsus*, who wrote his Book against the Christians under *Hadrian*, the immediate Successor of *Trajan*, if we may believe *Origen*) we cannot think their number so small as you conceive in the times of the *Apostles*, when they did not labour under these disadvantages. But when they had overcome these difficulties, and were exercised with new *persecutions*, it is strange how exceedingly they *encreased*. In *Severus* his time, about the Year of our Lord 201, according to *Baronius*, *sest. 37. 6* *Tertullian* wrote his *Apologie*, which was *Anno 200.* *sest. 7.* above 100 years before *Constantine*; yet even then there were such multitudes of

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Christians, as that he prefers them before the *Moors*, and *Marcomans*, and *Parthians*; as being spread over all the *Roman world*. His words, though they be so known that I wonder that you forgot them, yet are withall so very pertinent and full to my purpose, as that I think it necessary to transcribe them; thus therefore he is in *Cap. 37. Apolog. Plures nimirum Mauri & Marcomanni, ipsique Parthi, vel quantacunque unius tamen loci, & suorum finium, gentes, quàm totius orbis? Externi sumus, & vestra omnia implevimus, urbes, insulas, castella, mancipia, conciliabula, castra ipsa, tribus, decurias, palatium, senatum, forum. Sola vobis relinquimus templa.* Here you see *Cities*, and throughout the *whole world*, (that is, according to the language of those times, the *Roman Empire*) full of them. What can be more contrary to your Assertion? Yet *fulness* may be understood with a latitude, for a great, though not the *greatest* number. But that he understood the *greatest*, will easily appear from what he afterwards adds; *Potuiamus & inermes, nec rebelles, sed tantummodo discordes, solius divortii invidia adversus vos dimicasse. Si enim tanta vis hominum in aliquem orbis remoti finum abruptissemus à vobis, suffudisset utique dominationem*

*nationem vestram tot qualiumcunque amissio
 civium, imò & ipsâ destitutione punisset.
 Proculdubio expavissetis ad solitudinem ve-
 stram, ad silentium rerum & stuporem quen-
 dam, quasi mortua urbis quesissetis, quibus
 vos vobis remansissent; nunc enim pauciores
 hostes habetis præ multitudine Christianorum
 pene omnium civium, pene omnes cives
 Christianos, habendo. And again, Suffe-
 cisset hoc solùm nostræ ultioni, quòd vacua
 exinde possessio immundis spiritibus pateret.
 Certainly they whose very secession would
 leave nothing but solitude, and silence, and
 amazement, and empty possessions for unclean
 spirits behind them; they who had left
 their City as it were dead, almost destitute of
 Citizens to be governed, and their En-
 mies more numerous than their Subjects,
 must needs have been much the greater
 number. But when he says expressly,
 that almost all their Citizens were Christi-
 ans, what can be clearer than that?
 (notwithstanding what allowances may
 be made for the confidence of the man, and
 the humour of the oppressed parties to ad-
 vance their numbers.) Christians were
 so far from being few in comparison
 of the Heathens, as that the contrary
 seems most probable, that the Heathens*

in the Roman Empire were considerably outnumbered by them.

¶ XLIX. AND that in other Cities besides Rome and Alexandria, (which though Apostolical Sees you will not admit as pre-^{greater} numbers were under the Government of Ecclesiastical Monarchs with their Presbyteries, than had been governable by any single (however able) Presbyter. Instances may be given (besides the general proofs already intimated) out of the good Records of those times, as imperfect as we have them extant at present. One is of Neocæsarea a metropolis of the Province of Pontus Polemoniacus, (which I take notice of that you may understand how great a City it was.) Here though the persons are ex-

* Ἀπείρως ὄντων τῶν οἰκούντων
ἐν τῇ πόλει καὶ τῇ περιουσίᾳ
ἐκ. S. Greg. Nyssæ.
Vii. S. Greg. Thaumaturgi,
edit. inter opera Thaumaturgi,
à Gerard. Voss. p. 255.

pressly said to have been * infinite, that inhabited the City it self and the adjacent Region, (by which you may understand the extent of the Diocese of those times, that it included the ^{περίουσίαν} as well as the ^{πόλιν}, and that the number of the Inhabitants of such a Diocese did far exceed the Government of a single Presbyter;) yet there were but 17 Christians when S. Gregory Thaumaturgus was first

first made their *Bishop*, who managed his charge with such good success, as that in a Visitation of his *Diocese* a little before his death, again expressed as formerly, *αὐτὸν παύειν τὸ ἐπισκοπεῖν καὶ τὸ λαὸν διαπολιτεύεσθαι*, p. 313. ib. he found onely the same number of 17 *Pagans*. Yet this *infinite* number he had governed himself; without any addition of *coordinate coadjutors* upon the increase of his charge, and left them in the same condition *τὸ μὲν αὐτὸν ἐκτελεῖν τὸν ἐπισκοπικόν*, that is, to his *succeeding Bishop*. Sure you cannot but think this *Diocese* exceeded the greatest *Parish* in *London*. Another is that of *Carthage*, the *multitude of Christians* wherein, intimated in my former Letter, you tell me plainly, you *believe not*. Not to insist on the general Argument I formerly made use of, from the *multitude of Presbyters* here as well as elsewhere, which sure would not have been *multiplied* if one had been sufficient; the testimony of *Pontius* concerning the great *multitude of Christians*, that were present at the Martyrdom of *S. Cyprian*, (of which himself seems to have been one, which may make him the more credible) is somewhat considerable. He tells us, that *comitatu ejus infinitus exercitus adharebat, quasi ad expugnanda* Pont in vit. S. Cyp. fin.

Ep. 60.
ed. Pamel.

dam mortem manufactâ veniretur. Which military expressions of their readiness to die, are not so applicable to any as to Christians, who were onely concerned on that account. But a more pregnant presumption of their numbers is the summe collected out of the Contributions of his Diocese for the relief of Captives. *Misimus autem* (says he) *sestertia centum millia nummum, quæ istic in Ecclesia cui de Domini indulgentiâ præsumus, cleri & plebis apud nos consistentis collatione, collecta sunt, &c.* This 100000 sestertia being reduced to our English Coyn, according to the rate observed by Mr. Brerewood and Dr. Hake-will, will amount to 781250 l. and more according to the Bishop of Hereford; a summe so vast in the judgment of Pamelius and Baronius, as without the Authority of any new MS. and against the consentient readings of the former Editions of Mavritius and Morellius, by no greater warrant than their own conjecture of the *incredibility of the thing*, they venture to correct it by leaving out the later words *millia nummum*, reading onely *sestertia centum*, and by that means reducing it to 1000 part. Yet even so it rose to 781 l. 5 s. a summe very considerable for a single Parish of those times, especially

ally considering that they were newly recovered from a severe *persecution*, which may be presumed considerably to have exhausted them, both by the *summs confiscated*, and the loss of all their *lands and rising rents*, and the multiplication of the *domestick objects of their charity*; (for we find the necessities of the *Martyrs and Confessors* to have been supplied out of the *Treasury of the Church* from the story of *Peregrinus in Lucian*, and several passages in *S. Cyprian's Epistles*) besides the greater value of *Money* in those times before the discovery of the *Indies*, and the readiness of that *Church* to a *new contribution*, if the *Numidian Bishops* to whom they write should think it necessary. A sign that they had not been *extremely impoverished* by their *former charity*, whereas such a sum would, even in these days, since the great supplies from *America*, have ruined several of our *modern Parishs*.

BUT notwithstanding these difficulties I confess a *single Parish* (I mean the same *multitude of Christians* than which might have made up a *Parish* according to our late estimation) might have advanced a sum as great as this later of *Pamelius* and *Baronius*, without disabling them-

Apolog. II.

p. 99.

Pont. vit.

Cypr.

selves for *future contributions*. For I consider that in those times, as well as the *Apostles* there were those who *sold their lands, and brought the prices to the Bishop*, who (as *S. Justin Martyr* tells us) was *πᾶν τοῖς ἐν Χριστῷ ἔστι κληρονομίαν*, of which we have *S. Cyprian* himself for an *example*, who disposed of his own Land that way at his conversion, and had the same Land returned into his hands when *Bishop*, which he again intended to sell if he had not been prevented by the *persecution*, as *Pontius* his *Deacon* assures us. Besides, there was the *Offertory* at every *Communion*, which we find practised in *S. Justin Martyr's* time, and the same *S. Cyprian's*, and in the time of the Author of the *Constitutions* called *Apostolical*, and in those times was reckoned as a part of the *Communion* it self, and accordingly *criminals* were as well excluded from the *Offertory* as from the *blessed Sacrament*; and it was then the general practice to communicate *daily*. To which may be added their more solemn *Synaxes* and *Offertories* on *Sunday*, on which the *Apostle* himself particularly advised a provision for the *poor*, and their *occasional contributions*, such as that mentioned by the *Apostle* for the poor Christians in *Judea*,

Judea, and this of S. Cyprian's we are speaking of. And indeed besides the great propension of the *Christians* of those ages to *works of charity*, and the particular diligence of S. Cyprian, to stir them up to it by his *own example*, as well as *exhortation*, (as appears from Pontius, and from his Treatise *de Opere & Eleemosynis* still extant.) It was in reason the most prudent course they could take, to convert their Lands into Moneys to prevent *forfeiture*, and to lay out the Moneys on such good uses which might entitle them to *future rewards*, rather than hazard their loss in such times, when they were unsecure how long they might keep them; besides, that such a disposal of their *riches* was the most likely way to animate them for future *accidents*, and to make them unconcerned for *temporal fructifications*, and to raise their minds to *Heaven*, where their Treasures had been deposited. Besides the great *fruitfulness* of the Country adjacent observed by * Strabo, and several other ancient and modern Authors, which must have enhanced the price of their Lands when exposed to sale; and not onely that, but its great

* Τῆς γὰρ ἡμᾶς παλαιᾶς
ἐκδομῆς ἐστὶν ἡ μακρὸν σῆ-
μα. Strabol. II. Greg. p.
131. videl. 18. p. 833.

L. 18.

Strabo ib.

improvements, if we may judge of S. Cyprians time, by what it was when Agathocles invaded the Carthaginians, which you may see described in *Diodorus Siculus*, Bibl. l. 20. p. 731, edit. Græco-Latin. Flannov. 1604. that it was admired by the Sicilians themselves, whose own Countrey was admired for the same causes by the rest of the World; and the vastness of the City it self, if estimated with what it was before it was destroyed by the Romans. The Island it stood in was (as *Strabo* tells us) 460 stadia in compass, all walled in, which being reduced to our miles, will amount to about 45 miles. A scope very much larger than London, and their Walls so vast and capacious, as to contain Stables for Elephants, and 4000 Horses, and Lodgings and Guard-houses for 20000 Foot and 4000 Horse, which were their ordinary constant Guards, as *Appian*. Bell. Punic. p. 56. edit. Græco-Latin. Stephani 1592. And when it was destroyed by *Scipio Africanus junior* or *Emilianus*, had 700000 Inhabitants. And though at its rebuilding by *Julius Caesar* it might possibly fall short of its ancient magnificence; yet it was certainly a very great City even then, after the rate which then they counted

counted great, which rate I might easily have shewn to be as great as now. So

(a) *Strabo*, who lived not long after the Restoration, says that it was even then inhabited as well as any other City in *Libya*; and after him it is by

(b) *Ptolemy*, who yet flourished about 100 years before *St. Cyprian*, called *αἰὶν ἄλυσ*; and (c) *Tertullian* and (d) *Apuleius* call

the *Carthaginians* *Principes Africa*, relating to their own as well as former times, (for *Alexandria*, which was under a *Præfectus Augustalis*, was excluded from the ordinary notion of *Africa*, according to the *Notitia* of those times) as very well they might, considering that of the six *African Provinces* that of *Carthage* only was (e) *Proconsular*, and the City was the residence of the *Proconsul* himself, which must very considerably have contributed to its greatness. And now considering the very great fertility, and improvements, and populousness of the City, and the adjacent Region under its Civil, if not Ecclesiastical, Jurisdiction; considering that in times of persecution it is most

(a) Καὶ οὗτος ἔστιν ὁ ἀλλαν ἡ πόλις ὁμοῦται τῇ τῇ Λιβύῃ πάλαιον. Id. ib.

(b) *Ptolem.* l. 4. *Greg.* c. 3.

(c) *Tertullian.* de *Pall.*

(d) *Apul.* *Florida.*

(e) See *Pamel.* in *Tertullian.* de *Pall.* & *St. Cyprian.* epist. 45. 49.

most probable, that as much of this as belonged to *Christians* was converted into ready money; that of these very vast summs, which may have been thought credibly have been levied by these means, many were entirely bestowed on *charitable uses*, and that generally so much was as could be spar'd from the owners necessary expences, and therefore might be reputed *superfluities*, were so; that according to the state of *Christian Affairs* in those times, much more would have been reputed *superfluities*, than now, when not only all expences not adequate to the dignity of their persons were accounted so, but even such as were, it being neither *safe nor prudent*, nor agreeable to the *heroical magnanimity* so common then to maintain that *dignity*; that as the former summs were exhausted, more were daily brought in, that saying of *Tertullian* appearing then experimentally true, that the *Sanguis Martyrum* was *Semen Ecclesia*. These things, I say, being considered, it cannot be thought so incredible as *Pamelius* and *Baronius* conceive, that a considerable proportion of the Inhabitants of the *Diocese of Carthage*, according to the rate of *Dioceses* in those times, might indeed contribute the greater

MSS.

summ, so well attested by consent of MSS. so that there will be no necessity to leave the *received reading* upon account of their *onely conjectures*, which have hence appeared so groundless. But then as this *summ* of 100000 *Sestertia* is in a parallel case granted by *Seneca*, *Conso. ad Helv. c. 10* to have been equal to the *Revenues of a Province*, and so too great for a *Parish* after the rate now in use; so it is no way improbable that *considerable part of the Diocese* might indeed have given the *Revenue of a Province*, (upon the terms now described) without disabling themselves for further future Contributions. It being therefore so well attested by the consent of Copies, that the *summ* given was so *great*, as not to be thought credible concerning a *Parish*, and it being no way credible that any but *converted Christians* did contribute to it; it must hence follow, that the number of *Christian Converts* was even then greater in *Carthage*, than in any of our modern *Parishes*.

TO these *Christian Authors* concerning the *multitude of Christians* I shall add a *Heathen*. It is *Pliny* whom I mean, who thus dissuades *Trajan* from his severity against the *Christians* by an argument from the *multitude* of the persons likely

¶ LI.

Plin. ep. 1.
10. ep. 97.

likely to be concerned in it: *Visa est mihi res digna consultatione, maxime propter periclitantium numerum. Multi enim omnis atatis, omnis ordinis, utriusque sexus etiam vocantur in periculum, & vocabuntur. Neque enim civitates tantum, sed vicos etiam atque agros superstitionis istius contagio pervagata est, que videtur sisti & corrigi posse. Certè satis constat, prope jam desolata templa cœpisse celebrari, & sacra solennia diu intermissa repeti, passimque venire victimas, quarum adhuc rarissimus emptor inveniebatur, ex quo facile est opinari, que turba hominum emendari possit, si sit penitentia locus.* You see that many, not as you say few, were Christians, that not onely Cities, but Villages and Towns were overrun with that contagion, (as he calls it) that he thence concludes what a great multitude (that is, turba) might be gain'd by a more indulgent way of treating them. And that this multitude was to be understood comparatively to the Heathens, (directly contrary to what you say, that in comparison of them they were but few) appears clearly from what he adds, that their Temples had been almost desolate, (exactly herein agreeing with Tertullian's *Sola vobis relinquimus templa*) that their solemn Festivities had been

been long intermitted, that their Sacrifices (which we find to have been exposed to sale in the Markets, 1 Cor. 10. 25.) found few buyers; which could not have been if the number of Heathens had been then considerable, I do not say as you do, comparatively with the Christians, but even absolutely in it self. And then for discerning the pregnancy of this Testimony I pray consider, 1. That this *Epistle of Pliny* is mentioned by *Tertullian*, *Eusebius*, and *Orosius*; so that there can be no doubt of its being genuine. Consider, 2. That this *Epistle* was certainly written very soon after *S. John's* death, who died in *Trajan's* time, (*Baronius* places *S. John's* death in the second year of *Trajan*, and the writing of this *Epistle* in the fifth or thereabouts;) and therefore the words *diu intermissa* will in all likelihood extend the paucity of Heathens in those parts to *S. John's* time, at least certainly very long before your Period of *Constantine*. 3. That this Church of *Bithynia*, of which *Pliny* gives account being his own Province, was converted in the *Apostles* times, as appears 1 *S. Pet.* 1. 1. and therefore the Government there settled must have been, if not instituted, yet at least approved by them, especially being so near those

Sees

Tertul.

Apol.

Euseb.

Chron.

num. 2223

Oros. l. 7.

Sees which were undoubtedly founded by the *Apostles*. Yet it cannot even here be shewn, that ever *one City* had more than *one presiding Bishop*. 4. That this Testimony is of an *Adversary*, whose Interest had been to have made the *Christians* more despicable by concealing their numbers, if he could have done it veraciously. And, 5. That as *Pliny* must in all probability be presumed *veracious* in telling what he knew, so he had means of knowing what was really true, being *Governour of the Province*, and having actually made enquiry after the *Christians* in their persecutions of them.

¶ LII. I BELIEVE the great reason that inclines you to believe the *paucity of Christians in those times* is, that in *great and popular Cities* they were able to communicate at *one Altar*, upon which account you conceive them to have been no more than what may assemble in our ordinary *Parochial Congregations*. But you might as well have concluded *whole Cities* indeed, nay *whole Nations*, to have no more people in them than our ordinary *Parochial Assemblies*. You know every *clean Male Jew* was to appear before God at the two solemn Feasts of *Easter* and of *Tabernacles*, whose numbers computed by *Ce-*
stius

Titus Gallus, amounted to a number sure too great for a *Parish*, and the number in *Jerusalem* when besieged by *Titus*, taken there upon occasion of *Easter*, is a plain Argument of the vastness of their religious *Assemblies*. Nor was it onely proper to the *Jews* thus to confederate and unite their *Commonwealth* by their Conventions on account of *Religion* to partake of the *same Altar*, but the same Policy was observed among the *Heathens*. The *Assemblies* of *whole Cities* are so ordinary, that it were but *pedantick* to give instances of them. For those of *Nations* you may observe the *Athenian Panathenicks*, the *Olympick Solemnities* which were of all *Greece*, and then the *Panionia* of the *Asiatick Iones*, not now to mention those of the *Barbarians*. Nor were onely *Sacrifices* common to these vast *Assemblies* from the *same Altar*, which is more easily intelligible, but *speeches* also were made to *numbers* much greater than our *Parochial Assemblies*, which I believe you will think the greater difficulty, how the *Bishop*, who you say then was the *principal*, if not the *onely Preacher*, should be heard in a *Multitude* proportionable to a *populous City*. Yet is this so far from being *incredible*, as that it was

V in

in those Ages frequently practised. I will not instance in places of special contrivance, as that at the *Roman Rostra*, the *Theatres*, and *Amphitheatres*, where many thousands, sometimes 100000 or more, have heard with convenience. And yet it is very probable, that these publick places of *religious Assemblies* were contrived with conveniency for that purpose. Nay it is certain, that the *Jews* had their *Suggesta* and *Cathedrae* raised on high for that end. Nor shall I mention the *Oration*s of *Generals* to their *Armies*, who had the like advantages. It is very clear that upon occasions not so solemn nor prepared, great Routs of tumultuous people, wanting *heads* to whom a *particular address* might have been confined, have yet been spoken to. I will not again instance in the *Speeches* of *Petrinus* and King *Agrippa* to the generality of the *Jewish Nation*, of which we are discoursing. *Scripture Examples*, though purely *historical*, I find most easily admitted by you, and therefore I am the rather willing to insist on them. *Rehoboam* speaks to all *Israel*, 1 *Kings* 12.1, 13, 16, 20. So *Jehoiada* makes a covenant with all the people of the Land, 2 *Kings* 11.17, 18, 20. Our Saviour preaches his

Sermon

Sermon on the Mount to great multitudes from several places, *S. Matth. 4. 25. v. 1.* And several other places, to 4000 at one time, and 5000 at another, though in *wildernesses*; by which we may guess how much greater his Auditories were in *populous Cities*. The *Town Clerk of the Ephesians* to the whole City, *Acts 19. 29, 35.* *S. Paul* to all the City of *Jerusalem*, *Acts 21. 30, 36, 39, 40.* And by the multitudes converted by single Sermons of the *Apostles*, you may easily conjecture the vastness of their Auditories. Which will be the rather credible when it is considered, that the principal preaching of the first Propagators of Christianity, was generally in places of greatest frequent, such as the *Temple*, or *Synagogues*, or *Streets*, or *Schools*, or *Market-places*. Thus you see that it will not follow, that the number of *Christians* must have been few, if they assembled in one place for the *Word and Sacraments*, and if the *Bishop alone* had preached.

BUT neither *supposition* is so very LIII.
 certain, at least not so general, as you seem to believe it. For *preaching*, we see that while the extraordinary *zeal* of *prophecy* lasted, under which *preaching* was comprehended as well as *prayer*,
 V 2 (which

(which by the way is observable against them who allow *studied Sermons*, and yet complain of the *Spirit's* being quenched if their *prayers* be other than *extemporary*) several *Prophets* met and officiated in their *Synaxes*, 1 Cor. 14. 29, 30, 31. so far was it then from being confined to any person; *Bishop* or other, to preach to the people. And even afterwards we find *preaching* not always performed by the *Bishop*, though I am apt indeed to think it was ordinarily. The *Catechists* were usually *Presbyters*, and *Origen*, though a *Presbyter*, yet preached before *Bishops*. But for the times of *persecution*, wherein they could not meet so *numerously* in one Assembly; yet other provisions might have been made agreeably enough to the Principles of those Ages, for supplying the necessities of much greater than *parochial multitudes*. Such was that of *reserving the species*, which I believe was a shift found out in times of *persecution*, when every *particular person* could not get any opportunity of frequenting the *Synaxes* as often as he was desirous to *communicate*, which was then *daily*, it being the first meat they tasted. This *reservation* is clear from S. Cyprian de *laps.* the Author *De Spectaculis* among his

his works, *Tert. l. 11.* and *Ux. Dionys. Alex. ep. ad Fab. Antioch. in Euseb. S. Iren. to Pope Victor.* Now by this means very great multitudes might frequently *communi-*
cate, though their *Synaxes* were rarely and thinly celebrated, that they might not give their *Governours* any just offence by their *numerousness*. For by *Pliny's* Epistle to *Trajan* it appears, that they did upon this account utterly forbear their *feasts of charity*, upon his putting of the Law *De Heteriis* in force; and in all probability yielded as far as lawfully they conceived they might in the *Eucharist* it self. A second shift was that of *sending the Sacraments by the Deacons* to those that were absent. So *S. Justin Martyr* expressly, οἱ καλέσθαι παρ' ἡμῖν διακονοῖ *Apol. 11. p.*
διδάσιν ἐκείνῳ τῷ παρόντων μεταλαβεῖν ἐπὶ τῷ εὐχαριστῇ. 97.
 διδοῦσιν αὐτοῖς καὶ οἶνον καὶ ὕδατος, καὶ τοῖς ἐπαρουῶσιν
 παραφαιροῦσιν. And again, ἡ διδασκαλία *ib. p. 98.*
 καὶ ἡ μεταλήψις ἐπὶ τῷ εὐχαριστῇ δόντων ἐκείνῳ γίνεσθαι, καὶ τοῖς
 ὄντων παρουῶσι διὰ τῶν διακόνων πῖμπι. And who knows whether the *breaking of*
bread καὶ οἶνον, or *from house to house*, as we read it *Acts 11. 46.* (if it be meant of the *Sacrament*, and not rather of their *feasts of love*) may not allude to this *custom*? I shall not now dispute it, but only observe that this practice, though

not grounded on this Text, yet certainly used in those times, might from *the same Altar* have communicated much greater *multitudes* than are contained in our *ordinary Parishes*. But there was also a third Expedient for these *numerous Communions*, that though indeed the *Roman Altar*, where the *blessed Sacrament* was ordinarily and solemnly administered, were *only one*, even in those *populous Cities*, and that in the power of the *Bishop*; yet in private and occasional Assemblies *Presbyters* were permitted to do it by *leave of the Bishop*, without any prejudice to the *Unity of the Church*, which was signified by the *Unity of their Altar*. I will not mention the instances hereof in the *Acts of the Martyrs*, which are not so secure to be trusted. *Ignatius* and *Tertullian* are very clear to this purpose in the places already produced. Now this account being given how, notwithstanding the *multitude of Communicants*, and though the *Sacrament* were the greatest obligation to meet in *publick Assemblies*, yet much greater *numbers* than our *Parishes* might have been supplied conveniently enough from *one President and one Altar*; it will be easie to give an account of other things. For as for *preaching*, which

which is now more insisted on as a reason of *Church Assemblies* than the *Sacraments*, though certainly very differently from the sense of those *Ages*. First, you cannot prove that to have been so appropriated to the *Bishop*, as that ordinary *Presbyters* were excluded from it. All that can be pretended to this purpose is, that the *Exhortation* with the *Communion Office* was then generally in the presence of the *Bishop*, and that in his presence it was not usual for *Presbyters* to preach; (for this is the onely thing that was thought so strange in preaching of *Origen* before *Theophilus*, and *S. Augustine* before *Valerius*, that it was done in the presence of their *Bishops*) and that the power of *Ecclesiastical Assemblies*, upon what pretence soever, preaching as well as other Offices was appropriated to the *Bishops*. But, 1. All private visitations and conferences which were much better suited to the exigencies of those times, might undoubtedly be performed by single *Presbyters*; and these being performed with that diligence as they were then, would in a great measure supersede the necessity of publick Sermons. And, 2. Even for those publick preachings, which had no relation to the *Communion Office*, where

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that

that *one Altar* was concerned, might have been ordinarily permitted them by the *Bishop*. And, 3. Even those which were connected with that Office, might yet by the *Bishops leave* have been permitted in places distinct from the *one Altar*, as well as the *Communion* it self,

¶ LIV. YOUR instance of “*St. Patrick* founding 365 *Churches*, (for I onely “take notice of the more probable number) and ordaining in them 365 *Bishops*, and under them 3000 *Presbyters*, does not methinks seem any thing to your purpose. You say, *Here is no more Bishops than Churches*; I believe you meant the contrary, that there were no more *Churches* than *Bishops*, for this is onely to your design, of having as many *Bishops* as *Churches*, that is, in your notion of the word, as *Parishes*. And you know though we pretend many *Parish Churches* may be subject to one *Bishop*. Yet we are far from saying that there ought to be *many Bishops in one Parish*. But admitting there were in *S. Patrick's* time no more *Churches* than *Bishops*, yet how can it follow thence, that there were no more *Parishes*, or that the word *Church* in those Ages used without any restrictive Particle, must signifie that onely

onely which were equivalent to our present *Parishes*? For you know that we do not pretend, that there ought to be any more liberty for a *Bishop* to hold *plurality of Dioceses*, than for a *Minister* to have *plurality of Parishes*, though I will not defend all *practices* in both particulars; so that if the word *Church* imply that which is *Diocesan*, as most probably it did according to the sense of those times, then we do not think there ought to be more *Churches* than *Bishops*. Indeed I confess the *Dioceses* of those times must have been for scope of Land, as much less as the number 365 is greater than 21, or thereabouts, which is our number now. But it is withall most clear, 1. That as small as they were, they were yet greater than *Parishes*, there being about nine *Presbyters* to a *Bishop*, as your self observe. For your own notion of a *Parish* containing no more than are capable of being governed by a *single person*, where nine persons were thought necessary, there must be supposed nine times that proportion, that is, nine *Parishes*. And then if you think your self obliged to abstain from that *Communion* where *Discipline* is impossible, and think it impossible where the *Bishop* undertakes the government of
any

any more than he is able to give an account of by his own *personal care*; you must have conceived your self obliged as much to separate from Diocesan Communion *qua Diocesan* then as now, and therefore should not plead those *Dioceses as precedents*. But, 2. Your own *principles* will warrant the *enlargement of your Dioceses* now; for if *Bishops* might in the primitive times take the charge of *whole Cities*, not because the *Cities* were small, or the *Inhabitants* few, but because they who owned *Episcopal Authority*, that is, *Christians*, were so; then I may say our present *Dioceses* may be very much *enlarged* since the *divisions of Christians*. For whereas then they were all *unanimous*, the case is otherwise now, when *Papists* and *Scots*, and other *Non-conformists*, being deduced of all *Seats and Opinions*, those onely are accounted that own our present *Episcopal Authority*, would be so few comparatively, so that you see that by Separation upon account of the too great extent of our *Dioceses*, the inconvenience is not remedied, but confirmed in consequence of your own *Principles*. But, 3. What *inconvenience* soever may indeed be in things of this nature, isto be judged as well as reformed by

to Mr. Baxter.

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by the Governours, (whose proper care it is) not to be remedied by worse, such as are the *undutifulness and separations* of private persons from their Superiours on that account.

LV!

I CONFIRMED this by Argument from *experience*, from an instance of Rome which though so great in *Cornelius* his time, as to need the Services of above 1000 Clergie, was yet at the same time under the Government of one *only Bishop*. To this you answer, 1. That this was above 250 years after *Christs Birth*. But this is not the question, how *soon* it was, but whether it was not when *discipline* was severely enough observed? For from hence it follows, that *experience* has then shewn, that *discipline* was sufficiently reconcilable with a *Diocesan Government*, and therefore may be so now if Governours would be equally *industrious*. And that *discipline* was then observed, I believe you will not deny. You answer, 2. That "you never took all the *impotent persons*, "poor, and *widows*, in the Church, to be "Clergie-men and Clergie-women. I shall not dispute the propriety of my expression, (not but that I know that the word has indeed been used in a very large sense, so as

VII 6

Optat. Mi.
lev. I. II.
cont. Parm.

as to comprehend most persons relating to the Church, and possibly all there enumerated) both because I do not conceive the thing material to my present purpose, which is onely to shew the numberousness of the Church from the multitude of *Presbyters*, whom you will not deny to be properly *Clergie-men*; and because I confels I too much trusted my *memory* in quoting the place, and upon consulting the place find my self to have been mistaken in two things: 1. That I thought the word *Clergie* to have been used by *Cornelius*. 2. That I thought that all the several sorts there mentioned, *Presbyters*, *Deacons*, &c. to have been comprized in the number 1500, whereas I now find, that the later sort of the poor maintained on the charges of the Church were onely therein included. Omitting therefore these mistakes, which now I know I will not undertake to justifie, the thing I insist on is, that here are 46 *Presbyters* mentioned, and that there were in Rome *quadringinta*, & quod excurrit, *Basilica*, (as we learn from *Optatus*) when *Victor Garbiensis* was sent from *Africa* to be made the *Schismatical Bishop* of *Rome*, which was about the persecution of *Dioclesian*, when the Schism of the

Donatists commenced. Which number of *Basilica* or *Parish Churches* (for you have already seemed to grant, that *Rome* was then divided into *Parishes*) may very well agree with the number of *Presbyters* mentioned by *Cornelius*. There being therefore even then so many *Christians in Rome*, as were able to make up 46 *Parishes*, besides those of the *xœra* or *Region* adjacent subject, according to the practice of those times, to the *Jurisdiction* of the *City Bishop*; it is plain that the *Diocese* was even then of a larger extent than *Parochial*, as your self had already granted, (though here you endeavour to *answer the arguments*, that are designed to prove no more than what you had granted;) and therefore 46 times exceeding the ability of a *single person*. Yet I believe you will not deny, but that all this number was then sufficiently governed by *one Bishop*, without any visible decay of *discipline* observable in those times. I know indeed that *Mr. Potter* in order to his own design does endeavour to prove the number of *Presbyters* and *Titles* originally derived from *Cletus*, *Euaristus*, *Dionysius*, and *Marcellus* to have been 25. Nor shall I now digress to shew the ground of his im-

*Interp. of
the number
666, c. 19.*

mistake. All that I shall desire you to observe at present is, that his Authors are either evidently *late*, or suspicious if pretendedly *ancient*; not comparable in *credibility* to *Cornelius* and *Optatus* produced by me. But if I should admit all that he pretends, yet 25 *Parishes* themselves are too large an extent for such *Dioceses*, as you desire, that might not exceed the personal abilities of *one*.

¶ LVI. BUT you endeavour to give some account how their *Clergie* might be *numerous* though their people were *few*, from the conceived extraordinary exigencies of those times. But neither does it appear that the exigencies were indeed so *extraordinary*, there appearing no ground to believe any *Innovation* accommodated to present exigencies; but rather that that had been the *ordinary Government*: if it had, were it to your purpose. For the same *extraordinary exigencies*, which then required the united helps of a *multitude of Clergie*, made the burthen too great for *one*; and therefore if a *Bishop* cannot (as by your Principles he cannot) undertake the *government* of a number too great for his *personal care*, without prejudice of *discipline*; it will follow that he could not do it then. But
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it appearing clearly otherwise, namely that *discipline* was severely maintained under a *Government* properly *Diocesan*, that is including a *multitude* of *subordinate cures*; it is plain, that what *neglects* are now in that kind, are not to be imputed to the *Government* but the *Governours*.

BUT I shall consider the *disparities* ¶ LVII. themselves: "1. The *Christians* meetings were then obscure and small in houses, (as the *tolerated Churches* in London.) But I have already shewn you how the *multitudes* of *Christians* were (according to the practices of those Ages) suppliable without any unnecessary multiplication of *Altars*, or *Priests*, or *Churches*; and that this *multitude* of *Priests* was not accommodated to their extraordinary meetings in houses occasionally, but their solemn appointed places for *Parochial Assemblies*, for such were the *Tituli* or *Basilica*. You consider, "2. That these meetings were in so vast a *City* in so many *distinct* places. But the *Christians* of those times were not so sparing of their pains, as to scruple the distances of places in the *greatest Cities*, for the comfort of their *Synaxes*; for in *S. Justin Martyr's* time they came out of the Country

Country to the *City-meetings*, much more from the most distant places of the same *City*. And therefore it is not probable that the distance of place, but the multitude of the persons, occasioned the *multiplication of the Clergie*. And by the multitude of their poor, 1500 not onely 1050 as you mistake) you may guess at their multitudes. For it was too great a proportion for the multitudes of *one Parish*, especially where *S. Paul's Rule* was severely observed, that none should be maintained on the *Churches account*, but such as were *poor indeed*, and where none should eat who did not labour if he were able. Besides, the *treasures of that Church* were thought worthy the design of the *Secular Magistracy*, and great multitudes of poor are said to have been maintained on the *Church account* in the time of Pope *Sixtus* and *S. Laurence*. You consider, 3. The *Suburbicarian Assemblies*; I suppose you mean the Assemblies in the *Suburbs of Rome*, not those of the *Regiones Suburbicaria*, (which I believe you will not doubt but that they contained a number too great for a *single Parish*) and then the former Answer will suffice, that they who ordinarily came out of the *Country* to the *City Assemblies*, were not likely to scruple

Prudent.
Perist. in
Laurent.

scruple coming to them from the *Suburbs*, if their numbers might be entertained in one place with convenience. 4. You say, many *Presbyters* used still to be with the *Bishop* in the same *Assembly*. If you mean it on solemn occasions of great concernment for the *Government of the Church*, I confess it; but you cannot thence infer, that they being deducted few would remain for *Parochial Cures*, being those being but rare, they might all be spared from their *Parochial Affairs*. But if you think, that in all ordinary *Synaxes* such a number of them were *obliged* to a personal attendance on him, as must distract them from their other *Employments*; I believe you have no ground to think so. In the *Form of their Offices* by *S. Justin Martyr* you find no mention but of the *πρεσβυτεροι* and the *διακονοι*, a sign that there was no part of the Office obliging *Presbyters* to be present. 5. You observe, that here were in all but *seven Deacons*. But this is no argument to conclude the *paucity of Believers*; for it was an Opinion taken up in that Age, from that *unsecure principle* of making *Apostolical Practice* even in *Ecclesiasticals* obligatory, that no *Church*, how great soever, must have any more than *seven*, because there were

no more in the *Church of Jerusalem* at their first Institution. The words of the *Neocæsarean Canon* are plain ; *Διάκονοι ἐνθάδε*

Can. 14. ὁ ρεῖλεσιν ἐν) χρι) τ) κα) ο)να) κ)ν) πα)ν) μα)χ)α)λ)η) εἰ)ν) ἡ) π)ε)λ)ι)ς) *Conc. Neo-* πε)ν)θ)ή)ση) δ)ι) ὑ)π)ὸ) τ) ρ)εῖ)λ)α)ς) τ) Π)α)ύ)λ)ω)ν). And that

cæsar. this number was not *casually* taken up in the *Church of Rome*, but upon some such designed account, may very probably be conjectured because we find it observed in *S. Laurence* his time, who being *Arch-*

Pseuso- *Euarist.* *ep. 1.* *Perist.* *ubi* *deacon* of *Rome* is called *Primus è septem*

supra. *viris qui stant ad aram proximi, &c.* by *Prudentius*. And you will accordingly find constantly in the Author of the *Pon-*

tifical, the number of *Deacons* ordained by every *Bishop of Rome* to be less than of *Presbyters* ; and this comparative pau-

city of *Deacons* in respect of *Presbyters* was accounted by *S. Hierom* an occasion of the *Deacons* presumption, in his *Epist.*

85. ad Euagr. And if the form of *Christs* appearing in the *Revelations*, be taken from the *Bishops* sitting in the *Church*

(as if I be not mistaken the most *learned* and *judicious* *Mr. Thorndike* thinks it is) then as the *24 Elders* may allude to the

Christian Presbyteries, derived from the *lesser Sanhedrims* of the *Jews* consisting of *24* ; so the *seven ministring Spirits* may

in conformity to the *septenary number* of

An-

Vid. Orig.
tract. 24. in
Matth.

Angels, so famous among the *Jews*, (as Mr. Mede proves professedly) which are called *αγγελοι πδιματα* by the Apostle, *Heb. i.* allude to the *septenary number of Deacons*, which were always attending on the *Bishop*, in a readiness to execute his commands, as the *Angels* are supposed by the *Jews* to do on God himself. Nor need you wonder that so small a number of *Deacons* might be conceived sufficient to answer so great a proportion of *Presbyters*, considering that their special Office was to distribute the *Alms of the Church* to such as were maintained on publick charity, and to attend more immediately on the *Bishops person*, as ordinary Executioners of his commands. For I believe you will never find that they performed any service to *Presbyters* acting separately from their *Bishop*. And certainly for *distribution of Alms*, and *personal attendance on the Bishop*, as small a number as *seven* might be sufficient in a great City.

6. You say, "That many then were *Presbyters* that used not to *preach*, but "for privater oversight, and as the *Bishops Assessors*. This, though for my part I conceive it very true, seems strange to me to proceed from a person of your

principles, who usually teach *publick preaching in Ecclesiastical Assemblies* to be the indispensable duty of every particular *Gospel Minister*, by which name they include, if they do not onely mean, *Priests*. But supposing it true as I believe it was, that there were *several Priests* who did not *preach*; yet will not this diminish the multitude of *Parishes*, as you seem to conceive. For I believe you cannot prove that *publick preaching* was then accounted an ordinary *parochial employment*. And though it were not, yet there were others equivalent sufficient to take up the time and pains bestowed on it now, with equal edification; such were *visiting, communicating, exhorting, persuading, resolving cases of conscience*, and satisfying themselves concerning the *lives of penitents*, for discerning who were *fit or unfit* for their *communion*; all those Offices which were performed out of their *publick Synaxes*, and all that were performed in them besides *preaching*, that is, their ordinary *prayers*, their *hymni antelucani*, their *reading of the Scriptures*, their *catechizings*, their general *Exhortations pro re nata* not designed and solemn, their *collections* and ἀγῶναι. So that though there had not been so many *Preachers*, in
our

our modern notion of the word, yet there might have been as many *Parochial Priests* as *Titles or Parishes*.

7. YOU say, "That the *poorer sort* ¶ LIX.
 "most commonly received the Gospel. If your meaning herein be to conclude, that the 1500 *poor* were the most considerable part of *Believers*, that you might conclude the whole number of *Converts* to have been small; you should have remembered what *poor* they were, such as were maintained on the *publick charity*, that is, such as were not onely *poor* but *impotent*, unable to get their livings otherwise. And sure you cannot but think, that the multitude of other *Believers* upon whose *charity* they were maintained, especially if *poor* themselves, (though able to earn a livelyhood) as you seem to suppose, must have been great, especially considering the other expenses of their *charity* on the *Clergie*, on the *Martyrs and Confessors*, on their *hospitality to strangers*, &c. all which may be sufficient presumptions that these 1500 *poor* did not in any probability bear any considerable proportion to the multitudes of the *Roman Church* by whom they were maintained. And I believe in few *Cities* in our Kings Dominions, if
 X 3 any,

any, will be found so great a number of *poor*, who by reason of *impotency* are thought by the *Magistrates* fit objects of the *publick charity*, even in these our Ages, wherein all are supposed *Professors of Christianity*.

¶ LX.

8. You say, "That none of these but the 46 *Presbyters* had any power in the *discipline*. If you mean a *decretory power* in the sense I have explained it, then I think I have proved that the 45 *Presbyters* themselves had it not, but the *Bishop* alone. But you can thence no more conclude the *paucity of Believers* in one of the *Dioceses* of those times, than in any one of ours now, when it is plain that the *Bishop* himself has *monopolized* it, as your self complain. But if you mean an *executive* or even a *consultory power* of giving consent or advice in affairs of *discipline*, to be decreed by the *Bishop*; that was so far from being *confined* to the *Presbyters*, as that it was communicated to the *Deacons*, nay to the *common people* themselves. This might easily have been cleared from *Cornelius* his Contemporary *S. Cyprian*, (from whom we have the clearest account of the *discipline* of that Age) if I had not been unwilling to be more tedious than needs I must; and because

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cause upon reflection I believe your self will acknowledge it, and because it is usually undertaken by *Presbyterian*, but especially *Independent*, Authors. Indeed there were some privileges of the *Presbyters*, that they onely sate in the *Bishops* presence, as *S. Hierom* tells us, besides other distinctions in *Synaxes*. But it is sufficient for my purpose that the execution of discipline, which is the main thing which necessarily requires plurality, was managed by all; and that for counsel here was a number exceeding the Councils of several Princes of Dominions larger than any *Dioceses*.

But, 9. You say, "That by all this reckoning the whole Church maintained not (besides the *Officers*) near 1000 poor, we may probably conjecture that the whole Church of that *Bish.* was not bigger than some one *London Parish*, (*Stepney*, *S. Giles Cripplegate*) where are about 50000 Souls. But, 1. You are mistaken in your account: For, 1. The number of the poor besides the *Officers* were not near 1000 onely, but 1500; for the *Officers* are not included in that number, as you suppose. 2. That number of poor maintained on the publick charity, does imply a greater number than you suppose.

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2 LXXI

pose. For consider, 1. That no *poor* were reckoned in that number, but such as were unable to *earn a livelyhood* for themselves, according to *S. Pauls* Rule already mentioned. Consider, 2. That even of those *impotent poor* none were to be charged on the *Church* that had believing Friends able to maintain them, according to another Rule of the same *S. Paul*, *1 Tim. 5. 4, 8.* by which means none were likely to have been maintained by the *Church*, but such as might have been *starved* if they had not been so relieved. Now considering that, according to *Captain Graunts* Calculation of 229250 in *London*, not above 51 were starved, which he reckons as the 4000th. part, but with too great latitude, for it is indeed the 4495th. part, besides a Fraction of 5, or thereabouts, if his Numbers be rightly printed; let 1500 be multiplied by 4495, and the sum will be 6742500; or if it be multiplied by his own proportion of 4000, it will amount to 6000000, a sum too great for the *City*. And by all deductions that may be made, for the unkindness of some *Christian Friends*, and of most *Heathen*, that would leave many destitute of their help, for no other reason than their being
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Christians; and of others that were maintained by the *Church*, not for want of *callings*, but of *lawful ones*, as the *Stage-player* in *S. Cyprian*; and the *remisness* of *some Officers* of those many entrusted in this affair, who either might have not used their utmost diligence in *informing* themselves of the poverty and helplessness of the persons admitted by them, or might have failed of the success, and being misinformed after all humane diligence, and have had persons sufficient either in themselves, or by help of their Friends, obtruded on them; or all other failings imaginable, (for I confess *moral affairs* are not to be estimated by *Mathematical measures*;) yet it will be hard after all to bring the sum so low as 460000, which Captain *Graunt* conceives to be the whole number of *Inhabitants* in *London*, much more to reduce it to the limits of the greatest *Parish* mentioned by you. But, 2. If you had indeed computed right, and the number had been no greater than of one of those great *Parishes* you speak of; yet why should not the numbers of people here mentioned be thought sufficient for a *Diocese* even in our modern sense? For I doubt there are no *Cities in the Kings*
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Dominions that have *Episcopal Sees*, that have 50000 Inhabitants, except *London*. Ours of *Dublin*, which is thought by most that have seen it, to be second to *London* for *greatness and populousness*, is by a *Bill of Mortality*, and an account of the *Poll-money* sent to Captain *Graunt*, estimated to contain onely 30000, or thereabouts, (though I can hardly believe that to be our full number;) according to which estimation the *Parishes* you speak of will exceed us by two thirds more; and so I believe they will equal our *whole Diocese*; for I believe the rest of it put together can hardly exceed the proportion of two third parts to the *City*. And can you think the same number in a *Parish* governable by the *single unassisted abilities* of a single *Parish Minister*, and not think it so by a *Bishop* seconded by his *Presbytery*, *Dignitaries*, and *Parochial Curates*. Or, if the case of preserving *discipline* be harder in such a *Parish* than such a *Diocese*, (as certainly upon the accounts now mentioned it needs must be;) then I pray consider what *equality* is it to communicate with our *Parishes* indiscriminately, (such great ones themselves not being excepted;) and yet to separate as indiscriminately from our *Diocesan Communion*,

munition, even of such as exceed not those greater *Parishes* in the numbers of their people, though they do in numbers of their *Governours*. And if you think that as many may meet in *one place*, as may make up our ordinary present *Dioceses*, (as you must do if they may be conveniently included in a *Parish*;) then how can you conclude the less populousness of the *ancient* than our *modern Dioceses*, from that very Topick of their meeting in *one place*? For my part I verily believe that it is by accident, not designedly, that those *Parishes* have so vastly exceeded their ordinary proportion, merely from the encrease of the *trade of the City* in those parts, which were more thinly inhabited when the *Parishes* were first distributed, as you may easily conjecture from the disproportion, some of them exceeding other *Parishes* in your *City* an hundredfold, as is observed by Captain *Graunt*, which is more than there are *Parishes* in some of our *Dioceses*; and from the disproportion of their *ancient Churches*, when they were designed *Parishes*, with their *present multitudes*, and their *equality* with those other *Parish Churches*, whose *present Parishioners* are so extremely unequal, and that these vast Pa-

Parishes are generally in the *Suburbs*, where the *City* was very likely to encrease. And therefore seeing the *greatness* of those *Parishes* seem never yet to have been *approved*, though they were not yet amended ; you cannot thence conjecture, what has certainly appeared *false* as to matter of fact, that the *Roman Christians* were no more than one *Parish*, under the personal and immediate care of their *Bishop*.

¶ LXII. 10. You say, " When none were *Christians* but *persecuted Volunteers*, they " were the holiest and best of men, and " you have tried that 600 such make less " work for *discipline*, than 10 of the " Rabble that are driven into our *Churches*, and choose them rather than the " *Gaol*. Upon account of which conceived disparity, I presume your meaning is to conclude, that *one Bishop* might rule a greater number than now, and therefore though *Diocesan Churches* might indeed have been rulable by *one Bishop* then, yet we are not thence to conclude that it may be so now. But I have already shewn that *Government* must not be proportioned onely to the *good humours* of men, but must be able to prevent and reform those lapses to which men *easily*
and

and naturally degenerate, and therefore that there must have been the *same power in Governours* then as now, though there was not the same necessity of its *actual exercise*. And that the *Bishops power* was not onely over *orderly Converts*, but over *lapsed criminals*, who had then more temptations to *fall*, and being so to behave themselves *refractorily* against the *discipline* of their *Church*, when their lapses were countenanced, than now when they are discouraged by the *Civil Magistrate*; and over the *Heathens* who were to be *converted* and severely *disciplined* for the trial of their *veracity*, and securing them from a *relapse*. And if you find it so hard a matter now to persuade such as *know their duty*, and *acknowledge their reasonableness*, and have a reverence of such *persuaders and persuasions*, instilled in them by the principles of their *Christian Education*, to the practice of what they cannot deny themselves *obliged to*; certainly the difficulty of reclaiming *Heathens* must have been much greater, who were as debauched in their lives as ours now, and less disposed for *correction*, in all the regards now mentioned than *vicious Christians*, nay *contrarily prejudiced*, not onely by *practical* but
dog-

dogmatical prejudices against the *wisest* and most *rational exhortations*, as proceeding from the mouth of a *Christian*, of whom they had conceived so unworthy an opinion, by reason of the *slanders* raised against them then so commonly believed.

¶ LXIII “BUT when all is done (you say) “*two Cities* under the power of great “temptations, are not to be our *rule* “against Gods word, and the state of all “other *Churches* in the world, and undeniable *experience*. So that it seems you are at last diffident of your Exceptions against those two instances, and yet unwilling to yield though you should be convinced of their weakness. Indeed if what you pretend were true, that they were against Gods word, &c. I should confess so great *evidence* sufficient to reject them. But it is certainly otherwise, and I believe you cannot give an instance of a *Parochial Church* in the sense we now understand it ; for such a *multitude of Believers* as were governable by a *single Presbyter* alone, either in the *Scriptures*, or in any other *Church* in the world, (excepting those *two* so much decried by you) for the first three *Centuries*, so far you are from proving what you seem to design

design, that *Bishops* ought to be multiplied in proportion to them. Your *volume of proof* from Antiquity of *one Altar* and *one Bishop* in *one Church* will not do it; for I have already shewn *that Church* to be the Church of a *whole City* how great soever, and therefore to have been *Diocesan* not *Parochial*. And for the Argument from *Experience*, though it will hold well enough as I have managed it, that *discipline* has once been preserved under a *Diocesan Government*, therefore it may be so again; yet not *vice versa* as you do, *discipline is not observed*, (for this is all the *undeniable experience* you so much insist on) therefore it cannot.

M Y instance of "*Ulphilas* Bishop of ¶ LXIV
 "the whole Nation of the *Goths*, which
 "sure were greater than one *Parish*, you
 "seem to deny, when you say he was
 "Bishop onely of a *few Goths*, who were
 "presently persecuted to the death by
 "*Athanasius*, (*ut Socrat. l. 4. c. 32.*)
 "which few you say I may call a King-
 "dom if I please. But the number were
 "not so small as you suppose; for they
 "were *converted* long before they were
 "persuaded to the *Arrian Communion*, which
 "was no sooner than the time of *Valens*,
 "when

when *Eudoxius* prevailed with *Ulphilas* to bring them to it. For they were vanquished by *Constantine*, and by admiration of his success against themselves were drawn to embrace his *Religion*, to which they imputed his *victories* so strange beyond their expectation; and accordingly had a former Bishop in their Nation one *Theophilus* before *Ulphilas*, so that though even at the first the Nation, that is, at least the *generality* of them were converted to *Christianity*; yet before the time you speak of they had a considerable time to allow for further *propagation*. And accordingly when *Ulphilas* was brought over to the *Arrians*, he is said to have separated τὸ πᾶν οὗτο, (an expression certainly as *comprehensive* as that I used of a *Kingdom*) from the *Communion* of the *Catholick Church*. For his Authority is described to have been so great with the *Goths*, as that they took his words for *irrefragable Laws*, and yet certainly was not so great with any but *converted Christians*. But you say, *They were presently persecuted to the death by Athanaricus*. If you mean this as an Argument that they were *few*, because they were presently *extirpated by persecution*, you are certainly mistaken. For

Atha-

Soc. l. i. c.
18.

ib. l. ii. c.
41.

Sozom. l.
6. c. 37.

Theod. l. 4.
c. 37.
Sozom. l.
6. c. 37.

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Athanasius his storm lasted not long, but upon *Phritigernes* his return, who by the assistance of the *Romans* prevailed against them, the *Christian Religion* again returned, and was countenanced and so far advanced, as that in their Invasions of the *Roman Empire* afterwards in *Honorius* his time their *Army* was generally *Christian*; which could not have probably been, if they had been extirpated by *Athanasius*. But you say, That *Ulphilas* was an *Arian*. But, 1. If he had been so, yet that cannot weaken his Authority in our present case, both because this practice of a *Nations* having but one *Bishop*, is never reckoned by the *Heresiographers* as a point of *Arianism*, nor as a singularity of the *Arians* themselves upon personal accounts. Nay, my other instances of *Tiramentus* and *Moses* were both *Catholicks*; nay, the *Goths* themselves whilest *Catholicks* had the same form of Government that is, till *Ulphilas* was wrought on by *Eudoxius*. Till that time not onely his Predecessor *Theophilus*, but himself maintained the *Nicene Faith* in opposition to the *Arian Communion*, and yet in all likelyhood they were not much less numerous when *Catholicks* than when *Arians*; for the

Socr. Hist.

Eccl. 4.33

Socr. 4.37.

Y

whole

whole Nation which is said by him to have been reconciled to the *Arian Communion*, were in all likelihood none but *Christians*, and therefore *Catholicks*, seeing they seem at that time to have been *unanimous*. But, 2. It does not appear that he was a *real Arian*. I confess he did communicate with the *Arians*, and that not onely with the more moderate *Homousians*, but also with those who owned *Christ* to be a creature, and by degrees from communicating with the *Arians* the *Goths* afterwards used the *Arian* Forms of speaking, and from them proceeded to embrace much of their Opinion, and so at length alienated themselves from the *Catholick Communion*, as appears in their *later persecutions* of the *Catholicks* in *Italy* and *Africa*. But at first the very reason that prevailed with *Ulphilas* was, that *Eudoxius* pretended the difference betwixt themselves and the *Catholicks* to be ἐν φιλονικίᾳ ὁρῶν.

Theod. ubi τῶν δὲ μὴ σεμίαν δὲ διαρροῖαν, as *Theodoret* shews, and *Sozomen* censures his proceeding herein as done ἀσεβῶς, as *inconsiderate* rather than out of any ill design. And there were other *deceits* as *disingenuous* as this used by the *Arians*, to draw such to their *Communion* who were known *really*

ally to retain the *Nicene Faith*. You know how the greatest part of the *Latine Fathers* were imposed on in the *Council of Ariminum* by *Valens* and *Ursacius*, who read *ὁμολογῶ* instead of *ὁμολογῶν* in the *Nicene Creed*, and how a *Confession* of their *Faith* was drawn up by them at *Nice* in *Thrace*, and imposed on the *Catholicks* under the name of the famous *Nicene Creed of Bithynia*. So that there were two reasons that in those Ages prevailed with some *Catholicks* to communicate with the *Arians*; one that the first quarrel betwixt *Alexander* and *Arius* was thought onely personal, not on account of any *real difference*, at least that that betwixt the *later Arians* and the *Catholicks* was so; another was that, if there was any *real difference*, yet it was rather in *expressions mutually misunderstood*, than in *things*, or at least in things not conceived sufficiently *momentous* to divide *Communion*. As therefore you would not I believe in your own *practice* have it concluded, that you are an *Independent* or *Prelatist*, because you are for *communicating* with such as are so, but onely that you think our *differences* unworthy that the *Churches peace* should be broken for them; so you cannot conclude

that *Ulphilas* was an *Arian*, because he communicated with such as *were*, but onely that he thought the Controversies too *trivial*. Nor can you blame him for thinking them trivial, seeing he was persuaded they were nothing but *words*. Nor is such his *communion* the least intimation of his deserting the *Catholick Doctrine*, seeing he embraced them no further than he conceived them *not to differ* from what he had *formerly believed*. Nor need you think it so strange in *Ulphilas*,

Of this kind of Dispensation even in *matters of faith* see Examples of *S. Greg. Naz. S. Basil, Maximus in Petr. de Marc. l. 3. de concord. Sac. & Imper. c. 13. sect. 10, 11.*

for I verily believe that there were very many more in *Constantine's* time, especially who did not seem to condemn or desert the *Catholick Doctrine*, but were unwilling to separate *Communion* for any *unscriptural expression* whatsoever, where they conceived the *sense* secure; and did as much censure the *Arian* Forms of *ὁμοῖσι* and *ἀνόμοι*, as the *Catholick* *ὁμοῖσι* of being *unscriptural*. So that their whole design seems to have been, that persons agreeing in things might not disagree about words, which I believe you will not disapprove.

¶ LXV. TO my other instance of a *National*, at least much greater than *Parochial Church*,

Church, under *one Bishop*, that of the *Indians*, (not the *Persians*, as you mistake) both *converted and governed* by *Frumentius*, you say, "It is easie to gather by the History how *few* of them were then converted. If you mean, that they were so *few*, that they might conveniently resort to one place of meeting, (which we mean by a *Parish*) the contrary is so manifest from the places, as I believe you would not have said otherwise, if you had been pleased to have consulted them. *Socrates* plainly mentions *Socr. l. i. c.* one *ἐκκλησίαν* founded before *Frumentius* ^{19.} was consecrated their *Bishop* by *S. Athanasius*; but after his return to them with *Episcopal power*, he as plainly says, that he founded *many more*. *Sozomen* says, *Soz. l. ii.* that he did *ἐκκλησίας ὅτινες ἀποδοῦναι* in the ^{c. 24.} Plural Number; *Theodoret*, that *πληθύνουσιν* *Theod. l. i.* καὶ ἐκκλησίαν ἡμετέραν ἐξέδωκεν, which appears ^{c. 23.} also from *Ruffinus*, who had the relation from *Ædesius* himself, who was the Companion of *Frumentius*. To my third instance of *Moses*, all that you answer is, that its likely he had as few among the *Arabians*, there being no mention in the History of any thing to persuade us, that he had *many Churches* under him, that you remember. *Sozomen's* words

Soz. l. 4. c. 38. concerning him are, πολλὰς χριστιανίας παρὰ
 οὐδ' αὖτε κοινῶν δαίμονες ἐν ᾧ τὸ δόγμα τῷ μεταχρόνῳ.

Theod. l. 4. c. 1. Theodoret is indeed indefinite, but yet his
 words are such as imply a very considera-

ble multitude; τὰ ἀρχιεπισκοπικὰ εἰς Ἀξάδωνος περὶ
 τοῦ αἰτήσαντος παρεχόμεν, καὶ τῶν Ἀποστολικῶν διδασκα-
 λῶν καὶ τῶν σαυροφυλάκων, περὶ τῶν ἀλλήλων ἐποδίστησεν.
 For if they had been but *few* who were
 converted by him, it is not likely that
 the expressions would have been so *unli-*
mitted, having before spoken of the *whole*
Nation, who had desired him by their
 Princes *Maria*.

¶ LXVI AFTER these instances of *great num-*
bers under the *Jurisdiction of single Bi-*
shops, I at length applied them to my
 purpose, observing that they were *so*
many, yet *discipline* was not dissolved.
 To this you answer, "1. That in all this
 "I leave out a matter of chief considera-
 "tion, *viz.* That all the *Presbyters* then
 "were *Assistants in discipline*, and had a
 "true *Church Government*, which now
 "they have not. If you mean such *Go-*
vernment as you count *true*, in respect of
 their *Parishioners*, this you know is not
 denied them; they have a power of exe-
 cuting their *Ordinaries commands* among
 them, and to discharge their *own* office,
 though with *dependence* on the *Bishop*,
 which

which is as much as is consistent with an *Ecclesiastical Monarchick Government*, and is an *assistance* sufficient to enable an *Ecclesiastical* as well as a *Secular Monarch* to preserve *discipline*. If such as is *true* in respect of the *Government* in general; even this they have in the *lower houses* of our *Convocations*. So that all that you can complain of among us as dissonant from the *primitive example*, is that they are not indeed assistant at their *Bishops counsels* in every particular *act of discipline*. This you may remember I wished reformed, but as it is I cannot conceive it so extremely *prejudicial to discipline*, as to excuse the want of it under a *Diocesan Government*. For even among us the *Bishop*, or he who *represents* him, (though for my part I could wish that he would act *personally* without such *Representatives*) does not give sentence in particular *acts of discipline* without *counsel*, and that *counsel* qualified with such *requisites* as would make *Presbyters* fit to assist in it, that is, *skill in the Canon Laws* and *prudence in Government*; so that their being also *ordained persons* would onely prove an advantage of *decorum*, not of *material influence on Government*. Certainly unless *Clergymen* were better *skilled*

in these things, than I doubt they are commonly, their onely being *Clergiemen* would not so conveniently fit them for service in this kind, if wanting those other more *essential qualifications*, as their having them though wanting *Orders*. So that of the two evils which follow their disunion in the same persons this seems to be the *less*. But if you think no *assistance* sufficient, but such as may make them *independent* on their *Bishop*, that I have proved as far from the *practice* of those *earlier ages* as of the present.

IXVII. 2. YOU say, "It's strange that we
 " that have *eyes and ears* must be sent to
 " the *Persians* (you mean the *Indians*)
 " and *ancient History*, to know whether
 " one *Bishop* can hear, and try, and ad-
 " monish so many *thousands* at once, as
 " we see by *experience* are those *objects* of
 " *discipline*, which the Scripture descri-
 " beth; and when we see that it is not
 " done. But all this need not have been
 " thought *so strange*, if you had remem-
 " bered the true *state of the question*; that it
 " was not whether *discipline* were *actually*
 " maintained by our *Diocesan Government*?
 " but whether it *could not* possibly be main-
 " tained under it? and that it does no way
 fol-

follow that it *cannot* because it is *not*. That although this argument *ab actu ad potentiam negativè* (which is yours) do not hold, yet mine which proceeds *affirmatively* will, That *discipline* has actually been maintained under a *Diocesan Government*, therefore it is still *possible* to be maintained under it. That for concluding this *possibility* it is not requisite that it must be maintained *in all times and places*, but it is sufficient that it was in *any*, and that sure may be proved as well by *ancient and exotick Histories*, as by those which are *modern and of our own Country*. And for shewing the *possibility*, I have already proved, that so many *thousands* may as well be *disciplined* by one *Ecclesiastical* as one *Secular Monarch*. That of those many *thousand objects of discipline* you conceive described in the Scripture, many are onely Objects of *private cognizance*, which is not denied to ordinary *Parish Ministers*. That they who are of *publick* are not so extremely *numerous*, or if they were, they may be dealt with as in *Seculars*, some punished *in terrorem*, and others equally guilty permitted to escape without any great charge of *partiality*, than what is ordinarily thought *equitable* in great multitudes by *secular*
per-

persons. And that of those which remain, it is not so requisite that all be tried at once, and that one must hinder the procedure against the other. But after all this you say, "We have talked
 "but of a Phantasm; for it is not *one Bishop* but *one Layman*, a *Chancellour*, that
 "useth this *decretory power* of the Keys,
 "&c. and that the *Bishop* rarely meddleth
 "with it. Still you forget that I did in my former Letter expressly decline this Controversie, and intimated that our present question was not concerning the *decorum of the person*, but the *possibility of discipline* under him; (and sure you will not deny that a *Laymans* abilities for Government may be as great as a *Clergie-mans*, whence it will follow, that *discipline* may as well be preserved under him;) that our question was concerning *Diocesan Government* as such, that is, as including under it the *Cures of several Presbyters*, to which this office of *Lay-chancellour* is accidental. The business of the *Covenant* I am unwilling to engage in, because I do not know whether it can be done conveniently without offence. Your *Explication* of my *Information* concerning the words [*consent to the use, &c.*] in the *Act for Uniformity*, I
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verily believe to be *true*, both because you say it, and because it doth not deny, but onely give a further account of some passages not mentioned by my worthy *Author* ; and because the word [*use*] is omitted in the *Form* it self, though mentioned immediately before. What the Reasons were that were urged by the *House of Commons* for proving them *intolerable* I know not, nor have been informed by you ; yet I could conjecture several that were very apposite and expedient, notwithstanding they might not intend to oblige to an *internal assent*, in case *exteriour peaceable acquiescency*, as it is usually understood by *Conformists* themselves ; and that they did not intend to exclude *peaceable Conformists*, though otherwise not satisfied of the *expediencie* of every *single Imposition*, seems very credible, because there is not the least intimation of so rigid an exposition as that is which is mentioned by you, *That you must never endeavour any alteration, no not by a request or word*. All that is desired is, that you would not, while you are a private person, endeavour any further than by *request and words* ; (as indeed you cannot lawfully and justly do without encroaching on the offices

offices of others, which cannot be excused by the conceived justice of your cause.) That you would give leave, when all is done, to the *persons requested* by you to judge of the *reasonableness* of your *requests*, not obliging them to act by *yours* but their *own consciences*, which when all is done must be the measure of their own proceedings. That in case of their dissent from you, you neither *raise parties* against them, nor *encourage* them that do by communicating with them. That you would in such a case not easily conclude the error to be in your *Superiours*, considering that your *self* are at least as *fallible* as they; or if you did indeed think the cause so *evident*, as might justly warrant your dissent, (as I confess that there are some degrees of *evidence* to private persons sufficient to counter-vail any *authority* whatsoever) yet that you would use no *other means* for prevailing against the conceived prejudices of *Governours*, than such as would become the modesty of a *private person*, powerful *persuasions* and hearty *prayers*. That even in such cases they would give *active obedience* in things *not sinful*, and *passive* in such as were. This behaviour would salve the difficulties on both sides,

would

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would both preserve the *peace of the Church*, and the *peace of a Dissenters conscience*, if invincibly persuaded; would minister more comfort to him, and satisfy him of his own sincerity in designing the *glory of God*, when there were less suspicions of any ends of his *own*; and his *sufferings* for the *peace of the Church* would be as glorious and rewardable, if we may believe *S. Cyprian*, as if they were for the *faith of the Church*.

IF I had been dealing with a person less zealous and industrious for this *peace* d
LXVIII than you have approved your self by publick Monuments, it had here been seasonable to have conjured you by all that is or can be dear to a *Lover of God*, or of the *honour of Religion*; by all your *sacred or civil Interests*, by your respects either to the *Church or Country* of your birth and education, which are not more prejudiced by any thing than our *Ecclesiastical Divisions*; that you would be pleased to lay out those great Talents of *Parts and Interest in the Peoples Affections*, wherewith God has so abundantly enriched you, on the *reconciliation of the people with themselves* and with their *Governours*, (I am confident you would find that a more effectual course of promoting

ting discipline, for which you are so zealous, than the *unsettlement* of the *present* and *forcible Establishment* of another Form of Government as much maligned as this when it has prevailed, and has attempted the execution of discipline.) That you would consider it as your greatest security, to be *inquisitor and wary* in a cause of so dangerous consequence, if you should prove mistaken, and your greatest honour to *yield to truth*, and to *relinquish any opinions*, how long maintained, or how dear soever, when they shall appear to be *erroneous*. That you would be pleased in order thereunto, to consider impartially what I confess has here been weakly represented, not as an *adversary* to my cause; but as a diligent *enquirer after truth*, where ever it may be found, as our most serious *common interest*. That therefore you would excuse my failings in the *impropriety of words*, and correct those that may be found in the *disadvantage of my management*, and consider all not according to the *unskilfulness of my proposal*, but the *nature, strength, and evidence of the Arguments themselves*, as discoverable in order to your own satisfaction, by your own more discerning judgment. That you would beware of precipitancy in resolving,

to Mr. Baxter.

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ving, and of tenaciousness in *maintaining* insufficiently grounded *resolutions*, in a question of so great consequence for *ca-tholick peace*. These (I say) and the like Topicks might have been urged and insisted on to *another*, that had been less *skilful or sincere*; but to you I believe it is sufficient to have *intimated them*, rather as *warnings* what you may avoid, than as *instructions* in what you need to be informed. I shall therefore recommend the whole success to God, who has often *manifested strength out of the mouths of babes and sucklings*, and to your own ingenuous and pious *industry and favourable judgment*, in an affair so nearly concerning the *Churches peace*, and the *good of Souls*, for which you are deservedly so zealous; and conclude, onely desiring the continuance of your *prayers* (if I have already impetrated any portion in them) for

Your sincerely affectionate

Friend and Servant,

Trin. Coll. near Dublin,
June 26. 1673.

HENRY DODWELL!

LETTER III.

The Contents.

Reasons of delaying this Answer, ¶ 1. Endeavours to prevent his displeasure, ¶ 2. Advices then against some Intimations of his of publishing our Letters, ¶ 3. My unwillingness to differ from him in any thing tolerable, ¶ 4. The Charge of SCHISM briefly stated against them, ¶ 5. A pathetical Application of all that had been said to Mr. Baxter, ¶ 6.

Reverend Sir,

¶ I.

IT is now some considerable time since I received a short Letter of yours, assuring me of your receipt of my former larger Reply to yours. But partly in expectation of a *larger Answer* to the body of mine, and partly because I thought you a little offended at my former *freedom*, and because I was jealous how things never so innocently

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intended might have been *understood*, till a little time had abated the *resentment*; and because I *was*, and I hope ever *shall* be, very unwilling to give an *occasion*, though I be conscious of no *cause of disturbance* to a person so *pious and peaceable*, and who has already exposed himself so freely to the persecuting *pens and tongues* of the exasperated Zealots of the several *parties*, for his desire to bring them to a *mutual better understanding*, I have deferred my Answer hitherto.

I AM really sorry to see our *misunderstandings* still so *continued*, possibly through my *obscurity*; for otherwise I think there is nothing new objected by you, but what I think I might have referred you to the several *Paragraphs* where I endeavoured to answer it, which yet you take not the least notice of. You may perceive how far I have been from any thing that might favour of *arrogance*; how I have therefore waved those *principal disputes*, which I perceived had *principally alienated* you from our *Communion*; and how I have engaged on none but such whither you seemed your self to *invite* me, and how even there I have behaved my self, though indeed *freely*, (which I have always looked on the in-

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dispensable.

¶ II.

dispensable duty of a *virtuous friend*, and I presumed you to be of my mind) yet with all possible respect to your *person*, and submission in matters of *private concernment*, and acknowledgment of my *mistakes* where convicted. I had never so much as mentioned these things, if I had not been necessitated to it for your *satisfaction* and my own *defence*. If I have spoken any thing which might be capable of an *ill construction*, and may be spared without prejudice to the *merit of my cause*; I do again most heartily retract it, and submit to your own correction, if you be pleased to let me know the particulars. For I desire to have no other Contentions with you, but that which I believe you will not be offended with, the φιλονικία ναυαρχειν, an *emulation* who shall most contribute to a *solid peace*. These things I hope may satisfy a mind more *displeased*, and less *influenced with Christianity*, than yours, whom I find very well disposed even in the height of these little *resentments*; and I hope we shall both of us defeat the Devils policy, in turning those things which he intended as *provocations*, into grounds of a future *mutual endearment*.

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§ III.

ONE very good expedient to this purpose will be, not to be too forward to publish any thing on either side, both because there are several *acknowledged mistakes*, which I would not have by any means obtruded on the *publick*, (I mean in my *own papers*, for I do not undertake to censure *yours*;) and many things may be further cultivated, and I think we may both of us be more willing to *yield to truth*, whilest our Disputes are managed with due *privacy and candour*.

§ IV.

I HAVE always and still do profess my self unwilling to engage in any Disputes of private *personal opinions* with you, that may either be defended or denied without breach of *mutual charity*; and that I have been necessitated to such unhappy ones as divide *external communion*, though I believe they do on both sides leave room for *personal charity*: as I am sorry for it, so it is my duty to my dear *Mother the Church*, my love to *real peace*, which I am sorry to see you as pernicious to in your *consequences*, as you are zealous for in your directly *professed principles*, the very same things which have made me *love and honour* you, that have here obliged me to contradict you. And therefore I hope you will give me,

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if

if not your *ear*, yet your *pardon*.

¶ V. IF *onely Heresie* could oblige to *separate communion*, and there were no such thing as *Schism*; then I do confess that your plea for the *external communion* of all that agree in *matters fundamental*, would be more satisfactory; or if all *Schism* were onely in the *overvaluing of lesser differences*. But considering that God has made the *Christian Church* not onely a multitude of *Christians* agreeing in their assent to several *propositions*, like the followers of *Plato* or *Aristotle*, but a *body politick*, consisting of *Governours and Governed*, united in an *exteriour way of profession* in *Creeds and Sacraments*, and empowered with an *authority of depriving refractory persons of the benefits of Communion*, for the onely crime of *disobedience*, though the instance wherein *obedience* were required, were otherwise of no very considerable consequence. And considering that all the *Sects* were at first subject to the *Jurisdiction of the Church*, which was conformable to all *other times and places*, where there has been any such *society as a Church*, (as far as *History* can inform us, for all *Blondell's vast reading and diligence*, when thoroughly examined, will not afford you a different example) in

in that very *form of Government* from which they separated ; the question will not be whether a *Surplice*, &c. be necessary to be *imposed* ? but whether the first *Separators* could be excused for their *disobedience* to a *Government* so firmly settled by so long and so peaceable a *prescription*, under whose *Jurisdiction* themselves were born ? not whether *Episcopacy* be the *form* established by God as *obligatory* on all, where they are supposed in their own *liberty of choice* ? but whether it be not *lawful to submit* to it ? or whether *Subjects* can be excused for their *disobedience* to a *Government*, under whose *Jurisdiction* they are born, if acknowledged as *lawful*, though not most *perfect* ? not whether *Episcopacy* ought to be changed ? but whether *Subjects* could *lawfully* do it without the consent of *Superiours* ? whether *Subjects* erecting a new *form of Government*, independent on that of the *Bishop* within his *Jurisdiction*, be so much as *passive obedience* ? whether if it be not, it can be an excuse from the guilt of *Schism* ? whether *erecting an altar* in opposition to the *one altar* of the *Bishop*, be not the very notion of *Schism* condemned by the *Church* as such, as soon as *Eccelesiastical History* informs us of any such

Z 3 thing

thing as *Schism* in the world? whether by this way of proceeding there be any security for the future against the enterprizes of any *factious person*, that shall pretend the discovery of a new form of *Government*, either in *substance* or in any *indifferent circumstance*, to hinder the *infinite* propagation of *Schism*? whether if the *first Separators* had no power to do so, they could *propagate* any to their *Successors*? whether if they could not, the *present* case be not the same as *formerly*? whether your *communicating with Schismatics* do not countenance them, and involve you in the *guilt of it*?

¶ VI.

IF there be any such thing as *Schism* in opposition to *Ecclesiastical Government*, I beseech you consider how it is *possible* to be committed, if not by the means now mentioned? For *Gods* sake, for your *Souls* sake, for the *Churches* sake, I beg of you as on my *bended knees*, that as there is no reason that you should receive these things, so you would not reject them for *my sake*, because the *proponent* is contemptible. The question is not, whether you should be of my opinion? but whether you should not beware of being *guilty of the sin of Schism*, and being *accessary* to those *divisions* which you do so *seriously*

to Mr. Baxter:

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ously deplore? Our Saviour did not *deny* the *Scripture* when quoted by the *Devil*, and I hope you will not disown the *truth* from a *Christian*, though *weak and unworthy* to be called so. *S. Augustine*, who was a *great writer* as you have been, never got more honour by any than by his *Retractions*. And I know I need not tell you, that no *victory* is more glorious than to be *overcome by truth*. I intreat you excuse my *eagerness* in this affair, and believe it to proceed from nothing so much as from a hearty *affection to your person*, and an ambition of a *near union* to you, in the truly solid bonds of *catholick unity*, who might by your example be highly instrumental in the recovery of many Souls from that dangerous *sin of Schism*, of which too many are too little sensible. If I may any way prevail on you in these things, impose what *penance* you please for other *errors or imprudences*, whether *real or conceived to be so*, on

Your sincerely affectionate
Friend and Servant,

HENRY DODWELL.

Postscript.

S*Ince my Letter to Mr. Baxter, which gave him warning of my design to publish these, he has hastened out an old Discourse written before my Letters, which he will needs have pass for an Answer to my Letters, which were written afterwards. He cannot pretend it to make any Application to most of the particulars of mine: all therefore that he can truly so much as pretend, is onely that it is virtually an Answer, by disproving my Answers by such principles as are unanswerable by any principles laid down by mine, or by a further proof of his own assertions. But he is the person who accepts not of such virtual Answers from his Adversary. Otherwise why is he still so clamorous for Answers to Voetius and his own Disputations of Church-government? For what is there in either of them (as far as I am concerned, who am not concerned for any of the peculiar ways, by which the Romanists manage this same Argument, not now to mention the many other particulars, which peculiarly relate*

to the singular ways of stating the same Questions, in other Protestant, or even Episcopal, Authors, which are notwithstanding nor made use of by me) but what has already been sufficiently provided for by the principles of my former Discourse?

But I will not deal so hardly with him as he does with me. I accept even of virtual Answers where I can find them. What has he therefore said to the Subjects of the two Particulars which himself mentions as the summe of my Letters? Has he produced any thing new, to shew that his Arguments to prove the impossibility of Ecclesiastical Discipline, in a Diocese consisting of a number of Presbyters proportionable to the populousness of the Diocese, but obnoxious to the curb and Ecclesiastical coercion of the Diocesan Bishop, do not as validly overthrow the possibility of the like Secular Discipline under a Monarch of a District equal to a Diocese, with the like assistance of subordinate Governours? Has he proved that it is more the Bishops office to take a personal care of every Soul in his Diocese, than it is the Monarchs to secure the Lives and Fortunes of every Subject in his Dominions? Has he offered any further proof, that any thing in the Bishops Office does oblige him to discharge his Office to every Individual

dividual in his own person, more than the like office of the Magistrate does him to be particularly acquainted with all the cases of his particular Subjects? Has he shewn that it is any more a culpable delegation of the Episcopal Office, to imploy others in the care of those many numbers in a Diocese, to which no care of a single person can extend, than it is in a Prince that he does not personally arrest and punish every particular Offender? Till these things, or something equivalent to these, be urged with greater force than they were in those Letters of his which were answered by mine, and urged in such a way as may prevent the Answers which may be given by the principles laid down here; I cannot in equity think my self obliged to make particular applications to such Answers as afford no matter for further improvement or discovery.

The other particular insisted on by me was, that in those primitive times, wherein discipline did most remarkably flourish, the Government of the Church was notwithstanding Diocesan; which plainly shews that discipline is still practicable under a Diocesan Government. And what has he done new for avoiding this consequence? Does he deny that discipline was then practised? This he does not that I know deny,
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concerning those earliest ages, of which we are at present disputing. Does he therefore deny that the Government then was Diocesan? This is all he aims at. But what has he produced new, for disproving what I have here said to prove it so? He still repeats his old Assertion, that ~~was~~ then was equivalent to our present Market Towns of one Parish. But I see nothing new produced to disprove what I have said to prove mine, that Cities then were walled and incorporated, and included the Jurisdiction of the Countrey that belonged to them, and were generally in those places which were converted by the Apostles, as great if not more great and populous, as ours are now; and consisting of as great numbers of Christians of one denomination. And certainly those Cities, which had generally been Commonwealths, including their Jurisdiction in the Country subject to them, how small soever he will fancy the Cities themselves to have been, were yet too numerous to meet particularly in Assemblies so frequently as Christians did meet then, and in such times of jealousy from an otherwise perswaded Government. I have also proved the same from the multitude of Presbyteries assisting the Bishop, of which no imaginable account could have been given if a Bi-

dividual *in his own person, more than the like office of the Magistrate does him to be particularly acquainted with all the cases of his particular Subjects? Has he shewn that it is any more a culpable delegation of the Episcopal Office, to imploy others in the care of those many numbers in a Diocese, to which no care of a single person can extend, than it is in a Prince that he does not personally arrest and punish every particular Offender? Till these things, or something equivalent to these, be urged with greater force than they were in those Letters of his which were answered by mine, and urged in such a way as may prevent the Answers which may be given by the principles laid down here; I cannot in equity think my self obliged to make particular applications to such Answers as afford no matter for further improvement or discovery.*

The other particular insisted on by me was, that in those primitive times, wherein discipline did most remarkably flourish, the Government of the Church was notwithstanding Diocesan; which plainly shews that discipline is still practicable under a Diocesan Government. And what has he done new for avoiding this consequence? Does he deny that discipline was then practised? This he does not that I know deny,
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concerning those earliest ages, of which we are at present disputing. Does he therefore deny that the Government then was Diocesan? This is all he aims at. But what has he produced new, for disproving what I have here said to prove it so? He still repeats his old Assertion, that ~~was~~ then was equivalent to our present Market Towns of one Parish. But I see nothing new produced to disprove what I have said to prove mine, that Cities then were walled and incorporated, and included the Jurisdiction of the Countrey that belonged to them, and were generally in those places which were converted by the Apostles, as great if not more great and populous, as ours are now; and consisting of as great numbers of Christians of one denomination. And certainly those Cities, which had generally been Commonwealths, including their Jurisdiction in the Country subject to them, how small soever he will fancy the Cities themselves to have been, were yet too numerous to meet particularly in Assemblies so frequently as Christians did meet then, and in such times of jealousy from an otherwise perswaded Government. I have also proved the same from the multitude of Presbyteries assisting the Bishop, of which no imaginable account could have been given if a
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Bishops charge had been then no greater than could have been discharged by a single person, even this himself acknowledges from Ignatius, yet does not see how inconsistently with his own Hypothesis, nor does he offer to give the least account of it. I have observed that the multitude of Church-governours was proportionably as great then as now, but that the allotting each Presbyter his particular Cure, as it is now done by the distinction of Parishes, is in truth a more convenient expedient for making the Government practicable. I have shewn that his own decryed Instances of Rome and Alexandria are the onely Instances in all Antiquity, of Churches fitted and confined to the management of single persons. I have given an account how so great multitudes might notwithstanding communicate from the same Altar. To all these things I find nothing here replied, nor is it likely that he thought of them in a Book written so long before mine.

In short, though he have indeed produced more Instances, yet I see none but what are reducible to the same Topicks, and are therefore already answered in generally speaking to those Topicks. I find neither any new Arguments, nor any further Improvements of old ones, much less any satisfactory account
of

of my Arguments or contrary Assertions. So that if this be all he has to say, I see no reason why I may not leave it to the Reader to judge between us. These are my present thoughts on a cursory view of the design and management of his Book, that part especially wherein I am more particularly concerned. However I do not prejudge either the Reader or my self, if upon a close perusal any thing do yet appear, that may deserve a further examination, more than I see yet any reason to expect. I shall be thankful to him who will tell me what it is. O that it would please God to awaken this good mans former zeal for solid peace and piety! Those are things for which his Talents serve better than they do for Controversie. How much rather would I serve him in the meanest offices that might be really subservient to these things, than thus contend with him in these unedifying dividing Disputations?

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F I N I S.

A Catalogue of some Books sold
by Benjamin Tooke at the Ship in
S. Pauls Churchyard.

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Francisci Suarez Tractatus de Legibus ac Deo
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hominibus non minus utilis quam necessarius. Folio.

Herbert. Thorndicus de Ratione ac Jure finiendi
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